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In the years before the Civil War, Massachusetts underwent a great social
and economic transformation. Agriculture declined as a source of state income
and rural areas lost population. Changes in the factory system lead to the
creation of a large, permanent laboring force of Irish, dependent on daily
wages for survival. The status of Massachusetts' artisans was imperiled by
absentee ownership and new technology. Economic power gravitated to a small
group of textile magnates who also gained influence over cultural, educational,
and political institutions. The political history of the fifteen years before
the Civil War is largely a contest between these Cotton Whigs and those who
resented the changes in Massachusetts society. As long as the Cotton Whigs
were able to clothe themselves in the mantle of social and moral conservatism
they were able to dominate the politics of the state. But when the slavery
issue made the Cotton Whigs appear to place their economic interests above
their ethical sensibilities, their antagonists seized the opportunity to dis-
place them. Republicans, who represented the middle-class voters of the
small towns and the countryside, became Massachusetts' new dominant political
force.
Having consolidated their hold over Massachusetts by 1857, the Republi-
cans turned their attention toward the presidential selection of 1860.
Initially they feared that the Harpers Ferry raid would upset their carefully
laid plans. But after success in the 1359 elections, Massachusetts Republi-
cans began to look more favorably at John Brown, seeing in him the incarnation
of their Puritan values. During the election of 1850, Massachusetts Republi-
cans were careful to mute the divisions within their party and campaigned upon
the moderate platform of anti-extensionism. Initially the Massachusetts
Republicans refused to concede the significance of the secession movement.
Their opponents attempted to use the political crisis to divide the Republi-
can party. However, no serious economic panic occurred in Massachusetts and
the state's Congressmen generally ignored conservative pressure to compromise.
Conservative mobs silenced abolitionist meetings but their efforts merely
helped the abolitionists achieve a new respectability. The Massachusetts
Republican party came closest to dividing itself when Charles Francis Adams
proposed the admission of New Mexico to statehood, a proposal denounced by
the radicals.
Massachusetts radical Republicans and abolitionists shared considerable
common ground. The Garrisonians believed that the election of Lincoln was
their victory as well. They welcomed the secession crisis and believed that
they had been instrumental in weakening Massachusetts' devotion to the Union.
Massachusetts blacks likewise welcomed the crisis as an opportunity to abolish
slavery, but feared that compromisers might seek to limit their own rights,
earned after decades of struggle.
There was a close relationship between the social and economic com-
position of Massachusetts' churches and their teachings on slavery and
politics. Conservative clergymen argued that Christians should regard the
Constitution as divinely inspired and viewed disunion as a threat to moral-
ity, order, and even Protestantism itself. But many reformist ministers
wondered if the Union had outlived its usefulness and saw the crisis
as
punishment for the nation's sins. Of all the denominations, the most
con-
servative on slavery was the Catholic Church. Seeing a
connection between
antislavery and nativism, Irish Catholics gravitated toward the
Southern
cause. They hoped to prove their loyalty to their adopted country by fidelity
to the Union in a time of crisis.
Massachusetts political conservatives defined their identity by refer-
ence to the Union, but Republicans considered themselves as New Englanders
first. Most Massachusetts Republicans did not believe the Union was worth
sacrifice of party principles. Thus they fought modification of the state's
Personal Liberty Laws, opposed the adoption of the Crittenden Compromise,
and obstructed the Washington Peace Convention. Many were willing to allow
the South to leave in peace as long as secession was accomplished through
orderly and legal means.
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CHAPTER I
WORKING MEN AND MILLIONAIRES
Massachusetts, on the eve of the Civil War, was a society in the
throes of a great social and economic transformation. The Commonwealth
was no longer the homogenous, agricultural society of her Puritan past.
As the dams went up along the Connecticut and Merrimack rivers and hill
town farmers and Irish peasants streamed into the cities, thoughtful •
men in Massachusetts wondered if traditional New England values could
survive. The rude Irishman with his authoritarian church, unclean .cities
with their vices and temptations, the new breed of factory worker who
depended on his boss for sustenance--al 1 seemed to threaten the temDerate
self-reliance that was the hallmark of the Yankee way of life.
No figure in Yankee folklore is more predominant than the sturdy
independent farmer. He had wrested the Bay Colony from the wilderness.
As minuteman, he drove out the British oppressor. He was responsible
for his own destiny, free from servile relationships. But the ante-
bellum years were not easy for the Massachusetts farmer. In the hill
towns of Western Massachusetts the thin soil eroded; and the farmers
followed the streams which had washed away their soil into the valleys.
In the decade of the 1850's ninety-five towns in the Commonwealth lost
population; some like Wendell and New Salem in Franklin County diminished
by almost a quarter. Pel ham, despairing of its decline, voted to sur-
render its charter of incorporation. These towns, avoided by the rail-
roads, had become isolated backwaters. Many of their fields turned once
again into woodlots, as the new agricultural machinery— so useful on the
2broad level prairies of the West—was unsuited to the small, rocky
fields of the New England hills.
1
The factories that began to open in the 1830 's brought with them
some opportunities to the farmer. Once operating on essentially a
subsistence basis, certain farmers could take advantage of new markets
which the mill towns provided. In areas of the Connecticut Valley and
in Worcester and Essex counties, farmers discovered that the rivers
which provided relatively fertile soil also attracted consumers of agri-
cultural products. As the mills grew so did market crops such as
2
cereals, pork, beef, and wool.
But the economic expansion that created these new markets soon
destroyed them. The building of the western railroads brought the New
England farmer into competition with areas far more suited to the pro-
duction of these staples than his own land. The Massachusetts sheep herd
of 1850 was barely a third of its 1840 size. By the mid-1 850 's more than
half the state's beef came from the VJest and its oroduction of pork and
3
cereals had becone a relatively minor industry.
It would be a serious misstatement, however, to suggest that Mass-
achusetts' agriculture was in a state of collapse. Some new products,
such as apples, cranberries, and tobacco, helped take up the slack. In
areas such as the Connecticut River Valley, whose rich soil was amenable
to new techniques, the farmers prospered. From 1845 to 1855 the value of
agricultural production in Massachusetts rose from $22,590,000 to
$37,867,000. But these figures also tell a different story. In 1845,
agriculture accounted for nineteen percent of Massachusetts' productive
wealth; but in 1855 it provided only thirteen percent. In addition, the
1855 statistics show that agriculture was in the' hands of fewer individuals
3working in fewer towns. Only individuals in those areas favored with
fertile soil could make agriculture a field for ambition. Other
farmers were forced either to accept the prospect of a static economic
life or leave their homesteads for industrial pursuits.^
While Massachusetts' social theorists argued that agriculture was
the healthiest and the most desirable of all occupations, Massachusetts'
farmers were likely to disagree. In some agricultural areas there were
fewer hands than there was work. One example was Hampshire County, whose
farmers, as the 1860 Agriculture Report revealed, had switched from dairy-
ing to raising beef cattle largely because there were not enough help
available to milk the cows. Young rural folk who had seen the city and
its diversions were unwilling to return to the farm. Their elders worried
that the Irish hired men and servant girls who took their places would be
corrupting influences. Simon Brown, editor of the New England Fanner , re-
ported a final blow to the dignity of agriculture. He discovered in his
conversations with young women that nine in ten would prefer a husband
5
of almost any occupation other than farming.
A primary function of the county agricultural societies was to con-
vince farmers to stay on the land. At the annual meetings, non-farmers—
often leading politicians—would warn about the pitfalls which awaited
those who went west or entered industrial life in town. Speaking to the
1860 meeting of the Norfolk Agricultural Society, George Hillard urged
the farmer to ignore the temptations of the West: "These corn-bearing
plains are the prose of earth and not its poetry, and the imagination
languishes and dies amid those wastes of fertility." He warned his
audience that the West had no mountains or oceans and that it was lacking
the "blessings of civil society." What would happen to a New Engla.ider
4deprived of his schools and lyceums, his town meetings and his cattle
shows? At home he had good laws and good roads; and, above all, he
had order. Should he exchange all this for the chance of economic
gain?6
Other commentators emphasized that the New England farmer enjoyed
greater freedom than his Western counterpart. In Massachusetts he could
deal directly with his market, but in the West he would be at the mercy
of voracious middle men. In the West he would find the waters "turbid"
and "stagnant," and succumb to "diseases of miasmatic origins, chills
and fever." One county orator, John L. Russell, offered another reason
to persevere on the stony New England terrain. He declared that "the
hardier the soil and more obstinate the earth, the freer and more developed
the race which subdues it," and suggested that Yankees might degenerate on
the rich soil of the prairies.^
But if the West was unhealthy so were the Massachusetts cities to
which New England farmers moved in substantial numbers. Indeed, during
the ante-bellum years, more migrated to these cities than to the West.
In January 1861, concerned citizens organized the Massachusetts Sanitary
Association to inquire into the deterioration of health in urban areas.
The organization noted that the death rate in the cities was twice that
of the rural areas and that the life span of Massachusetts farmers was
sixty-four years while a Massachusetts cobbler could expect to live only
forty- two. Theodore Parker, in his sermon "The Material Condition of
the People of Massachusetts," noted that the average death in Boston was
at age twenty, far below that in rural areas of the state, and that, of
all occupations, printers were most subject to a premature death. He
offered as an explanation that "the farmer breaths air; the shoemaker
5wax and leather; the printer, ink and typemetal." Parker looked at
Boston with disdain. He liked neither the dependent workmen nor the
upper classes. The latter, by avoiding manual labor, had become a
"puny set of men
. . . spindle legged
. . . ashamed of their bodies,
yet pampered
. . . with luxuries." These men, divorced from the land,
needed some honest work to perspire away the "effete matter" hanging
o
to their bodies.
To farmers who felt that urban employment might be less grueling,
Silas Brown pointed out industrial alternatives. The farmer's work
was clean compared with that of the slaughter-house worker who all day
stood ankle deep in blood and filth, his days short compared to the
shoemaker toiling fourteen to sixteen hours over his bench. The Spring-
field Republican warned young men who hoped to earn their fortune in the
city that the chances of success were less than one in a hundred. Cities
were places where young lives were wrecked and aspirations crushed.
Farmers were secure from the anxieties and uncertainties of the commercial
world; they were not subject to the economic fluctuations which might
impoverish the merchant overnight. And not relying or a fortunate rise
in the stock market to fill his barns, the farmer was entitled to more
respect than the businessman. Josiah Quincy was particularly indignant
that many Massachusetts' youth mistakenly had emulated Amos Lawrence;
they ought to understand the joys of farming and reject the trouble of
9
commerce.
But beyond these moral exhortations, how could one keep the Mass-
achusetts farmer on his land? Many anxious commentators saw agricultural
education as the answer. Josiah G. Holland, a colleague of Samuel Bowles
on the Springfield Republican, worried that constant labor on the farm was
6degrading the farmer, and that he needed to exercise his mind as well
as his body. Work alone could be dangerous if unrelieved by creativity.
Holland warned that Yankee farmers could become as debased as the Irish
laborer and pointed to rural Ireland as an ominous example of the effects
of mindless toil. Massachusetts' rural population was in danger of decay
as the brighter and more ambitious boys left for the towns.
^
The trend could be reversed only by making agriculture a science and
turning every farmer into an inventor. The Massachusetts farmer needed
new ideas more than he needed new tools; his mind was more in need of
regeneration than his soil. George Boutwell , a leading Republican poli-
tician, echoed these sentiments in an address before the Middlesex North
Agricultural Society. He emphasized that labor was respected only when
it combined with a high order of intelligence and degraded whenever it
was associated with servility or ignorance. This concern with the quality
of work became more pervasive as the changes in society accelerated.^
II
Concurrent with the changes in agriculture, there were alterations in
the New England industrial system that made the factory's image more
threatening to traditionalists. The entrepreneurs who had erected the
first mills in Waltham and who had founded the industrial community of
Lowell, were aware of the prejudices which existed against their new
establishments. The Lowells, the Lawrences, the Appletons, and their
peers realized that popular fears of a permanent, dependent factory class
could impede the recruiting of a labor force and could breed an ill -will
that would have political repercussions. To meet these objections, the
millowners developed a paternal labor syslem. They recruited young,
7unmarried women from the declining hill towns and placed them in board-
ing houses under the watchful eyes of matrons. The Boston Associates—
the capitalists who owned the majority of the New England textile mi 1 Is
—
announced that they would refuse to hire anyone "habitually absent from
1 7public worship on the Sabbath, or known to be guilty of immorality."
The girls, who came from rural areas of New Hampshire, Vermont,
and Massachusetts, usually stayed in the mills no longer than a few
years. Saving something for their dowry, they generally returned to
their native towns to marry. Their experience often provided a period
of adventure and relative independence in an otherwise restricted life.
These girls, whose backgrounds were steeped in native New England values,
posed little threat to traditionalists. They were less susceptible to
the vicissitudes of the business cycle than any other potential labor
force. If orders were slack and the mills forced to close, these girls
had no hungry children to feed. They could return to the family farm
to await better times. As an early Lowell historian wrote: "While
most of our operatives are born and bred in virtuous rural homes, and
after working for a few years in the mills, return to agricultural
1
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pursuits, the interests of Lowell will rest secure."
With the influx of the Irish the paternalism of the mills ceased.
The Irish began to enter the factories in the 1840's, but it was not
until the 1850's that they made their full impact. Country girls no
longer traveled to the Merrimack mills as the presence of aliens made
employment less respectable. Unlike Yankee girls, the Irish newcomers
were often illiterate and unruly. One Native American paper in Lawrence
complained about the Irish propensity to attack policemen, brawl on
Sundays, and deface trees. While one has to recognize the bias of the
8author of these remarks, there is little doubt that these impoverished
immigrants were a disruptive force in the new urban environment. 1
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Nevertheless, the Irish, by providing a tremendous source of in-
expensive labor, were a great stimulus to the Massachusetts economy.
As Oscar Hand! in has noted, Massachusetts' low wages, which were well
below those in New York, gave the Commonwealth's employers a substantial
advantage. Furthermore, the mill owners could now pursue economic ob-
jectives more singlemindedly
. They did not feel constrained to look
after the morals of these unruly newcomers, nor would they require
attendance at religious services for Catholic employees. 15
Massachusetts now had a permanent laboring class dependent on daily
wages for survival. More ominous, there were now large numbers of
laborers whose annual earnings averaged from $300 to $350 a year, and
were thus unable to support a family by their own efforts. This fact-
along with Irish hostility to the Protestant-dominated schools—accounted
for the willingness of Irish parents to send their children into the mills
at an early age. As child labor became more common, the Massachusetts
factories began to assume the odious aspects of the European industrial
system. The Irish had little chance to rise to positions of responsibility;
they were relegated to the lowest operative positions in the mills or to a
lifetime of casual day laboring. The Irishman's only mobility was in a
physical sense. As Stephen Thernstrom and Peter Knights have pointed out
in their studies of Newburyport and Boston, the Irish laborer was often
transient, drifting from one community to another in search of work to
sustain him. This floating population of alien workingmen, unsusceptible
to traditional social control, was another source of anxiety to the
16
native Mew Englander,
9Along with the Irish came an increase in expenditures for the
care of the destitute. In 1860 Boston's North American Review noted
with alarm that since 1845 expenditures for the city's House of Industry
had increased six-fold. The Overseers of the Poor spent seven times what
they had needed fifteen years earlier. Those Yankees who did remain in
the textile mills found that their interests conflicted with the Irish.
In 1853, native workers in Salisbury and Amesbury went on strike when
their employers abolished the traditional morning break. In response
the employers fired them and hired Irish replacements. In Chicopee,
in 1358, native workers refused to support a strike led by dissatisfied
Irish workers. Cultural differences prevented the two groups from per-
ceiving their common interest.
^
The experience of Lawrence is typical of the transformation of the
Massachusetts industrial city. Created in 1845 and named after entre-
preneur Abbott Lawrence, it resembled in its first few years an idyllic
planned community. But the city quickly changed. Along the Merrimack
River, rank with sewage brought down from Lowell, grew an Irish shanty
town. The city suffered from a typhoid epidemic brought on by the
pollution of the water supply. Ten years after its birth, Lawrence had
become an unhealthy, immigrant city, unloved and alien to its rural
neighbors. ®
III
Despite their importance, cotton mill workers represented only a
fraction of the ante-bellum Massachusetts labor force. The 1860 census
listed 57,032 persons as "agriculturists," 69,049 as laborers or factory
operatives, and 122,251 as mechanics. The latter group, overwhelmingly
10
Protestant and native-born, had an identification and value structure
distinct from the Irish operative.^
Although the Massachusetts textile industry has served as a symbol
of nineteenth-century New England manufacturing and has attracted the
attention of historians as the first American industry to revolutionize
the factory system, it was second in importance to boots and shoes. In
1855 the value of cotton textiles produced in the state was $26,000,000
while that of the boot and shoe industry was $37,000,000. As the shoe
business was far less technologically sophisticated, the number of
persons employed was far greater than in textiles. In 1855, some
74,326 earned their living by producing shoes while 34,787 were employed
by the cotton industry. There were striking differences between the
wage scales of the two groups. During the latter 1850's the average
weekly wage for a shoemaker was nine dollars while that of a male mill
20
operative was from $3.75 to $6.00.
These disparities in productivity and wages hint at some of the
differences between the two work forces. Paul Faler, in his study of
the ante-bellum shoemakers of Lynn, Massachusetts, describes their work
as being "halfway between the cottage industry of the subsistence farmer
and the mechanized factory system." Cobblers still owned their own tools,
worked in small shops known as "ten-footers," and aspired--occasionally
with success— to become bosses. Unlike the Irish day laborer or operative,
the shoemakers formed a highly stable community. Due to a relative lack
of mechanization, their industry required greater skill and allowed them
greater independence. One of the pillars of their value system was the
Methodist Church with its emphasis on the availability of salvation for
all men. The other was their mechanic's ideol ogy--the labor theory of
11
value—which maintained that the source of all wealth was the applica-
tion of human labor to raw materials. The mechanic identified him-
self—along with the farmer— as the producing class and considered him-
self superior to such non-producers as aristocrats, capitalists, and
21
paupers.
But while the shoemaker-mechanic of 1860 was proud of his status
as a skilled artisan and convinced that he was the backbone of the
Commonwealth's industrial health, he was becoming increasingly convinced
that he was not reaping his fair share of the rewards. Shoemaking had
no tradition of absentee ownership, but the signs were clear that the
industry was becoming concentrated in fewer hands with new machines
making the expense of establishing a shoe manufactury prohibitive for
anyone without great wealth. In 1854 the sewing machine first found
its way into shoemaking; and while it initially replaced only the female
sti tchers— the least skilled and most poorly paid workers in the
22industry—the male cordwainers worried that their turn would be next.
Outside market forces were increasingly dictating the work patterns
for the New England shoemaker. The agent who sold shoes was unconcerned
with the craft satisfaction of the worker and urged the production of
more cheap brogans destined to be worn by Southern slaves. This demand
for speed rather than skill threatened the very basis of the shoemakers'
way of life, for work divorced from creativity and thought was as de-
basing to the mechanic as it was to the farmer. By 1860 shoe manufacturers
were shipping much of their business to rural areas where unskilled hands
were willing to work at lower rates. As the real wage for shoemakers
declined, another unwelcome element entered the industry; by 1860, twelve
percent of the Lynn shoemakers were Irish. A few years earlier there had
12
been virtually none.
3ut the shoemakers, seeing that forces were making them more like
the Irish, made every effort to establish their cultural differences.
If the Irishman was known for his affection for hard drink, the
mechanic's alternative was to form temperance societies and affirm the
inappropriateness of liquor in an industrial society. If Irishmen
were sterotyped as slothful, immoral, and illiterate, the mechanic
formed self-betterment societies which emphasized thrift, punctuality,
and moral behavior. If the Irishman was attracted to the Democratic
party and its proslavery sympathies, the mechanic would support the
Republicans and their emphasis on the dignity of labor and the im-
24
morality of the plantation system.
IV
While farmers and mechanics suffered from the pressures of declin-
ing status and income, a small, tightly-knit group of capitalists were
reaping the benefits of the changing economic conditions. In the first
quarter of the nineteenth century, this group of ag-jressive and resource-
ful entrepreneurs, led by the Lawrences and the Appletons, left their
homes in the hinterland and penetrated Boston's commercial world.
Though Nathan Appleton was the son', of a middling New Hampshire farmer
and Amos Lawrence started his career as a clerk in Groton, Massachusetts,
they became the symbols of power and wealth in the Commonwealth. By
marriage and by business partnerships they allied themselves with such
established trading families as the Lowells and the Cabots. Together
they formed the apex of the class that dominated Massachusetts for much
of the nineteenth century. Based on the ownership of the great textile
13
mills, their holdings also included most of Boston's banking and in-
surance and much of Massachusetts' railroad system. 25
Economic power was the foundation of the cotton elite's authority,
but not its entire compass. As Thorstein Veblen has noted: "In order
to gain and hold the esteem of men it is not sufficient merely to possess
wealth or power. The wealth or power must be put on evidence." The
vulgar display of wealth typical of the late nineteenth-century million-
aires was inappropriate to the values of ante-bellum Boston. The
Lawrences and Appletons were too close to their Puritan roots to build
garish mansions on Beacon Hill to overawe the masses. But the control
of cultural institutions was an accepted and even necessary part of the
creation of this new elite class.
As Ronald Story has argued in his study, "Class Development and
Cultural Institutions in Boston," Harvard University was one of the
primary vehicles of cultural control. The leading educational institution
in New England and an important symbol of historical continuity with
previous upper classes, Harvard in the 1850's came under the close control
of the manufacturing elite. Harvard's support had once been based on a
fairly broad public subscription and on periodic grants from the state
legislature. But by the eve of the Civil War a handful of wealthy contri-
butors had taken over the support of the university; they now dominated
the Harvard Corporation and carefully selected a faculty to conform to
27
their political and social outlook.
Harvard remained a small, largely provincial institution. Though
the class size increased slightly during the pre-Civil War years, due
to the increased enrollment of Southern students, the senior class of
1860 still had only 106 members. College authorities intentionally kept
14
the enrollment limited as a way of preserving the elite character of
the school. Their conception of Harvard was patterned after the
British example. The college was to be a place where the children of
the upper class would become acquainted with one another and recognize
their social unity. This function was even more necessary in Massachu-
setts than in England due to the mobility of American society and the
newness of the elite; young Lawrences and Appletons needed a conscious-
ness of their position instilled upon them.
Harvard's role as a class arbiter was not lost on the rest of the
Massachusetts population. Those outside the social pale of Cambridge
sent their children to less expensive institutions such as Amherst,
Dartmouth, Bowdoin, or Brown--insti tutions which o^ten demonstrated a
greater tolerance for antislavery and unorthodox economic opinions.
Those in Western Massachusetts, particularly, complained that Harvard
was the "College of Boston and Salem and not of Commonwealth." Henry
Wilson, speaking for the artisan viewpoint complained that the men who
controlled the Corporation "assume it to be their mission to keep Harvard
College from the influences of the outside barbarians." John Murray Forbes—
whose fortune was made in Western railroads after those of the textile
magnates and was thus not of the inner circle of Massachusetts society-
complained that Harvard was a club of the favored few and became a supporter
29
of the embryonic Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Edward L. Pierce, a close friend and biographer of Charles Sumner,
has left a keen description of the ante-bellum Boston elite. "There
was but one society to which admission was sought, and everyone in it knew
every one else who was in it. It was close and hard, consolidated, with a
uniform stamp on all, and opinion running in the grooves,— in politics
15
Whig; in faith, Unitarian and Episcopalian." Intellectual, despotic-
over individual thought, ante-bellum Boston, Pierce argued, was com-
parable only to ancient Athens. An integral part of the elites' pres-
tige was the preservation of its rectitude, They were deeply concerned
with the esteem of those who were their fellow citizens, if not their
social equals. And to gain their esteem it was insufficient to wield
30
mere economic power. One had to prove one's moral virtue as well.
Understanding the traditional New England emphasis on community
responsibility, the elite was concerned with their duties as well as
their privileges. In this regard, Boston's elite was significantly
different from its most important economic rival— the New York merchant
class. New York's upper class was a far more mobile, heterogeneous group
than that of Boston. At the same time, it was more singleminded. The
New York merchants were satisfied to increase their fortunes and leave
other elements to wrestle with the problems of morality and social control.
New York's upper class, living in a city both larger and mere diverse than
Boston, had less sense of responsibility and less concern for reputation
31
than did their counterparts in Massachusetts.
Still, paternalism flourished in Boston. The journals and memoirs
of the Boston elite are filled with expressions of social responsibility.
Amos A. Lawrence was a pious example. On signing the papers for an im-
portant business transaction he hoped that, in the event it was success-
ful , "I may not forget my duty in using it, not for my own aggrandizement,
but for the advance of Christ's Kingdom on earth." Robert Winthrop, in
his 1861 memorial of Nathan Appleton, wrote that "the very investment of
so large a part of his property in domestic manufacture had many of the
best elements of charity." Winthrop suggested that Appleton 's satisfaction
16
with his own success "was not a little enhanced by the consideration
that he had been the means of affording employment to so great a
number of operatives ... who might otherwise have failed to obtain
32
work and wages."
The elite's sense of moral accountability would make the question
of slavery especially agonizing. On the one hand, their economic position
depended on the continued supply of slave-grown cotton and, partly, on the
Southern market for textiles. Many of the elite had close relationships
with Southern planters through both business dealings and class ties at
Harvard. Some had marriage alliances with Southern families. Further-
more, as a ruling class, the Boston elite v/ere psychologically disposed
to sympathize with the efforts of the planter class to avert social
33
turmoil
.
But antislavery contentions to the contrary, the Boston elite did
not cower craven ly at the feet of the slaveowners. The elite were aware
of the New England repugnance to slavery and sensitive to charges that
they were abandoning traditional values for economic gain. During the
1850's they were repelled by the crass, proslavery tactics of the Demo-
cratic administration and desperately hoped to find some solution which
would ensure sectional peace without wholly supporting the slavery posi-
tion. But the Cotton Whigs found it impossible to satisfy both their
consciences and their pocketbooks, and in their failure lies much of the
history of Massachusetts politics in the fifteen years before the Civil
War.
CHAPTER II
THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION
Until slavery uprooted the old parties, the Cotton Whigs— an
amalgam of conservative business interests led by the textile manu-
facturers—dominated Massachusetts' political life. The cotton mag-
nates, whose economic power had developed so dramatically in the
1820's and 1830's, had quickly translated their new fortunes into
political power. An event symbolic of the passing of authority into
new hands was Boston's 1830 Congressional election. In that year
Nathan Apple ton defeated Henry Lee, the representative of the older
mercantile families and their principles of free trade. At about the
same time, Daniel Webster, sensing the changing winds, embraced the
tariff as the touchstone of his political creed and became the primary
ornament of the Massachusetts Whigs J
The enormous financial resources of the textile manufacturers,
which enabled them to support conservative pulpits and a conservative
university at Cambridge, gave them great influence within the Mass-
achusetts Whig party. Due to their generosity, the party was rarely
without funds enough to stage enormous rallies for their candidates,
subsidize friendly newspapers, or flood the state with pamphlets that
proved that prosperity was inseparable from the protective tariff and
Whig rule. In order to keep Webster in public life, the mill owners
gave their foremost statesman substantial shares in their corporations.
When these gifts failed to maintain Webster in the style of life to
which hewas accustomed, the leading manufacturers subsidized him with
2
substantial cash payments.
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A weapon nearly as effective as the purse was the threat of social
ostracism. Those who embraced political heresies found themselves un-
welcome at the most fashionable homes--a significant snub in a closely-
knit society like Boston. Thus, in the 1840's, Charles Sumner became
a social outcast for his excessive zeal in promoting prison reform.
George Ticknor, an arbiter of Boston society, explained to one of
Sumner's friends the necessity for such action: "I am sorry as you
for the effect these discussions produce upon society in Boston; but
the principles of that society are right, and its severity toward dis-
organizes and social democracy in all its forms is just and wise."
Ticknor asserted that, by disciplining the apostles of unsound opinions,
public morals--that is, those of the ruling oligarchy--coul d be main-
tained. Antislavery men whose family ties normally would have admitted
them to the inner circles suffered under this rule. Richard Henry Dana
once drove down Beacon street and commented to his companion: "There
was a time when I was welcome at almost every house within two miles of
3
us, but now hardly any are open to me."
As long as the tariff remained the foremost political issue, the
Cotton Whigs remained in a commanding position. Leading politicians
such as Webster, Robert Uinthrop, and Edward Everett had successfully
convinced a majority of the native-born operatives and artisans and the
more prosperous market-oriented farmers of their interest in a protective
tariff. The Massachusetts Democrats appealed to those who, for a variety
of reasons, considered themselves outsiders in the Commonwealth: busi-
nessmen unable to crack the inner circle of the Lawrences and Lowells,
religious dissenters (especially Methodists and Baptists), farmers in
the poorer and more remote areas, and the Irish. These groups, though
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substantial in numbers, were not a majority in Massachusetts. The
Democrats voiced their suspicion of the banks and opposed special
privileges for corporations. They called for reforms in the election
laws and in the penal system and for a more democratic judiciary. They
denounced Massachusetts' liquor laws (which forbade the selling of
spirits in quantities less than fifteen gallons) as imposing temperance
on the poor but allowing indulgence to the rich. But as long as the
Whigs could clothe themselves in the mantle of social and moral conserva-
tism and while the majority of the Massachusetts voters identified them
4
with the traditions of the Commonwealth, the Whigs would remain in power.
It was the escalation of the slavery issue that finally destroyed the
political supremacy cf the Cotton Whigs. By seeming to place their econom-
ic interests before their ethical sensibilities, they could no longer con-
vince their constituency that they were defenders of the traditional values
of the Puritan Commonwealth. Their antislavery opponents could claim with
credibility to represent the moral sentiment of Massachusetts and could as-
sert that the Cotton Whigs were a narrow, self-interested clique apart from
the mainstream of the state. Such an assertion found a receptive audience
among those who were coming to resent the dislocation the manufacturers
had brought into their lives.
Sentiment in Massachusetts had been always at least mildly antislavery.
But except for a few abolitionists, most people prior to the mid-1840's
re-
garded slavery as a relatively unimportant issue. An upright citizen
of
Massachusetts would look upon the South's peculiar institution as
an un-
pleasant, though happily remote, problem. And most men
agreed that the
federal Constitution prohibited Northern citizens from any
substantive
action. When the Texas issue arose in the 1830's all
Massachusetts Whigs
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joined to oppose annexation. Many New England conservatives had long
opposed expansionism as disruptive of the fabric of the nation. They
believed that men on the frontier would be without law and civilization.
As the nation expanded, the influence of New England would decline.
These Whigs feared that the interests of the newly settled areas would
be closer to the agrarian South than to the Northeast. Furthermore
the continued westward migration might draw away a work force needed in
the mi 11 s
.
President John Tyler, already unpopular in Massachusetts for abandon-
ing Whig economics, pushed for the annexation of Texas, and the Boston
establishment rallied against him. Abbott Lawrence, declaring that the
North "must resist every attempt at the acquisition of territory to be
inhabited by slaves," became a leader of the anti-Texas movement. Robert
Winthrop, Boston's representative in Congress and a leading spokesman
of the manufacturers' interests, announced that should Texas be added to
the Union it would "break up the balance of our system, violate the
compromises of the Constitution, and endanger the permanence of the
Union." The Massachusetts Whigs united as they never would again when
the Democrats nominated the ardent expansionist James Polk for the
5
presidency in 1844.
Shortly after Polk's election, the Massachusetts legislature sent
Samuel Hoar, a leading Concord lawyer, to South Carolina to protest the
practice there of arresting black sailors—some of them Massachusetts
citizens—when their ships stopped at South Carolina ports. The South
Carolina legislature, hearing of Hoar's mission, passed with only one
dissenting vote a resolution declaring the Massachusetts emissary
persona non grata and directed the governor to expel him from the state.
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With an angry mob milling in front of his Charleston hotel, Hoar
quickly slipped away to Boston.
Massachusetts reacted angrily to the incident. The legislature
drafted a resolution accusing South Carolina of an act of war and
warned that she had attacked the basic foundation of the Constitution.
She had forfeited her right to ask Massachusetts citizens to uphold
Constitutional provisions that benefited Carolinians. The Hoar affair,
in addition to straining the relations between the two states, gave
political leverage to a group of younger anti slavery Whigs--men like
Charles Francis Adams, Charles Sumner, and Henry Wilson—who had
grown restless in their subordinate role in the party.'
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In March 1845, Congress narrowly voted to annex Texas, setting in
motion a series of events that would shatter Massachusetts' dominant
party. The conservative Whigs disliked Texas annexation as heartily
as ever, but argued that the national government had now entered into a
compact it was required to honor. These Whig leaders understood that any
continuation of the controversy would only further strain relations with
their Southern friends. With a Democratic administration taking office
in Washington, they recognized that the Southern Whigs were necessary
allies if they were to retain a favorable tariff. But if Texas annexation
presented difficulties for the leaders of Massachusetts Whiggery, it
provided an opportunity for the antislavery Whigs. Led by Adams, Sumner,
Wilson, Horace Mann, and John G. Palfrey, this young and ambitious group
became known as the Conscience Whigs. Though the artisan Wilson was a
notable exception, many of the Conscience Whigs were men of influence,
eduration, and breeding. But they were not part of the powerful textile
8
class whom they often viewed as parvenus with crass materialistic instincts.
22
Mobilizing the popular sentiment stirred by the expulsion of
Hoar and Texas annexation, the Conscience Whigs pushed through the
legislature resolutions that opposed the acquisition of any new slave
territory and denied the legality of Congress' action on Texas. As
the debate over Texas continued, the Boston manufacturers grew more
upset with their upstart opponents. Thomas G. Cary, a state senator
from Boston, urged that the inflammatory speeches cease lest the South
take offense and retaliate against Boston's commerce. Ebenezer Rockwood
Hoar, son of Massachusetts' emissary to South Carolina and later Attorney-
General of the United States, declared in response: "It is as much the
duty of Massachusetts to pass resolutions in favor of the rights of man
9
as in the interests of cotton."
In May 1846, President Polk announced to the nation that Mexican
troops had drawn American blood on American soil. Many in Massachusetts
were skeptical of the President's account and believed that his call for
a declaration of war was a move to conquer additional territory for
slavery. The state refused to appropriate money to support volunteer
companies, and recruitment in Massachusetts met with less response than
in other sections of the country.
Polk's actions placed the Cotton Whigs in a difficult position. If
they opposed the Fresident they would run the risk of seeming unpatriotic,
but if they supported him the antislavery faction at home would accuse
them of being tools of slavery. Webster was happy he was out of Washington
when the vote on war came. But Boston's representative in the House was
not so fortunate. Though he disliked the war, Winthrop reluctantly voted
to authorize it, and became one of only two Massachusetts Whigs to do so.
"Blood! Blood! is on the hands of the representative from Boston," wrote
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his former friend Sumner; "Mot all Neptune's ocean can wash them clean."
Winthrop's vote made him the Conscience Whigs' primary target. Though
Samuel Gridley Howe did pocrly when he challenged Winthrop in the 1846
election, the an ti slavery forces had their revenge in 1847 when John
Palfrey's refusal to vote for Winthrop cost the Bostonian election as
Speaker of the House.
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The final breach in the Massachusetts Whig party came in 1848 when
the national party nominated Zachary Taylor for the presidency. A
slaveholder so inexperienced in politics that he had never voted, Taylor
was known solely for his military record in the recent Mexican War. To
the Conscience Whigs, Taylor's nomination was a conspiracy between the
cotton planters and the Northern manufacturers— "the Lords of the Lash
and the Lords of the Loom," as Sumner called them. The Conscience Whigs
then joined with disaffected Democrats and members of the abolitionist
Liberty party in supporting Martin Van Buren and the new Free Soil party.
The nomination of Charles Francis Adams for Vice-President helped the
new organization become the second party in the Commonwealth and denied
the Whigs a majority in Massachusetts' state and national elections. The
Cotton Whigs took this as an ominous sign; for, by combining forces, the
Whigs' opponents could remove them from power.
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In the wake of the Mexican War came the problem of governing the newly
conquered territory. Inevitably, this involved the question of slavery.
Henry Clay, hoping to avoid a serious conflict, offered a broad compromise
designed to settle the outstanding differences between North and South.
For Daniel Webster, looking ahead to 1852 as his last hope for the pres-
idency, the Clay proposals came as an opportunity to remove slavery from
national politics. He had discovered that his position on slavery— that
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it was morally evil but politically insignificant—appeased neither
his constituents at home nor his friends in the South. He thoroughly
disliked antislavery agitators and called the Wilmot Proviso— the
resolution to prohibit slavery in territories acquired from Mexico— "a
mere abstraction" which would prohibit "a naked possibility upon which
no man would act." Slavery was a political albatross around Webster's
neck, and as he strode into the Senate chamber on March 7, 1850, his
12intention was to remove it once and for all.
Speaking, he said, not as a Massachusetts man but as an American,
Webster urged his colleagues to accept the compromise proposals, which
included a stronger fugitive slave act and the organization of New
Mexico without a prohibition of slavery. Most of Massachusetts received
the speech with surprise and disapproval. Even Robert Winthrop thought
Webster had gone too far and worried that support of the compromise would
"overturn every Whig state north of the Potomac." Antislavery men re-
sponded immediately and vigorously. In John Greenlea," Whittier's cruel
phrase Webster was now Ichabod:
So fallen! so lost! the light withdrawn
Which once he wore!
The glory from his gray hairs gone
Forevermo re.
Most of the Massachusetts delegation in Congress, sensing the unpopularity
of Webster's position, refused to support the compromise when it came to
. 13
a vote.
But while the Commonwealth as a whole rejected the compromise, Boston's
economic elite— though dubious at first— rallied to Webster's cause. Their
representative in Congress, Samuel A. Eliot, was the sole Massachusetts
Congressman to vote for the Fugitive Slave Law. Webster had convinced
the Boston business comnunity that without an appeasement of the South
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their commerce was likely to suffer. He quoted an unnamed Southern
Senator as saying that "the Lowell mills might and should all stop
unless the North quit this violence of abuse." The Boston Advertiser
,
a spokesman for Boston conservatives, noted that the Fugitive Slave Law
might put the South in a frame of mind to accommodate on the tariff.
As the Compromise of 1850 became law, hundreds of Boston's most in-
fluential men rushed to sign a letter praising Webster as the savior
1
4
of the Union, and a hundred cannon volleys sounded on the Common.
II
Boston's Whigs might celebrate the enactment of the compromise
but they would pay a heavy political price for their association with
it. The compromise, and especially the Fugitive Slave Law, served as
a catalyst for forces which had long resented the domination of the
Boston Whigs but which had been divided among themselves. The Free
Soil movement had been a tentative step in the direction of an anti-
slavery coalition, but the Whigs of 1848 had still retained a certain
credibility as an antislavery party--a credibility that vanished on
the seventh of March, 1850.
In the 1850 elections a new coalition of Free Soilers and Democrats
swept the state. Loco-foco as well as Free Soil, the coalition was anti-
Boston as well as antislavery. It was strongest in the small towns and
rural areas, among artisans and farmers. Though its most dramatic act
was to give Daniel Webster's old Senate seat to Charles Sumner, most of
those gaining office under the Coalition were men of humble backgrounds
and anti-aristocratic views. George Boutwell, the new governor, was a
Democrat and the son oi a farmer. Nathaniel Banks, the Speaker of the
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Massachusetts House, was a former Waltham bobbin boy. The coalition
had great appeal among the shoe towns of the Commonwealth, and at
least three of its prominent members had been cobblers: Henry Wilson,
who became President of the State Senate; Amasa Walker, the new Secre-
tary of the Commonwealth; and John B. Alley, a member of the Governor's
Council. All this prompted Caleb Cushing, an anti -Coalition Democrat
loyal to the slavery views of the national party, to ask scornfully if
1
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"the state were to be shoemakeri zed or not."
An important objective of the Coalition (which upper class Free
Soilers such as Adams and Palfrey found too radical) was to weaken the
institutions that gave the Cotton Whigs their hegemony, and to restore
the influence of the countryside at the expense of Boston. Harvard,
with its aristocratic airs and its opposition to anti slavery, was a
primary target. The Coalition-dominated legislature sought to control
the election of the Harvard corporation and to secure the appointment
of more liberal members of the faculty. The Coalition also supported
the passage of a general incorporation law as a way to weaken the
financial oligarchy of Boston. Previously, a bank charter could be ob-
tained only by special act of the legislature—a favor that was restricted
to a select few during the years of Whig rule. Some of the mill owners,
correctly perceiving the Coalition as a threat to their interests,
threatened operatives who voted for the reformers with dismissal. Here
was primary evidence for the Coalition of the arrogant power of their
opponents and the need for electoral reforms such as the secret ballot.
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Even though the Cotton Whigs had lost control of the state govern-
ment, they retained their authority in Boston and were anxious to demon-
strate their fidelity to the 1850 Compromise. Massachusetts had never
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returned a fugitive slave and its mercantile community considered the
rendition of a Negro necessary to prove reliability to Southern
clients. E. L. Pierce, recollecting the atmosphere of Boston at the
time, wrote that "the capital, the society, the culture and intellect
of the city took part with no apparent regret or sense of shame but
with alacrity, in a service which in other days would have been shunned
17
as unworthy of humane or Christian men."
In anticipation of this sentiment, a group of militant abolitionists,
led by Samuel Gridley Howe and Theodore Parker, formed a Vigilance Committee
to frustrate the enforcement of the law. They successfully prevented the
abduction of two of Parker's parishioners, William and Ellen Craft, and
assisted twenty Negroes to burst into the Boston Court House and rescue
the fugitive Shadrach. In April 1851, a Georgia slaveowner claimed that
Thomas Sims, a black man living in Boston, was his property. The civil
authorities of the city were determined that this time their efforts to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Law would succeed. They placed an armed guard
outside the courthouse where Sims was held and strung iron chains before
the entrances to frustrate a rescue. Abolitionists were quick to note the
symbolism when Justice Lemuel . Shaw stooped low beneath the chains as he
entered his courtroom to send Sims back to slavery. Antislavery journal-
ist William S. Robinson claimed that the money and the Websterism of
Boston were responsible for this outrage: though the return of Sims
18
humiliated the entire state, the infamy belonged to the city alone.
Spurred in part by the Sim's case, the Coalition mobilized behind
a new state Constitution that would institutionalize their attacks on the
Whig establishment. Of primary interest to the reformers was the re-
duction of the political influence of Boston which annually sent a
soli
o
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block of forty-four conservative Whigs to the lower house of the
legislature. The Coalition's newspaper, The Commonwealth
,
argued that
"with a vast accumulation of capital on the one hand and the influx of
a poor, ignorant, foreign population on the other," the cities no
longer represented "historical Massachusetts." The proposed constitution
greatly increased the representation of the rural areas at the expense
of the cities. Had it become law the Whigs would have lost any chance
to regain power. But by combining with the Irish—who disliked the new
charter because it prohibited the use of state funds for religious
schools--the Whigs were able to defeat the new constitution. This
"Cotton and Catholic Coal ition"--of Abbot Lawrence's wallet and the
Irish vote— infuriated the Coalitionists and stimulated latent nativism.
Sumner, though not a nativist himself, mourned the defeat of the consti-
tution; "It would have broken the back of the Boston oligarchy, the
stumbling block of all reform," he wrote. Following this setback in
1853, and with the insistence of the new Pierce administration that
Massachusetts' Democrats eschew all alliances that might offend the
South, the first antislavery coalition to govern Massachusetts disinte-
grated.
Ill
After the defeat of the Coalition the Whigs regained office. But
their tenure would be brief, as the events of 1854 stirred an antislavery
storm that would remove them forever as the ruling party of the Common-
wealth. Stephen A. Douglas' Kansas-Nebraska Act opened the fertile
areas of Kansas and Nebraska to slavery by repealing the Missouri
Compromise. At this betrayal Massachusetts' conservative Whigs roared
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with anger. Had they not acted in good faith in upholding the Compro-
mise of 1850? Had they not risked severe political reprisals by aiding
in the return of Sims? This new act dashed their hopes that slavery—
with its damnable tendency to incite fanatics—could be put to rest, and
that in the return to older issues, they could re-establish their pre-
eminence in Massachusetts politics. Amos A. Lawrence wrote of the oc-
casion: "We went to bed one night, old fashioned, conservative, com-
promise Union Whigs and waked up stark raving mad Abolitionists." This
proved to be a substantial exaggeration, but Lawrence and his peers did
pack Faneuil Hall to denounce Douglas' bill in uncompromising and un-
whiggish terms. Theirs was the bellow of a man on a limb who had just
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heard the buzz of a saw.
In May, two days after the House of Representatives passed the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, federal officers in Boston seized Anthony Burns,
a fugitive Negro from Virginia, and held him for transportation back to
his master. Boston's merchant class, who had made the return of Sims a
token of their Unionism, now came forward with funds to aid in Burns'
legal defense. Richard Henry Dana, the slave's attorney, noted that
men who for years had spurned him because of his antislavery activities
now greeted him like an old friend. But neither the protests of the
merchants nor a desperate raid on the court house led by Worcester
minister, Thomas Wentworth Higginson, could save Burns. Federal Attorney
Benjamin F. Hallett, working closely with President Pierce, mobilized the
militia and called in federal trooDS. Boston had not seen such an occupying
force since the early days of the Revolution. On June 2, with the city
under virtual martial law, lawmen escorted Anthony Burns through the
. .
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streets of Boston and put him aboard a South-bound ship.
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The unhappiness of the Cotton Whigs over the Kansas-Nebraska Act
and the Anthony Burns affair was as much out of self-interest as moral
indignation. As Robert Winthrop noted, these events formed "a recipe
for reinflating Freesoilism and Abolitionism" with all their potential
for disruption of authority. But those conservatives who continued
their protest against the Kansas Act after 1854 usually did so outside
of politics. They were attracted to the New England Emigrant Aid
Company, which textile magnates such as Amos A. Lawrence and Providence's
John Carter Brown could control and which was confined to such safe ob-
jectives as the spread of New England industry and values in the West.
Had the Cotton Whigs joined an antislavery political coalition at this
point, they would undoubtedly have had to share leadership with Banks and
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Wilson--men they considered their social inferiors.
In the fall of "i 854 an unparalleled political tidal wave struck
Massachusetts. A new political party, the Americans, won every statewide
office, all of Massachusetts' Congressional seats, the entire State Senate,
and all but three of the 380 seats in the lower house. Unlike the narrowly
anti-foreign Know-Nothingism of many states, the Massachusetts American
party was a highly diverse coalition of voters. Some saw the Slave Power-
as their greatest enemy while others were more concerned with the foreigners
in their midst who increasingly made Massachusetts' cities alien places.
There was, however, no necessary conflict between antislavery and nativism—
indeed, many New Englanders believed slavery and Popery to be parallel
evils. In their minds both the slave owner and the priest were agents of
monstrous conspiracies to subvert individual freedom and judgment. But
there was a serious conflict among the Americans as to their fundamental
direction. Certain leaders, like Henry Wilson, saw the movement as a
step
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toward a thoroughly antislavery party. Others like Henry Gardner,
the Boston dry-goods nierchant who became governor in 1854, hoped
that nativism could divert popular attention from slavery and unite
23
North and South in a common antipathy toward foreigners.
The Americans enjoyed their greatest strength among the artisans
and farmers who had supported the an ti -Whig program of the old Coalition.
The men who served in this Know-Nothing legislature—whom the Whigs
ridiculed for lacking experience in government and eloquence in debate-
represented those elements of Massachusetts society who felt their
independence slipping away. They struck out at forces in society which
represented a threat to the ascendancy of the Protestant artisan and
yeoman, whether it be the mi 11 owner, the Catholic Church, or the Slav3
Power. The 1855 legislature passed a spate of bills which registered
the frustration of the working men of Massachusetts against those who
controlled the state's economic institutions. The new legislators
worked in a loco-foco spirit: they abolished imprisonment for debt, re-
stricted child labor, and enacted a mechanics lien law. They also showed
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great interest in, though failed to pass, a Ten-Hour Law.
The Americans, recalling the role of Catholic voters in defeating
the 1853 Constitution, were determined to reduce the newcomers' political
influence. The party's platform demanded that immigrants wait twenty-one
years before voting and be permanently barred from holding office. The
Know-Nothings charged that the Massachusetts Irish were loyal supporters
of slavery. As evidence they pointed to the aid provided by the
Irish
Columbian Artillery in the return of Anthony Burns. Nativism
and anti-
slavery coalesced as the Massachusetts legislature abolished
all foreign-
born military organizations in the Commonwealth.
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Revenge for the Burns affair did not end with reprisals against
the Irish militia. Antislavery legislators were determined to punish
Edward Loring, the Federal Conmissioner who had sent Burns back to
slavery. They petitioned Governor Gardner to remove Loring from the
county judgeship he also held. Gardner, with a record of accommodation
to the Fugitive Slave Law, emphasized the old Whig principle of the
independence of the judiciary and refused to follow the legislators'
request. Later the legislature enacted over Gardner's veto a personal
liberty law which nullified the Fugitive Slave Law in Massachusetts by
making it practically impossible to enforce. This signaled an open
split between the Governor and the antislavery majority of his party. 26
The emerging leader of the Massachusetts Americans was Henry Wilson.
His election to the United States Senate was a galling blow to the Whig
establishment. Sumner's victory had been bad enough, but at least he
was a Harvard alumnus and a man of letters. But now a cobbler was sit-
ting in Edward Everett's former seat. Wilson was no less objectionable
to those conservatives who had hoped to forge an alliance with the
Southern Americans. By 1855 it was clear to Wilson ard his allies that
the national American party was dominated by conservatives who sought to
mute the slavery issue. Wilson's subsequent search for a new antislavery
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coalition lead to the foundation of the Massachusetts Republican party.
In order to complete his coalition, Wilson needed the support of the
Conscience-Whig Free Soilers like Dana and Adams who had spurned the
Know-Nothings. Despite overtures from the Americans, the antislavery
upper class wanted no part of this plebian movement. The secret ritual
of the working-class Know-Nothing lodges repelled these men of family
and culture. Their disapproval hardened as the legislature pursued an
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unsavory investigation of the state's nunneries under the leadership
of Joseph Hiss, the Grand Worshipful Instructor of the Massachusetts
28
Know-Nothings.
In 1854 the upper-class Free-Soil ers had formed an anti slavery
party which they called "Republican." But this tentative attempt met
with ignominious defeat in the year of the great Know-Mothing sweep.
The true foundation of the Massachusetts Republican party occurred only
when these old Free-Soilers joined with Henry Wilson's antislavery
Americans. For Massachusetts Republicanism could only be complete when
it tapped all the sources of antislavery in the state, and this included
the nativists and artisans represented by Henry Wilson as well as the
reformers who supported Sumner. Nevertheless, their 1855 gubernatorial
candidate, Julius Rockwell, lost to the incumbent Gardner. But this in-
dicated only that they had failed to build their organization and dis-
cover winning issues. This would come the following year when "Bleeding
Kansas" and "Bleeding Sumner" became the catalytic forces for Massachusetts
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Republicanism.
On May 21
,
1856, proslavery raiders from Missouri rode into Lawrence,
Kansas, looting and burning, and left the free-soil town in ruins. John
Brown retaliated by killing Southern settlers at Pottawatomie Creek, and
soon the entire territory was in a state of civil war. Massachusetts anti-
s lave ry men responded by pledging arms and money through the State
Kansas
Committee to the beleaguered free-state settlers. On the day following
the Lawrence raid, South Carolina Congressman Preston Brooks,
enraged over
Charles Sumner's recent SDeech against slavery, approached the
Massachusetts
Senator on the Senate floor. Using a gutta percha cane,
Brooks beat
Sumner until he was bloody and unconscious. Brooks was
showered with
34
testimonials from throughout the South; a group of students gave him a
gold-headed cane. When the House of Representatives failed to expel
the assailant, resentment in Massachusetts rose to explosive levels.
What better proof, Republicans argued, of the barbarism of slavery
and the shallowness of Southern attachment to the Union.
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The presidential election of 1856 was well suited for the consum-
mation of the Massachusetts Republican party. The party had in
John C. Fremont a candidate whose political record was obscure enough
to offend no one. The trouble in Kansas gave Republicans an issue—the
non-extension of slavery in the territories—win" ch could unite all
voters of an antislavery persuasion. Still, Massachusetts Republicans
were uncertain of their strength and entered into a compact with Gardner
not to challenge him, in return for the governor's neutrality in the
presidential race. The Fremont ticket swept the Commonwealth, receiving
sixty percent of the vote. Especially encouraging to the Republicans
was the defection en masse of the Whigs from Western Massachusetts and
Worcester County. The Boston Whigs watched glumly as their candidate,
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Millard Fillmore, was crushed.
In his excellent study of ante-bellum Republicanism, Free Soil, Free
Labor, Free Men , Eric Foner notes that Republican ideology was more than
merely an attack on Southern slave society; it was "an affirmation of the
superiority of the social system of the North." But there was an added
dimension to the struggle for free institutions in Massachusetts. Unlike
those in the more purely agricultural states of the North, Massachusetts
Republicans believed that the threat to free labor was internal as well
as external; it came from the mill owner and the Irish immigrant as well
as from the Southern cotton planter. Moderate antislavery became the
common bond that united those who resented the changing structure of
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of Massachusetts society. Loco-focoism and nativism, though they
touched deep well-springs of sympathy, could not unite both a Wilson
and an Adams. Some might resent the domination of the cotton elite
because they saw them as obstacles in the path of upward mobility,
while others saw them as materialistic usurpers of traditional author-
ity. But all could agree that compromising Cotton Whigs had acquiesced
to the wishes of the slaveowners for the sake of preserving and ex-
panding their manufacturing enterprises—the most visible cause of the
social dislocations they resented. To say that the Republicans used
slavery as a symbol for a myriad of frustrations is not to say that
they were either cynical or hypocritical. Most Massachusetts Republicans
genuinely disliked the South's peculiar institution. But slavery was
politically useful because it was the evil most universally understood.
Men of many backgrounds could see in slavery the epitome of all they
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disliked.
By 1857 the Republicans were strong enough to defeat Gardner. Their
candidate was Nathaniel Banks, the former bobbin boy, who had risen
through the ranks of Massachusetts politics and had served as Speaker
of the United States House of Representatives. Though the Sumner wing
of the party thoroughly distrusted Banks, even they admitted he was an
improvement over the Hunker Gardner. To professional politicans like
Wilson, Banks' moderate position on slavery was an advantage in attract-
ing a broader spectrum of voters to the party. The following year
the
Republicans completed their capture of Massachusetts' political offices
. . 33
by winning control of both houses of the legislature.
By 1859 the Republicans were so dominant in the Commonwealth
that
it is easiest to define the party by the groups that refused
to support
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them: the urban commercial elite and the Irish Catholics. The broad
middle classes of the Commonwealth were solidly within the Republican
ranks. With a sprinkling of reformers and intellectuals, it was the
party of the Protestant farmer and artisan, the countryside and the small
town. The Republicans considered themselves the backbone of Massachusetts
society. They looked hopefully to the future and the opportunity to in-
still their Puritan values into the federal government.
CHAPTER III
HARPERS FERRY AND BEACON HILL
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On the night of October 16, 1859, John Brown and his small band
of whites and free blacks slipped into Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and
seized the federal armory. The raiders hoped to initiate a massive
rising of slaves and topple the South's "peculiar institution." Ex-
cept for a handful of conspirators—who were privy to Brown's plans-
Massachusetts was perplexed by the strange events that were unfolding
along the edge of the Blue Ridge Mountains. First reports indicated
that workers at a government dam near Harpers Ferry, enraged when a
contractor had absconded and left them unpaid, had seized the town,
and that local Negroes had joined the rioting "out of compulsion."
Each telegraph report increased the numbers involved in the distur-
bance, and Bostonians scanning their newspapers on the evening of the
18th were informed that as many as 500 to 600 armed Negroes were in-
volved.
The Boston Evening Transcript could discover a lesson in this event,
even on the basis of these fragmentary reports. Such a labor dispute,
should it occur in the North, could never cause the alarm it was generat-
ing in Virginia. For the South "glories in a social condition making it
subject to continual trepidations," while the North's social system was
based on the firm bedrock of free labor. "At times like these the in-
herent weakness of a state of society where large numbers are held in a
state of servitude is revealed." Only when later reports indicated the
leader and the purpose of tne raid did the Transcript's editor realize
2
how meaningful his comments had been.
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By the morning of October 19, the nation knew that the mysterious
old man at the head of the Harpers Ferry raiders was the Kansas war-
rior John Brown. Brown had a long connection with New England and
Massachusetts. Born in Torrington, Connecticut, he later lived in
Springfield, Massachusetts, where he ran a wool business that ended
in spectacular failure. Returning to Springfield in 1851 he organized
the "League of Gileadites," a secret group pledged to resist the Fugi-
tive Slave Law. After he made his reputation as a Kansas guerrilla
'
captain, Brown was in demand with Massachusetts an ti slavery groups,
speaking in several cities and meeting figures like Emerson, Wilson,
and Sumner. In 1857 he testified before a committee of the Massachusetts
legislature to urge an appropriation for the defense of Kansas. 3
As further information about the raid became known, a feeling of
uneasiness spread among influential circles in the Bay State. Virginia
authorities had discovered letters in Brown's possession with Massachusetts
postmarks, which suggested that their authors had helped Brown. Impli-
cated were: Thomas Wentworth Kigginson, a radical Unitarian minister from
Worcester; George Luther Stearns, a wealthy suburban businessman who dabbled
in reform; Frank Sanborn, a Concord schoolteacher and minor-league Trans-
cendentalist ; Samuel Gridley Howe, head of the Perkins School for the
Blind; and Theodore Parker, the controversial Boston minister who was
dying of consumption in Italy. These men were all uncompromising radicals
and their involvement in such a desperate activity might not have come as
a surprise, but the newspapers also reported that the New England Emigrant
Aid Company had supplied Brown with rifles. Respectable and conservative
businessmen had been associated with the company during the Kansas troubles:
men like Amos Lawrence, the great textile magnate, and John Carter Brown,
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Rhode Island's most important merchant. Many of these men had South-
ern commercial connections and prudent reputations to preserve.
Brown's confiscated letters also mentioned, though less directly,
politicians like Henry Wilson and William Seward. With the Mass-
achusetts elections only a few weeks away, Republicans wondered
anxiously if the Harpers Ferry raid would hurt their chances of
retaining political control of the state. 4
The Republican newspapers of Massachusetts—such as Boston's
Atlas and Daily Bee and the Springfield Republican—were loyal and
effective organs of the party. Like most partisan sheets of the
period, they carefully presented the news to conform to the opinions
of their readers and to advance the objectives of the party. Their
first objective after the Harpers Ferry raid was to establish the fact
that Brown was not a Republican. Indeed, the old fanatic was "a de-
nouncer, a bitter hater of the Republican party." He was no friend of
responsible statesmen like Seward and Wilson but only of extremists like
Gerrit Smith and Frederick Douglass. He differed from them only in that
they, unlike Brown, had too much regard for their personal safety to en-
5
gage in such violent expeditions.
The Republican editors reminded their readers that the party's policy
was one of "pure State's Rights" with respect to slavery. If Southerners
wanted to retain their "peculiar institution," it was cf no concern to
Republicans as long as they did not attempt to expand it beyond its exist-
ing boundaries. Republicans were but followers of those great Virginian
statesmen, Washington and Jefferson, who believed that "the silent yet
potent laws of political economy" would eventually favor freedom. Some
Republicans resurrected Daniel Webster and claimed that he had never
concealed his belief that slavery was an unparalleled evil and that
its expansion ought to be curtailed. His position, they claimed,
was essentially the same as the Republicans. Had Brown staged his
raid on March 8, 1850, could anyone have claimed that Webster had
encouraged it? The editor of the Boston Traveller suggested that
Brown's actions were more in keeping with Democratic principles.
In an aimless attempt at historical parallel, he claimed that Demo-
cracts from the Whiskey Rebellion to the Dorr War had justified the
right of rebellion. Furthermore, Brown's raid v/as but the practical
application of Popular Sovereignty-- the right to do anything without
respect to the Consi tution.
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It was in the interest of the Republicans to portray the Harpers
Ferry raid as a bit of opera bouffe , to emphasize how ludicrous it was
that a ragged little band could attack the sovereign state of Virginia
and arouse the entire South. It was, as the Springfield Republican
wrote, a farce, and not even the hanging of Brown could turn it into a
tragedy. Besides no more serious consequences would result than an
occasional slave getting an additional lash in order to make him "con-
tented in his natural and proper pi ace.
Lest it be asserted that Harpers Ferry was the logical result of
antislavery politics, it was also essential that Republicans portray
Brown as insane. And how better to maintain the Republican position
than to assert that the Democratic administration had driven Brown mad.
The press pictured Brown as a peace-loving man who had gone to Kansas
to establish a new home for his family but had been brutally attacked
by the forces of slavery. The Republican , choosing to ignore Brown's
messianic and controversial career as a Springfield wool merchant,
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remembered him as "naturally a quiet man" who had enjoyed the trust
and respect of his neighbors. It was men in the service of Buchanan
who had murdered two of Brown's sons and had destroyed the old man's
reason. Two years before the Harpers Ferry raid, Brown had lectured
in Massachusetts, exhibiting a heavy chain and relating a story of
great brutality. In October 1859, Republican papers told the story
again of how Brown's sons, bound in oxen chains, were forced by federal
o
troops to march thirty miles under a broiling Kansas sun.
When Brown's trial began in late October, Republicans shifted their
attention to the indecent haste with which the Virginia authorities were
trying their prisoner. Judge Richard Parker denied motions for time to
gather affidavits to demonstrate that Brown was insane; and when two
Northern lawyers arrived to replace the court-appointed Virginians,
Parker allowed them no recess to become acquainted with the case. The
Evening Transcript rhetorically asked whether anyone had ever heard of
such a request being denied in a capital case. "Never in a Protestant
country," the paper replied. There was old Brown, lying wounded on his
cot, unable to hear clearly the proceedings of his trial, while the
9
Virginia authorities railroaded him to his doom.
Behind this attack on Virginian justice was a deep Republican
anxiety. The Middlesex County Republican convention met in Charlestown,
Massachusetts, to nominate candidates for local offices and the subject
of Brown was an unwelcome embarrassment. As the delegates debated how
to best preserve the party's image, a majority seemed ready to suoport
a resolve deploring the raid but blaming it on the Buchanan administra-
tion, until someone suggested that the most expedient course was to
avoid any mention of Brown at all. In Concord,' the town Republican
committee asked local author Henry Thoreau to refrain from giving
his "Plea for Captain 'John Brown."'
0
First term Congressman Charles Francis Adams worried that Harpers
Ferry would make his new position more difficult. Would Washington
become a more chaotic and dangerous place for a Massachusetts Repre-
sentative? "I have lived so little in any school of trial in late
years that I know not how weak I am." Adams wrote to his son Henry
then studying in Dresden that "in your little German corner of the
world" the recent events in America might seem distant and obscure,
but there was nothing occurring in Europe that would have such a pro-
found impact on the world. 11
II
No one was more unsettled by Harpers Ferry than Henry Wilson, who
feared that Brown might destroy the coalition which formed the Mass-
achusetts Republican party--a coalition which Wilson had been instru-
mental in creating and which represented his life's work. If Charles
Sumner were the symbol of the Massachusetts Republican party, Wilson
was the engine that made it work. Sumner, the ideologist, was tempera-
mentally unfit for compromise. Wilson was the pragmatic politician
who pursued immediate objectives, seeing that the war against slavery
would be won one skirmish at a time. Politics was the vehicle which
had enabled Wilson, born to a poor family in a declining New Hampshire
hilltown, become an influential Senator. Politics had enabled "the
Natick Cobbler" to lay aside the tools with which he once made the
cheap brogans destined for Southern slaves. Now he was a man of
influence sought out for advice by the leading men in New England.
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Wilson was so totally immersed in politics that he left his wife on
their wedding night to deliver a campaign speech.
Wilson was a state legislator when Daniel Webster delivered his
Seventh of March address upholding the Compromise of 1850 and its fugi-
give slave bill. Wilson rose in the Massachusetts House of Representa-
tives to condemn the speech and introduce a resolution instructing Webster
to vote for the Wilmot Proviso. When the resolution was defeated Wilson
defiantly announced to his colleagues: "I will go out from this hall
and unite with any party or body of men to drive you from power, rebuke
Daniel Webster and place in his seat a Senator true to the principles
and sentiments of the Commonwealth." For over a decade Wilson moved
through the shifting alignments of Massachusetts parties from Whig to
Free Soil to Know-Nothing , until he at last discovered in the Repub-
1;
licans the vehicle to banish the influence of slavery from the Bay State.
For Wilson, the Republican party was the party of free labor and
the common man. It represented social mobility and material reward for
honest endeavor. Not surprisingly, he considered himself a grand example
of the process. Wilson's Republicanism opposed the arrogant Southern
aristocracy and the Boston commercial elite, for both despised honest
self-made men. While Hunker politicians like Caleb Cushing contemptuously
asked if Massachusetts' government was to be "shoemakerized," Wilson
sought the support of those who, in his opinion, were "more intelligent
but less wealthy" than the Boston Whigs. In a letter to Sumner, he ex-
pressed his contempt for the upper class: "I for one don't want the en-
dorsement of the 'best society' of Boston until I am dead— then all of
us are sure of it--for it endorses everything that is dead." By 1859
Wilson could relish the political destruction of his old enemies in
Massachusetts and could look forward to the triumph of Republicanism
on the national stage. Surely this party was too important to let
"a damned old fool" like Brown jeopardize its success . 4
Wilson had particular reason to fear the results of the Brown
raid. In May 1858, Hugh Forbes, an Englishman who had been hired by
Brown as drillmaster for his antislavery "army," approached Wilson on
the Senate floor and excitedly related an almost unintelligible story.
He had fallen out with Brown, was denied his salary, and now wanted
to even the score by exposing Brown's plans for a dramatic attack on
slavery. Forbes, speaking "in a towering passion," incoherently ex-
pressed his grievances against Brown and left Wilson anxious and con-
fused. Wilson then wrote to Samuel Gridley Howe, told him of his
strange visitor, and asked what Brown was up to. Howe responded that
Brown would confine his activities to Kansas and that Forbes was un-
balanced and unreliable. Satisfied, Wilson let the matter slip his
mind. But now the memory of that meeting came rushing back and Wilson
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worried that he would be accused of foreknowledge of the raid.
Wilson also recalled that during the previous May he had first met
Brown at a dinner with the Bird Club, an influential group of radical
antislavery politicians and businessmen that ate at the Parker House.
Wilson was suspicious of Brown, in part because of the incident of the
preceeding year, but more fundamentally because he disliked those who
let their passions overrule their reason. As Brown and Wilson sat
side-by-side at the dinner table their conversation was brusque.
"Senator Wilson, I understand you do not approve of my course," said
Brown. Wilson replied curtly: "I am opposed to all violations of law
"1
and to violence, believing they lay a burden on the antislavery cause.
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Wilson was on a tour of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania
when he received word of the Brown raid. These states, with local
races in early November, were crucial for the presidential contest of
1860 and this fact was undoubtedly on Wilson's mind as he completed a
long series of speeches. Would all his effort be ruined by this rash
old man? He could not know, but he was certain that "Brown's invasion
has thrown us, who were in a splendid position, on the defensive . . . .
If we are defeated next year we owe it to that foolish and insane move-
ment of Brown's.""'
7
Ill
While the Republicans denied any association with Brown, their op-
ponents made every effort to link them with the old Kansas warrior.
Benjamin Franklin Butler opened the barrage in the Massachusetts
Senate. The most flamboyant politician in the state, Butler possessed
an instinct for the jugular that made him notorious even in an age of
bare-knuckled politics. He told his Republican colleagues in the
Senate that they must bear a heavy responsibility for the events at
Harpers Ferry: "Ye are the men who abetted him in Kansas in his attacks
on peaceable citizens there and paraded him as a martyr to freedom.
Upon your head is his blood." Butler suggested that the Republicans
made their mistake by letting Brown believe that they wer? in earnest
when they talked about fighting for freedom rather than merely posturing
1
8
for political effect.
Many of the anti -Republicans celebrated when "bushels of letters"
were discovered in the Maryland farmhouse that Brown had used as his
headquarters. Though only abolitionists such as Sanborn, Howe, anu
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Gerrit Smith were really implicated by these letters, the anti -Repub-
licans were in no mood to observe such distinctions; they claimed that
this discovery proved that important Republican leaders were privy to
Brown's plans. They insisted that Brown was a member of the Republican
party, a man "petted and flattered and used" by their inner circle.
The Boston Post
,
mouthpiece for the Buchanan administration and a major
dispenser of federal patronage throughout the Commonwealth, claimed that
Republican luminaries such as Wilson, Banks, and Congressman Anson
Burlingame, had wined and dined Brown on his recent trip to Boston and
had honored him for his militant attacks on slavery. The Boston Courier ,
voice of the most conservative remnants of Massachusetts Whiggery, re-
minded its readers that Governor Banks had once said he was willing to
"let the Union slide" and that Burlingame had boasted that the Republicans,
when they came to office, would "grind the 'Slave Senate' between the
upper and nether millstones of our power." Thus Brown's fanaticism, ac-
cording to the anti -Republi cans , was but "the evil fruit of the evil
tree" of Republican agitation. The "Black Republicans" had become the
"Brown Republicans." Their irresponsibility had led to an inevitable
19
result: "The knife of the black man at the throat of the white man."
On one point Massachusetts conservatives agreed with their bitterest
enemies, the abolitionists: Brown was not insane. For if the abolition-
ists needed a sane martyr, the anti-Republicans needed a nane criminal.
They argued that the insanity plea was a mere attempt by Republicans tc
cover up their responsibility, and that the affidavits collected by
defense lawyers proved only a tendency to insanity in Brown's family,
but nothing about the old man himself. They claimed that the
affidavits'
description of Brown sounded like that of any abolitionist: hones;,
47
benevolent, mild mannered on all subjects except slavery with which
he was completely absorbed and totally unreasonable. If Brown were
insane, conservatives argued, so was one quarter of Massachusetts and
20
three quarters of its clergy.
Much of the anti -Republican propaganda was aimed at those con-
servatives in the Commonwealth—basical ly former Whigs--who had drifted
into the Republican party. "Good will come out of this if it serves
to open the eyes of tens of thousands of well-meaning men," the Post
declared. These men must be made to realize the danger which abolition-
ism posed to all property. What if Southern politicians and clergymen
advocated that free traders burn the mills at Lowell and divide the
property of the owners among the operatives? What if a Southerner had
rented a farm near Lowell, and used it as a base to seize a factory and
. . 21
incite the workers to revolution?
Urging Massachusetts property owners to empathize with Virginians
had its limitations, however. Though strong class lines existed in the
Bay State, the bourgeoisie was reluctant to acknowledge them. The image
of an open society based on free and happy labor was important even to
conservative Republicans. To admit that Massachusetts workers represented
a potential source of discontent and instability would be to concede a
good deal of the proslavery argument. Though Republicans, who were
usually of native stock, had little affection for the Irish laborer in
their midst, few would admit that these workers were a potential target
for revolutionary activity.
Two anti-Republican tickets contested the 1859 election. In addition
to the Democrats, an "Opposition Party" was formed by old Whigs and con-
servative Americans. T.iey met on October 19, to nominate former Governor
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George Nathan Briggs for his old office. Many wealthy and influential
men were in this movement—men who had once controlled the Common-
wealth, but whose day of political power had passed. They gathered in
Faneuil Hall to denounce both major parties. They found the Democrats
guilty of kindling a fire in Kansas which "created confusion and dis-
traction everywhere. " In traditional Whiggish fashion they complained
about Democratic opposition to measures which would "expand the re-
sources and encourage and protect the industry of the country." But
these old Whigs saw the Republicans as no less an evil: their policies,
contrary to the Constitution, were a threat to the Union. These "old
fog!es"--as the Republicans called them---could nevertheless perceive
some fundamental contradictions in their upstart opponents. They noted
that Republicans claimed to be the friend of the Negro in one state
while, through exclusion bills, denied them "the liberty of breathing
its air" in another; and that Republicans condemned alien influences
in one section while they "pandered to the worst passions of the
foreign element" in another. The Opposition hoped to convince conserva-
tive Republicans that the struggle over the expansion of slavery into the
territories was essentially over, that the whole issue was now an ab-
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straction capable of exciting only fanatics like Brown.
Some Massachusetts Whigs wanted to join with the Democrats and form
a united opposition to the Republicans. A few already had supported
Buchanan in 1856 as the only way to prevent Fremont's election and its
presumably disastrous consequences. Moreover, the Massachusetts Demo-
cratic party itself had been changing. Having abandoned many radical
economic positions, it was not so offensive to conservative Whigs as in
the past. And the solid connections many Democrats enjoyed with Southern
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commercial interests were an enticement to the Boston business com-
munity. But when the Democrats nominated Benjamin Butler for gover-
nor, fusion became impossible. Butler's political base was among the
factory workers of his native Lowell; and although he was an immensely
successful lawyer with extensive holdings in New England textile mills,
he continually attacked the vested economic interests of the Common-
weal th--especially the banks. Even an intense dislike of the Republicans,
compounded by the shock of Harpers Ferry, could not induce an old Whig
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to support a man like Butler.
While the Opposition stayed close to moderate an ti slavery respect-
ability, the Democrats embraced the proslavery hunkerism of the Buchanan
administration. The real objective of Massachusetts Democrats, after
all, was not in winning state elections—at best a very long shot—but
in staying in the good graces of the President and enjoying the federal
payroll. Benjamin Hallett, a leader of the state party, made no effort
to hide his proslavery views. In a speech at Lowell, the center of the
New England textile industry, Hallett asserted that the Republican party
was based on twin follies: enmity to foreign labor and hatred of the
South. New Englanders should recognize that the Republican party was
attacking the basis of their prosperity; for it was Southern cotton and
foreign labor that kept Lowell alive. He reminded his audience that
Massachusetts built her mills, her ships, her houses, and her cities
out of slave cotton. She was as responsible for the employment of
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thousands of slaves as if she owned them herself.
The Democrats' major contention was that Republicans, concerned
with distant and exotic problems, ignored the common white man at home.
Butler argued the Republican obsession with Kansas proved this: "We
flew into a fever because a few men were killed out in Kansas. We
subscribed Sharps Rifles, we threatened dissolution of the Union,
... we put our handkerchiefs to our eyes and turned our eyes up
and showed the whites of them in holy horror." But for every white
man who died in Kansas, Butler claimed that twelve died in the un-
sanitary almshouses of Massachusetts. In Governor Banks' latest
executive message there were five pages on Kansas and five lines on
the problems of Massachusetts' poor. "Is it not time to have an ad-
ministration of the government that will devote five lines to Kansas
and five pages to our own home institutions?" asked Butler. The pug-
nacious Democrat denied that New Englanders should be concerned with
the expansion of slavery into the territories, any more than Southern-
ers should worry if Massachusetts settlers brought their pigs into
Kansas
.
On October nineteenth, shortly after Harpers Ferry, Massachusetts'
legislature repealed the last of the Commonwealth's discriminatory
black laws. Over the previous two decades, Massachusetts had removed
laws that had condoned segregation in schools and public transporta-
tion and which had forbidden miscegenation. Now the Republican-dominated
legislature repealed the law which prohibited blacks from joining the
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state mi li tia.
Though Massachusetts had relatively few blacks, there was enough
anti-Negro feeling in the state to make this an attractive issue to
the Democrats. Butler, a general in the militia, objected strenuously
to serving alongside "the blackest Negro that came out of Guinea,"
and warned that the morale of his men would suffer from the forced
integration. Anyone who did not agree, Butler said, "had better exhibit
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his taste in that line by taking to himself a black wife." According
to the Boston Post
,
there could be but one purpose in enrolling blacks
in the militia at this time: to aid future John Browns burn and pil-
lage. Massachusetts Republicans, the Democrats argued, would never
use a black militiaman to curb internal disorders; for any law they
enforced would become so odious it could never be maintained. A
black militia could only serve unconstitutional purposes such as
assisting in an insurrection of Southern slaves. Democrats hoped that
the image of Negroes with guns would bring a sharp reaction at the
polls.
IV
The Republicans conducted a quiet campaign. From their perspective,
it was best that little interest be generated in this election. If
Massachusetts voters did not become alarmed over the sectional crisis
or if their negrophobia did not get out of hand, they would vote as
they had in the past elections and return Banks and a Republican legis-
lature to Beacon Hill. Some Republicans—Banks among them— had opposed
the militia bill arguing that, since the Supreme Court had ruled that
Negroes were not citizens, it was unconstitutional to admit them to the
militia. Furthermore, they felt the bill needlessly handed their op-
ponents an effective issue. Other Republicans like William S. Robinson--
who wrote the "Warrington" columns for the Springfield Republ ican- -mini
-
mized the issue by ridiculing the militia: "Surely the least we can do
for our downcast brethren is to give them a chance to amuse themselves
in that harmless way that is so agreeable to General Butler." Robinson
noted that Butler had been a sponsor of Irish companies and suggested
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that most people in Massachusetts would sooner trust their lives and
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property to Negroes than to Irish.
Nativism proved another problem for the party. Some Massachusetts
Republicans still referred to themselves as "American Republicans" and
wanted to pursue a vigorously anti-alien position. Thus, the friends
of Micah Dyer, a candidate for the state senate from Boston, promoted
him as a man who had kept the public schools "pure" and free from
"superstition and bigoted invasion"— a reference to the long struggle
over which version of the Bible was to be used in the Boston public
schools. But other Republicans wanted to minimize this appeal; their
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eyes were on the large German vote in the West.
Butler's comparison of slaves with livestock gave the Republicans
an opportunity to go on the offensive and to instruct the voters on
slavery's degrading effects on white men. If there was no difference
between property in pigs and property in men, one could accept the claim
that all laboring men--white as well as black—ought to be held as slaves.
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This was a subject Republicans preferred to John Brown.
At the November election, Republicans retained solid control of the
state. Although the Democrats had increased their delegation in the
House by twenty and in the Senate by three, they were still a tiny
minority. Banks' 1858 majority slipped to 8,000, but his percentage of
the vote actually increased. Republicans were relieved at the results
and felt they had weathered the storm unleashed by Brown. As the Evening
Transcript put it: "There will be less harping upon Harpers Ferry . . .
,.31
as the elections will be over for a year.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PURITAN WARRIOR
John Brown was not banished from the public mind merely be-
cause the elections had passed; his Puritan heroism made him a
figure not easily forgotten in Massachusetts. Among those most
deeply affected by the old man was the anti slavery lawyer and Re-
publican politician, John Albion Andrew.
Andrew had been a Maine boy of modest circumstances who, in
the tradition of many ambitious adolescents of northern New England,
had set off to Boston to forge a career. When he arrived in Mass-
achusetts in search of a tutor who would instruct him in the myster-
ies of the common law, he carried with him a commitment to social
reform. Although he established a reputation as a lawyer of uncom-
mon integrity and more than average skill, Andrew never forgot the
ills that plagued his society and spent far too many hours in his
philanthropic activities to become one of Boston's wealthy attorneys.
To Andrew the law was a moral force rather than a tool of commerce.
He regularly visited local prisons and listened to the stories of
poor men and women who had been convicted without legal advice. In-
variably he would prefer to help them—often without fee—and pass
by the more lucrative, if less socially purposeful, cases that appealed
to his colleagues J
Andrew was among the Massachusetts Republicans with a foot in the
abolitionist camp. He was a devoted friend of James Freeman Clarke,
the radical minister who, like Emerson and Parker, had clashed with the
conservative forces that dominated New England Uni tarianism. Andre* was,
in fact, a member of Clarke's Church of the Disciples, a congrega-
tion that attracted reformers and dissenters of every stripe.
Andrew spoke from the same platform as Parker and Phillips, and
joined the "Anti-Manhunting League" to prevent the capture of
fugitive slaves in Boston. But while Andrew shared the abolition-
ists' passionate dislike of slavery, he retained a respect for law
and the Constitution that made him temperamentally distinct from
them. Unlike the majority of Massachusetts abolitionists who waged
their war on slavery outside of the political process, Andrew saw
2
in the Republican party a vehicle for progress.
Andrew served a term in the Massachusetts legislature, in
which he earned his reputation by matching wits with Caleb Cushing,
Attorney-General in the Pierce administration, who made a formidable
presence in a legislative body of farmers and small-town lawyers.
Andrew took the lead in replying to his attacks on Massachusetts'
Personal Liberty Law, denying it was a violation of the Constitution,
while deftly ignoring Cushing's charge that the law was a step in the
direction of Negro social equality. By 1859 Andrew had become an im-
portant member of the radical wing of Massachusetts Republicanism, a
close ally of Charles Sumner, and a charter member of the influential
Bird Club. Radical Republicans considered Andrew an excellent candi-
date for statewide office.^
Andrew was also the friend and attorney of Samuel Gridley Howe
and through him became closely involved in the Brown defense. He
might have gone to Virginia and defended Brown personally had he not
felt that an antislavery lawyer from Massachusetts would infuriate
a Southern jury. Unlike some of Brown's friends, Andrew was more
55
interested in preserving the old man's life than in presenting an
ideologically pure case, and he reportedly had hired Benjamin Butler
to defend Brown, until Butler injured his ankle and was unable to
travel. He then contacted Maryland Republican Montgomery Blair, who
though declining to serve in the case, recommended Samuel Chilton
of Washington. Andrew also corresponded with George Hoyt, an Athol,
Massachusetts, lawyer who was in Virginia to defend Brown, and urged
him to pursue an insanity plea. It would be a difficult tactic,
Andrew wrote, as Brown would deny he was insane. Hoyt agreed to go
along with Andrew's advice: "Whether he is insane or not, we ought
to try on the garment."^
Andrew also chaired a committee that included such radicals as
Howe, Emerson, and Samuel Sewell, whose task it was to raise funds for
Brown's defense. They approached a broad range of individuals and even
met with favorable responses from a few conservatives. Some Republican
politicians, however, were wary of association with the cause. Charles
Francis Adams replied that, while he had a strong sympathy for Brown
and his family, he thought it best for him to start his term in Congress
"unencumbered" by any association with Harpers Ferry. He confide'd to
his diary his fears that Brown's attorneys were unsympathetic to the
antislavery cause and that they might use their information to embarrass
donors
.
How much did Andrew know about his friends' involvement in the
Harpers Ferry raid? This is a difficult question to answer with certainty.
As attorney for Howe and Sanborn, Andrew had to convince the public that
his clients were not criminally implicated with Brown. In this role he
sent letters to several Boston newspapers denying that Howe had supplied
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Brown with arms. Howe may have wished to save his friend from the
embarrassment of politically sensitive information, and in one
letter he told Andrew that the Kansas Committee had given Brown
rifles on condition that they be used in Kansas alone. Sanborn
maintained in his memoirs that he had refrained from telling Andrew
the "full particulars of the case."
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But the nature of Andrew's advice to his two worried clients
indicated that he was aware of their predicament. He gave them the '
hypothetical example of a man in Maine who gives a cannon to someone
who then uses it illegally in Texas. The Maine man could be tried
for conspiracy but only in Maine. This thinly veiled advice con-
vinced Sanborn, after a short trip to Canada, that he could return
home and rely on Massachusetts to defend him. Andrew also came into
the possession of five letters which Higginscn wrote and which ap-
parently contained incriminating information. Sanborn urged that
Higginson recover them, and Andrew, sensitive to their nature, in-
sisted that Higginson pick them up personally rather than trust them
to the mails.^
Andrew's involvement with those close to Brown complicated his
political career, especially when he ran for governor the following
November. Had he been a mere politician he would have kept his dis-
tance from the entire Harpers Ferry affair. But Andrew was also a
romantic perfectionist who was deeply touched by the old man's hero-
ism. In his younger days Andrew had written that "a few bullet holes
through the bodies of reformers, though they destroy mortal life,
are only so many sky lights for the truth to shine through." Now,
in Brown, he saw the practical application of this abstraction.
Andrew had always believed it was in the struggle against evil that
men raised themselves to moral heights. How could a man of such
sentiments refuse to rally to one who, in the face of such odds and
at such sacrifice, had fought the sin which stained the national
character? The heroism of men like Brown would destroy slavery--
that "unnatural thing"—which stood as an obstacle to human progress.
Andrew believed that Harpers Ferry was one of the great events of his
age; he felt compelled to play his part in the unfolding of history.
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Andrew's emotional commitment to Brown was not without other diffi-
culties. Always an advocate of non-violence, Andrew reflected on the
day of Brown's execution that he had never fired a gun nor struck a
blow in his life. But Brown the martyr transcended the violence of
Harpers Ferry. Andrew made this clear when he spoke before an anti-
slavery audience at Tremont Temple. He stated he did not know whether
the raid was wise or foolish: "I only know that whether the enterprise
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itself was the one or the other, John Brown himself is right ."
II
Many came to share Andrew's feelings about Brown's courage and
dignity in the face of death. As the old man stoically waited for his
execution, public opinion grew more favorable towards him, often divorc-
ing the individual from his deeds. No doubt an important reason for
this was the coverage given him by the New England press. He remained
the most compelling news story throughout the autumn of 1859 and editors
hungered for any information they could obtain. Brown's friends will-
ingly channeled his eloquent letters to friendly journalists.
Brown's sense of drama never failed him in 'his last few weeks. No
man ever made a more convincing martyr. At his trial he used the
opportunity to speak to an audience far broader than the several
hundred spectators who crowded into the Charlestown courthouse.
After Judge Parker sentenced him to hang, Brown rose and delivered
a speech that electrified much of the North. He disavowed any de-
sire to incite murder, treason, or slave insurrection. All he had
hoped to do was to run slaves off to Canada and awake his fellow
citizens to the unchristian nature of slavery. He reminded his
audience that the Bible teaches "to remember them that are in bonds
as bound with them," and thus, that as a Christian, the sufferings
of the slaves were his personal responsibility. Erect and unruffled,
he stated that he had no regrets that his blood would be mingled with
that of his sons and with the blood of the millions who perished under
10
s lave ry.
Among the spectators in the courtroom was Thomas Russell, an anti-
slavery judge from Boston who had once hidden Brown from federal of-
ficials. Russell later wrote an account of Brown's address for the
Boston Travel ler whi ch told of the old man's absolute calmness and self-
control and the respect which his courage had won from even his most
bitter enemies. He emphasized that, as Parker's sentencing had come
earlier than expected, Brown's remarks were neither affected nor pre-
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pared. Rather, they came naturally from an honest, rustic heart.
Brown projected an image as a latter-day Cromwell, the avenger
of a Puritan God. Many New Englanders found him plausible and welcome.
Even though the Victorian mind held that ethical sensibility was the
special gift of women, the ante-bellum Yankee retained an Old Testament
morality which visualized moral enforcement as a vigorous and masculine
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task. In a period when Massachusetts was undergoing profound change,
Brown was a timely figure. The transformation from a rural, agricul-
tural society to an urban, manufacturing one and the introduction of
large numbers of non-Protestant non-Yankees created a fear of moral
laxness among older stock citizens. Commercial relationships were
replacing personal bonds; the value of a man's word was not what it
once had been. Although the vigorously moral society of the Puritans
had long since vanished, Massachusetts still identified with its
historical past.
In this time of moral flabbiness when (as the Worcester Transcript
wrote) "we have worshiped God on cushioned seats," John Brown had a
special significance. For those who believed that the days of the
Puritan martyrs had long passed, Brown seemed to step out of the pages
of Foxe to confront his generation with a moral example, to exemplify
"the spirit of those old Biblical saints and martyrs who encountered
bonds and death in righteous causes." The Congregationalist , an organ
of New England Orthodox Tri ni tari anism, called Brown a genuine disciple
of Christ "whose acts were without doubt the agency for strengthening
the antislavery ranks and dispelling moral apathy." Other writers
eagerly compared Brown to John the Baptist, John Hus, and even Joan of
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Arc. His address to the court was like Paul's speech before Agrippa.
No one did more to further Brown's reputation as a Puritan hero than
James Redpath. In his series in the Atlas and Bee , Redpath asserted that
Brown and his modern Ironsides were unparalleled successes for rendering
slave property insecure throughout the South. Brown would teach Mass-
achusetts to emulate Harpers Ferry the next time a slave-hunter came
after a fugitive. Redpath recalled stories of camp life in Kansas tnat
would gladden the heart of the sternest Puritan, of how the old man
gathered his rough followers around him every morning and evening
for prayers, how no food was ever served without a respectful grace,
and how no profanity, no man of loose morals was allowed in his camp.
Brown had captured several proslavery Missourians after his successful
deliverance of slaves. The prisoners swore profusely at their captors,
and when they continued their blasphemy despite warnings, Brown ordered
them on their knees at gunpoint and demanded that they pray.
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Boston readers discovared through an interview with Brown's wife
that her husband had never taken tobacco or liquor, that his life had
been one of self-denial, that he had instructed his family: "Let us
save money and give it to the poor." Mary Brown related that, when an
admirer sent John a fine coat that she recognized he would never wear,
she returned it for a coarse one. These revelations were bound to
havean effect onasociety as concerned with recititude as Massachusetts.
By December, Samuel Bowles' Springfield Republican , which in October
had dismissed Brown as a madman and a fool, was calling him a "true
man and a Christian," whose spirit would live on to inspire the North
and whose influence would never be excluded from any planter's mansion
14
or Negro hut in all Virginia.
Many in Massachusetts relished the idea that Brown would trouble
the sleep of Southerners. Harpers Ferry ignited the anti -Southernism
that had long smoldered in the Commonwealth. Anti -Southernism had as
its core a genuine revulsion to the ownership of human beings; but by
the 1850's it had developed into a sentiment much broader than simply
anti slavery. A gap had widened between New England and the South that
made the two sections into virtually separate nations. Many New
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Englanders saw the South as a backward, slothful society whose lack
of industry was almost un-American. Hiding behind the mask of
chivalry was a society lacking fundamental decency. Slavery, bad
for degrading blacks, was worse for degrading whites; by creating a
leisure society the South had made itself susceptible to all the sins
of idleness. Wendell Phillips' image of slavery as an enormous
15
brothel did not go ignored.
Thus Virginia's difficulty in dislodging Brown's small band was
an occasion to point out the moral failings of the South. Most people
in Massachusetts believed that, had a similar raid taken place in their
state, a handful of local citizens would have quickly suppressed it.
Massachusetts would have never succumbed to panic and called on federal
troops. Virginia was a sorry sight. Once she had nurtured some of the
nation's greatest men; now she spawned ruffians and cowards. Slavery
had exhausted the fertility of her soil and the character of her
people. Cowardness was inevitable in a people who needed to enforce
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their social institutions with whips, fetters, and coffles.
All autumn the Massachusetts press delighted in reporting evidence
that the South was gripped with hysteria. Their readers smiled at a
report that the Virginia militia, believing a Shaker peddler's cart was
an infernal machine, had inspected it from "apple-sauce to pumpkin seed"
before expelling him from the state under armed guard. The Massachusetts
Spy told of a man near Harpers Ferry who, on hearing the whippoorwil Is
of the forest, thought it was the cries of his neighbors being slaught-
ered by abolitionists and rode into town to raise the militia. Accord-
ing to Redpath, the South would need diapers before it heard the last
of Brown.
Behind this ribaldry was genuine earnestness. For these anti-
slavery Yankees had found a real weakness in their antagonist. At
the very least, preached the Reverend A. L. Stone at the Park Street
Church, Southerners had learned that they best not attempt to expand
slavery. The Springfield Republican noted that the possibility of
servile insurrection increased daily as the planters, through their
sexual indiscretions, continued to diffuse more white blood into the
slave population, thus making it more aggresive and intelligent.
Southerners would never be able to keep word of Harpers Ferry from
even the most obscure slave hovel, and formerly submissive slaves
would receive new inspiration by the knowledge that there were white
men willing to die to smash their chains. The Puritan warrior had
1
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apparently enjoyed a great victory.
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Harpers Ferry presented a formidable dilemma to William Lloyd
Garrison. As a disunionist seeking to end the North's complicity
with human bondage, Garrison saw that Brown had advanced the cause of
unraveling this unholy compact of states. But how could he endorse
Brown's actions without repudiating his own lifelong pacifism? Brown
and Garrison had met at Theodore Parker's house in 1857 where, each
convinced he was God's agent to remove the scourge of slavery, they
argued over the questions of violence and non-resistance. Garrison
had lectured Brown on the ungodliness of force and fortified his posi-
tion by ample quotations from the New Testament. But the pietistic
perfectionism of Garrison had little influence on Brown, raised on
the Calvinist belief that man was a sinful creature entirely dependent
on God's grace. For every New Testament evidence that Garrison
could muster, Brown retorted with citations from the Old. Though
Garrison, at least, came away from the meeting with a healthy respect
for Brown's character, there was no way in which these two could act
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in unison.
After careful consideration, Garrison made his pronouncement on
Harpers Ferry in the Liberator of October 28. He reaffirmed his peace
principles and called the raid . "well intended but misguided," but he.
also attacked the hypocrisy of Brown's proslavery enemies. "By the
logic of Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill," Brown was justified.
Though Garrison emphasized that this was not the logic by which he
lived his own life, he noted that most Americans revered the heroes
of 1775. If men were justified in resorting to force over so trivial
an issue as a three-penny tax on tea, how much more so were those who,
bound in chains, saw their children marching off to the auction block.
Slavery itself was a form of violence; one must choose between the
spirit of Bunker Hill and the servility of the slave plantation.
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Garrison chose Bunker Hill.
Having determined how best to reconcile an ti slavery with non-
resistance, Garrison was typically intolerant of those who did not
follow his views. When John Greenleaf Whittier published a poem
about Brown which condemned the "folly which seeks through evil good,"
Garrison reminded Whittier that he had glorified the Revolutionary War
heroes in many of his other works. He noted that, unlike himself,
Whittier participated in elections and thus upheld the Constitution
and its protection of slavery. Whittier was also struggling with the
conflict Brown had raised between his antislavery and his pacifistic
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views. Truly repelled by the violence of Harpers Ferry, he had
seen one of the pikes that Brown had made for use by liberated
slaves. He blanched and declared: "It is not a Christian weapon."
But while condemning the Harpers Ferry raid, the Quaker poet saw in
Brown the qualities of love and justice. It was he who popularized
the apocryphal scene of Brown, on his way to the gallows, kissing
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the slave child.
Garrison's charge that he had been inconsistent in his pacifism'
stung Whittier deeply. When he wrote to Garrison, his gentle Quaker
style could not conceal his irritation. He denied that he had ever
glorified the violence of the Revolution and accused Garrison of
omitting those sections of his poems in which he specifically called
for peace. The controversy between the two men indicates the narrow
intellectual path on which many non-resistant abolitionists were forced
to walk after Harpers Ferry. In accusing Whittier of a double-standard
on non-violence, Garrison may have been projecting a sense of doubt
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about his own consistency.
Wendell Phillips was less circumspect in his praise of Brown. In-
vited to lecture at Henry Ward Beecher's Pilgrim Church in Brooklyn,
Phillips delivered "The Lesson of the Hour"--one of his greatest speeches.
There was no question in his mind that bullets were better than fetters.
He denied that Brown could be held accountable for treason as Virginia
had no foundation in law. No government cculd exist except on the
basis of willing submission by its citizens. Virginia was but "a
pirate ship," and John Brown "a Lord High Admiral of the Almighty, with
his commission to sink every pirate he meets on God's ocean." Brown
had twice the right to hang Governor Wise that Governor Wise had to hang
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John Brown. Phillips, who had long sought the dismemberment of
"this Sodom of a country of ours," believed the Harpers Ferry raid
had brought disunion closer. He saw the raid as a vehicle to incite
antipathy to the national government; he reminded his audience that
it was not Virginia militia who had captured Brown, but Federal troops
"with the Vulture of the Union above them"—marines whose salary was
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supported by every taxpayer.
Brown had so animated the abolitionists that a non-resistant like
Parker Pillsbury could revel in the prospect of a coming Armageddon.
"The time is at hand," he wrote a friend, "when mothers will count it
a joy to give up their sons in such a conflict as ours, ... so that
the slave may have his liberty." Every an ti slavery sermon, act, or
prayer, Pillsbury believed, worked directly for insurrection. Oliver
Johnson saw Brown's martyrdom as the means of exterminating "pro-
slavery hunkerism" from the North, and James Freeman Clarke felt Brown
had lifted antislavery sentiment to a "loftier and more Christian at-
titude." George Luther Stearns, apparently recovering from the hysteria
of October which had promoted a journey to Canada, by March of the follow-
ing year could see the success of Harpers Ferry in political terms:
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"It will force the Republican party upward."
The abolitionists were aware that it was Brown the martyr who was
valuable to their cause. Higginson wrote his mother that if Brown were
freed "it would not do half as much good as his being executed." While
most of the abolitionists did not express themselves so cold-bloodedly,
many undoubtedly realized that the gallows erected in Charlestown,
Virginia, were of more value to their cause than many volumes of the
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Liberator.
The Liberator of November fourth reported that among John
Brown's achievements at Harpers Ferry was that he "awakened the
hermit of Concord from his usual state of philosophic indifference."
No other event had so captured Thoreau's imagination. Brown, the
perfect transcendental hero, had successfully confronted the amoral,
commercial values of mid-century America; Thoreau relished the in-
structive value of Brown's passing. Life was a paradox for Thoreau.
Man had within himself a noble potential but usually never recognized
it. Some became "serfs of the soil" like the farmers who toiled near
Walden pond; others achieved the sham success of the merchant poten-
tates of Boston. But Brown's death would be an affirmation of his
greatness. For in order to die a man must first live, and Brown was
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among the few that had lived.
Thoreau read his "Plea for Captain John Brown" in Concord,
Worcester, and Boston. He probably attracted more attention during
these lectures than at any other time in his life, including the sug-
gestion by the Springfield Republican that he imitate Brown and do
good by rushing to the gallows. But Thoreau had never been concerned
with popularity; he was out to sear the conscience of Massachusetts.
In his "Plea" he emphasized a common theme among the abolitionists:
Massachusetts was an accomplice in the sins of slavery. She was one
of the "confederated overseers" which had pledged itself to keep the
slaves in bondage and return them to their masters should they escape.
Thoreau showed no remorse over the violence of Harpers Ferry. For once
the Sharps rifle had been used in a righteous cause rather than in the
hunting of Indians or of fugitive slaves. Let us not now weep for
Brown, he declared to hi s audience; it is too early for that. We can
weep after the slaves are free. Now let us take our revenge.
No less impressed with Brown was Lydia Maria Child. The author
of a long shelf of sentimental, popular fiction and one of the most
militant women in the anti slavery cause, Child wrote to Governor Wise
asking permission to go to the Charlestown jail and nurse the wounded
Brown. Aware of the dangers that might face any abolitionist in the
South, Child was nevertheless determined to carry out her "mission of
humanity," until Brown persuaded her that he was recovering and under
the watchful care of a compassionate jailer. Though the trip was
aborted, Child's correspondence with Wise and with the wife of Virginia
Senator James Mason, became one of the most eloquent and popular de-
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fenses of Brown, selling over 300,000 copies.
The Garrisonians would have been less than human had they not
felt some sense of satisfaction following Harpers Ferry. The decade
of the 1850's had been a frustrating one for them. Garrison had alien-
ated a majority of the antislavery movement. The ranks of the ideo-
logically pure Garrisonians had dwindled as some of the eld stalwarts
died, while others drifted toward the Republican party. Few young men
appeared to refill the ranks. The Liberator limped along with its slim
list of subscribers--mostly Negroes who presumedly needed little in-
struction in the evils of slavery and racism. Where Garrison had once
provoked controversy, he now found indifference. It was one thing for
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an agitator to be mobbed, but quite another to be ignored.
Brown put the Garrisonians back in the spotlight. Like the Turner
raid which projected Garrison to notoriety almost thirty years earlier,
Brown's exposure of the South' s weaknesses made the Garrisonians appear
(depending on one's point of view) like prophets or incendiaries.
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Phillips' lectures were front page news and Garrison spoke in a
Tremont Temple overflowing to the rafters. Disunion, once merely
the topic of a poorly attended 1857 Worcester conference, now seemed
a distinct possibility. A crucial moment in the slavery conflict had
arrived. The nation could not avoid the confrontation.
IV
On December 2, fifteen hundred troops were in Charlestown, Virginia,
to assure that the execution of John Brown would proceed without inter-
ruption. The old man faced death as calmly as he had faced the judge
who had sentenced him. In Massachusetts the day was an occasion to
express both respect and contempt for the departed warrior. Bells
tolled in mourning in Saugus, Lynn, Plymouth, and New Bedford, but in
Westfield local Democrats fired cannons to celebrate the hanging. Ef-
figies of Governor Wise hung in woburn and Natick; while in Concord
a mock-John Brown swung in front of the Town Hall, with a ribald will
making Thoreau one of the chief heirs. The abolitionists of Concord
wanted to lower the town's flag to half-staff but were dissuaded when
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they learned that conservatives had planned to forcibly prevent them.
In the Massachusetts legislature, a representative from Nantucket
proposed adjournment in Brown's honor at the hour of the execution.
This brought the angry retort from Richard Spofford of Newburyport that
honoring a felon would disgrace the Commonwealth. He noted that a few
days earlier a truly great American, Washington Irving, had died and
that the legislature had taken no notice. John Tucker of Boston de-
nounced Brown as a criminal and said that he and "the coward Howe"
were guilty of disturbing the peace of the Union. John Griffin of
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Maiden replied, suggesting that his colleagues direct their "Union-
saving speeches" to South Carolina rather than to Massachusetts.
Though some Republicans in the legislature praised Brown's character,
few thought it useful to make such a provocative gesture as adjourning
in his honor. A similar motion in the Massachusetts Senate lost by a
.
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narrow margin.
On the evening after the execution several thousand persons crowd-
ed into Boston's Tremont Temple for what the press described as the
largest meeting of its kind ever held in the city. A portrait of the
recent martyr rested on the podium, surrounded by a wreath of ever-
green and amaranth. Conspicuously displayed was the remark by Brown:
"I don't know as I can better serve the cause I love so well than to
die for it." Other posters carried Biblical and political quotations
with a heavy emphasis on the anti slavery statements of noted Virgin-
ians—Washington, Jefferson, and Patrick Henry. Above the speaker's
desk was a large replica of the great seal of Virginia. This had be-
come a favorite device of Brown's admirers because of its insurrect-
ionary appeal: a warrior with his foot on the neck of a fallen tyrant
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and the motto, SIC SEMPER TYRANNIS.
According to the Liberator , there was no "funeral drapery" in the
hall. The spirit of the meeting was not one of mourning but of "faith,
trust, and the renewed conservation of spirit." As the proceedings
were about to begin, a man rushed to the front of the hall and unfurled
a banner to the enthusiastic response of the crowd: "He dies by the
mandate of the Slave Power, yet Still lives by virtue of his heroic
deeds." Boston witnessed a resurgence among the abolitionists as well.
Never had they reached such an audience, never had so many respectable
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people been touched by their words. The long list of speakers echoed
the theme established by Garrison: "Today Virginia has murdered John
Brown; Tonight we witness his resurrection."^
No group was so deeply affected by John Brown as Massachusetts' blacks.
On the day of the execution hundreds wore black crepe arm bands and attended
memorial services in their separate churches. Most black shopkeepers
closed their stores and the Post complained that it was impossible to get
a haircut or to have one's shoes blacked all day. In Chelsea a black man
trying to lower the flag to half-staff was chased off by a group of objec-
u-* 35ting whites.
But though Brown was deeply respected among blacks, the Harpers Ferry
raid presented some definite embarrassments. Most whites—and even many
abol itionists— bel ieved that the black man was less aggressive and less
sensate to oppression than the Anglo-Saxon. Brown had hoped to disprove
this in Virginia, but the results of the raid had the opposite effect. Pro-
slavery forces argued that the failure of slaves to rally to Brown's side
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proved that blacks were content in their servile role.
Wendell Phillips discussed this problem in "The Lesson of the Hour."
He noted that in the history of the world only one people had ever cut their
own chains: the blacks of San Domingo. Anglo-Saxons who talked of the
black man's cowardice and servility should remember that their ancestors had
endured serfdom for generations. Nevertheless, Phillips thought that the
redemption of America's blacks would come through the "interference of a
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wiser, higher, more advance civilization."
Some blacks were affected by self-doubt following the raid. Charles
L. Remond. a black minister from Salem, expressed deep disappointment that
there was no general uprising in Virginia. He disagreed with
Phillips, arguing that blacks would have to free themselves. He
warned his peers that prayers alone would never break chains. Free-
dom was never won without sacrifices like that of Brown; blacks
should emulate him in the future.
But the Reverend J. Sella Martin, a former slave himself, vigor-
ously defended the slaves in the Harpers Ferry region. At the huge
meeting at Tremont Temple he claimed that because Brown had not shed
willingly the blood of the owners, he was unable to gain the slaves'-
trust. The slaves did not act cowardly in declining to rally to Brown;
they were merely showing the distrust of whites that they had learned
through generations of treachery. But Martin too looked forward tc
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the day of a black John Brown.
CHAPTER V
MASSACHUSETTS FIGHTS THE SENATE
Many powerful men in Massachusetts were disturbed by the deifi-
cation of Brown. Conservative politicians feared the growing appeal
of anti slavery. Businessmen grimaced at Boston's tarnished image
aniong their Southern customers. The Boston Post
, on the day of
Brown's execution, reinforced these concerns. It reported that the
Richmond Enquirer had expressed surprise that the conservative men
of New England had not publicly denounced Brown's raid and displayed
their determination to uphold the Constitutional rights of the slave-
holding states. The Virginia paper hinted that commercial reprisal
against Massachusetts business might be in the offering."1
While antislavery orators were lauding Brown inside Tremont
Temple, a crowd of angry anti-abolitionists gathered outside. There
was talk that night of emulating the Boston mob of 1825 that had put
a rope around Garrison's neck and dragged him through the streets.
But the crowd, which contained some of those very conservative and
influential men that the Enquirer had referred to, decided to call
for a Union meeting in Faneuil Hall, to be held as soon as arrangements
2
could be made.
It was by no means assured that conservatives would respect the
the rights of abolitionists to hold their meeting. As radical anti-
slavery views gained acceptance in Massachusetts, conservatives
questioned whether free speech was compatible with a stable society.
Certainly Brown's relationship with Massachusetts radicals seemed to
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testify to this tendency: those oily-tongued agitators had led that
simple farmer to his act of fanaticism. The Courier suggested that
freedom of speech presumed a moral disposition to restrain abuse. Only
when men were intelligent and self-disciplined was complete freedom in
the public interest. Conservatives worried that New England was partic-
ularly subject to excesses. Nehemiah Adams, the orthodox minister of
Boston's Essex Street Church, noted that in the South the soil which
grew the largest sugar cane also supported the largest alligators.
Likewise, New England's rich cultural soil supported more distinguished
men than any other region, but it also produced more charlatans, more
unreasonable and wicked men. The Courier claimed that freedom from the
Southern code of dueling and from the lynch law was a mixed blessing.
Their absence gave license to the most vituperative abolitionists. 3
Some of Massachusetts' leading citizens signed the handbills which
called on all who "honor and cherish the Constitution" to meet at
Faneuil Hall. Former governors of several dethroned political persuasions
leant their support: Democrat Marcus Morton, Know-Nothing Henry Gardner,
and Whigs Levi Lincoln, George N. Briggs, and J. H. Clifford. Other
prominent supporters included industrialists Nathan and William Appleton.
On the evening of December 8, Faneuil Hall was packed with respectable
and prosperous men, eager to rehabilitate Massachusetts' reputation.^
This "union-saving" assembly saw a marathon of speeches and resolu-
tions which even Edward Everett found "long and languid." Resolves were
proposed by George Lunt, editor of the Courier , and were unanimously adopt-
ed. They stated that the purpose of the meeting was to prove that
Massachusetts had been "falsely exhibited in the eyes of the nation," and
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that its true nature was sound and conservative. But most of those
present came to hear Everett make his reappearance into political life. 5
After the deaths of Daniel Webster and Rufus Choate, Edward Everett
stood unrivalled as the paragon of Massachusetts conservatism. His
career had touched virtually all the honors to which the upper-class
Bostonian might aspire. At the age of nineteen, he became minister of the
Brattle Street Church, the largest and most fashionable congregation in
the city, where he instructed the Brahmin class in morality and theology.
He travelled in Europe and conversed with scholars and princes, and when
he then returned to Massachusetts to accept Harvard's chair in Greek it
was with all the proper international connections in hand. Everett soon
discovered an affinity between academics and politics and made an easy
transformation to the national House of Representatives. Later he served
as Governor of Massachusetts, Minister to England, President of Harvard,
Secretary of State, and United States Senator. Everett dedicated his life
to the preservation of New England culture and the strengthening of the
American Union. He was convinced that the civilization of upper-class New
England was without peer and believed in the Constitution with the tenacity
of a fundamentalist. Like Webster and Choate before him, Everett used his
golden throat to raise the moral homily and the patriotic address to an art
form. 6
Despite the many troohies of his career, Everett's public life was not
without pain. The slavery issue, his bete noire , hounded him for decades.
Like Webster and other Massachusetts politicians who served in the national
government, Everett found that the demands of his antislavery constituency at
home were incompatible with the strong Southern influence in Washington. As
75
a young Congressman, Everett had sought to assure his Southern colleagues
that he was not an untrustworthy radical. In an emotional and ill-advised
speech he announced that there was "no cause in which I would sooner buckle
a knapsack on my back" than to put down a slave insurrection in the South.
Domestic slavery, he maintained, was not an "immoral and irreligious insti-
tution." These words would haunt Everett for years. 7
By 1838, Everett was running for re-election as governor and Massachusetts
was beginning to take an interest in the politics of slavery. That year he
advocated the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, the end of
the interstate slave trade, and opposed the admission of additional slave
states. He won the endorsement of the Liberator
, but lost many of his
Southern friends. Two years later when President Tyler nominated him to
become Minister to England, Southern Senators bitterly attacked him for his
views on slavery. W. R. King of Alabama claimed that his confirmation could
spell the dissolution of the Union; and the vote on the nomination was an
g
uncomfortably close one, twenty-three to nineteen.
A Senator in 1854, Everett watched with great misgivings as the Democrats
introduced the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. When the bill came to a vote and
Everett was absent, he faced the change of cowardness and unfaithfulness to
his constituents. A few days later, he submitted to the Senate a petition
signed by 3000 Protestant ministers, protesting the Nebraska act. Democrats
now criticized him for aiding in the prostitution of the clergy. Shortly
afterward, Everett resigned from the Senate, deeply pessimistic over the
future of his country. Writing to his close friend Robert Winthrop, he
concluded that "there is no course left for men of moderate counsels between
g
the extremists at both ends of the scale."
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After his retirement, Everett dedicated himself to raising money for
the purchase and restoration of Washington's home at Mount Vernon. It
seemed a fitting task For his eloquence, asking his countrymen, North and
South, to open their purses for a patriotic cause. Until the attack at
Harpers Ferry, Everett believed that his public career was over. But John
Brown's raid convinced him that his beloved Constitution was in mortal
danger, and he once again was willing to enter the public life he had left
with such bitterness five years earlier.^
Everett was in a black humor when he moved to the Faneuil Hall podium.
He was convinced that leading Republicans had prior knowledge of Brown's
plans, and that they were exploiting the South' s hysterical response for
political advantage. He felt his country was on the edge of a precipice
and that Brown's adventure was but "the precursor of a final catastrophe."
Soon the country would be in a state when "houses will be attacked, their
owners mobbed, statues knocked over, and other lawless outrages become the
order of the day." For Everett, the radical antislavery spirit was not
only a danger to peace between the sections, but a threat to the internal
order of Massachusetts societyJ 1
Everett's Faneuil Hall speech was a jeremiad worthy of the best efforts
of Cotton Mather. He warned his audience not to be complacent, not to
believe that their society was healthy merely because commerce and industry
continued to run normally. He noted that French stocks were never higher
than on the eve of the Revolution of 1848, that the theaters of Paris were
packed during the height of the Reign of Terror. "The great social machine
moves with a momentum that cannot be suddenly stopped," but may conceal an
inner cancer. And what would either side accomplish by tearing apart the
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fabric of the Union? Would the South find her social institutions more
secure outside the Union? To antislavery men he asked whether disunion
would not merely aggravate every evil which they deplored in slavery? And
would not this division debase us in the eyes of the world? Would we not
have to submit to the dictation from European powers in our affairs? 12
Everett asked his audience to remember the horrors of the Haitian
insurrection: the midnight burnings, the merciless tortures, the white
babies impaled on pikes, and "other abominations not to be named by
Christian lips." Southern whites, Everett reminded his audience, are our
compatriots; they worship the same Bible that we do. Yet Brown sought to
turn their homeland into another Haiti by placing New England pikes in the
hands of "an ignorant subject race." And what if the abolitionists were
successful in ending slavery by other than Haitian means? Would Massachusetts
be willing to welcome two or three hundred thousand emancipated Negroes?
13
Everett sat down, succeeded at the podium by Caleb Cushing--one of the
few men in Massachusetts who could follow him without embarrassment. Cushing
was one of the most learned men of his generation, a brilliant linguist and
essayist. Even the abolitionists agreed on this point, thinking it criminal
that such talents should be used to the detriment of human liberty. Cushing
had once supported a moderate antislavery position. His first publishable
essay as a young man was on Haiti, and he submitted it to the North
American Review
,
then edited by Edward Everett. It was a somewhat compas-
sionate article which suggested that blacks were capable of moral and intel-
lectual development. But Everett thought it too strong for the Revi ew'
s
Southern readers and asked Cushing to rewrite it, noting that publishers
"must submit to the servitude of public opinion." Later, as a member of
78
the American Colonization Society, Cushing attacked slavery for promoting
idleness and "vicious indulgence." When he served in the House of
Representatives in the 1830's, he was a strong supporter of John Quincy Adams'
fight against the proslavery Gag Rule, and by the 1838 election he even had
won the endorsement of the Liberty party.
14
The turning point in Cushing's political life occurred in 1841, after
the death of President William Henry Harrison. "His Accidentcy," John Tyler,
vetoed the charter for a third National Bank and alienated virtually the
entire Whig party. Cushing was one of a few Northern Whigs who supported the
new President, a move that brought him into close contact with Southern poli-
ticians and that exposed him to the Southern viewpoint. This had an enormous
impact on him. Read out of the Massachusetts Whig party, Cushing became a
Democrat. This was a great advantage; for, unlike Everett, Cushing would
never find himself caught between the proslavery requirements of national
politics and the an ti slavery demands of Massachusetts. He virtually turned
his back on his home state and forged a career of power and influence as one
15
of the nation's most notorious "doughfaces."
Central to Cushing's outlook was his faith in the destiny of white
America. His militant expansionism lead him to further his political identi-
fication with the South. Under one Southern President, he served as Minister
to China and worked to increase the penetration of American trade into Asia.
Under another Southern President, he fought the Mexicans as a general of
volunteers. The Massachusetts legislature had refused to appropriate funds
to send men to the Mexican War, claiming that it was a conspiracy to grab
lands for slavery; but Cushing joined with other private citizens and paid for
1
6
the equipment of his men out of his own pocket.
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For Cushing, Negro slavery was merely part of a larger master plan
for white domination of the world. Indians and Orientals were also
inferior and must submit to the white race which was "the consummate
impersonation of intellect in man and beauty in woman." The white man's
duty was "to Christianize and to civilize, to command and to be obeyed,
to conquer and to reign." No section of the country and certainly no state
could check this inevitable tendency. Massachusetts was trying to be a
"drag or brake" on the wheel of history, but Cushing warned his fellow
Yankees that they must decide whether they would lead or be led. It was
impossible to deflect history from its ultimate purpose. 17
During the turbulent years of the Kansas conflict, Cushing 's prophesy
had the ring of truth. As Pierce's Attorney-General, Cushing was, next to
Jefferson Davis, the most powerful man in the national administration. He
was shaping the course of events while Massachusetts' other prominent men,
denied appointments because of their anti slavery views, were merely spectators.
He helped author the Administration's Kansas policy and wrote a legal opinion
later to emerge under Taney's signature as the Dred Scott decision. In
addition, he controlled the' Democratic party in Massachusetts with its
jo
attendant federal patronage.
As Cushing spoke at Faneuil Hall, he was a man alienated from his home
state. He had worked so closely with Southerners that he had come to accept
their viewpoint—even to the point of justifying secession. If Southerners
could not live within the Union in security, it was their right--even their
duty— to withdraw. And if disunion came, would Northerners march into the
South and attempt to destroy her peculiar institution? Cushing looked out
over the sea of faces and asked: If this is attempted are there not men who
will seize the abolitionist traitors by che throat? Yes, his audience cried
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enthusiastically. If there is war, Cashing continued, it will not be along
the Mason and Dixon's line but within New England, and it was be waged
between those who love the Constitution and those who call it a covenant with
Hell.
19
II
Republicans varied in their reaction to the Faneuil Hall Union meeting.
Some conservative Republicans, genuinely concerned over the prospects of
sectional conflict, had attended the assembly as a gesture of national recon-
ciliation. They believed that the party cause in 1860 would be served by
demonstrating that even a state as strongly Republican as Massachusetts
"still steps to the music of the Union." But the most vocal Republicans
ridiculed those who "poured out their wailings like a host of Jeremiahs" at
Faneuil Hall. They alleged that organizers of the meeting had circulated
lists of its supporters in the South and that Massachusetts merchants, fear-
ing to lose an important part of their trade, had quickly fallen in line.
Thus, those who had so loudly proclaimed their love of the Union were in
reality declaring their love for their pocketbooks. Henry Wilson denounced
the meeting on the floor of the Senate and claimed that its supporters did
not "weigh a feather's weight in my state." Proof of this, he claimed, was
the fact that Boston had recently elected a Republican mayor in repudiation
20
of the compromisers.
Though Wilson taunted the "Union-savers," he and the other Massachusetts
Congressmen agreed that the winter was a time for tact and moderation. Even
Charles Sumner, recently returned from Europe and his agonizing search for
health, saw the wisdom of this policy. Their eyes were on the upcoming
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presidential election and the conservative voter who, though incensed at
the Democratic administration, might fear that a Republican victory could
lead to a national disaster. Now was the time to convince the timid that
there was an important distinction between the radical abolitionist and
21
the solid Republican.
Of particular concern to Republicans was the organization of the House
of Representatives where the party held a plurality but not a majority of
seats. Southern Democrats justified their intransigent opposition to John
Sherman, the Republican candidate for Speaker, on the grounds that he had
endorsed Hilton Helper's inflammatory appeal to the non-slave holding South,
The Impending Crisis
. Republicans believed this was part of a Democratic
strategy to convince the country that Republicans were unfit to govern.
Wilson was conciliatory and defensive on the issue. He said that Sherman and
the other Republicans who had been listed in Helper's preface had never seen
the book but had endorsed only an extract that contained statistics on slavery,
Through patience and moderation the Republicans were able to elect William
Pennington, a moderate from New Jersey.
^
But there was a good deal of unhappiness among the radical Republicans
back home. William S. Robinson wrote in his "Warrington" column that the
behavior of the Massachusetts delegation proved that Congressmen lost both
their manhood and their senses once they took office. Frank Bird worried
that the public might believe that the only forceful men in public life were
on the side of slavery. But though the policy of silence caused friction at
home, the delegation felt that, in the long run, it would preserve Republican
unity. The example of the Democrats proved it: they had talked about
slavery without inhibition and in the process had widened the divisions in
the party. 3
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Abolitionists made life for Henry Wilson difficult that winter.
Mississippi Senator Albert G. Brown attacked Wilson for having appeared
with disunionist Henry Wright at a Natick meeting that had endorsed the
right of slaves to revolt and the duty of Northerners to assist them.
Wilson was quick to explain the circumstances. He informed Brown that it
was a Mew England custom to tolerate all shades of opinion and that persons
of all views commonly attended Natick meetings. He pointed out that the
Democratic postmaster of the town who was "as sound on the slavery question as
the Senator from Mississippi" was also present. Wilson further maintained
that Wright had been talking about moral resistance to slavery not armed
resistance.
Wilson was incensed over the incident. He believed that Wright had
maneuvered him into an embarrassing position and wanted it to appear that
Wilson endorsed violent attacks on the South. Wilson wrote Wright and ac-
cused him of an act of ''personal unkindness." In this letter, intended for
public attention, Wilson declared that if Massachusetts were to abandon
peaceful and constitutional reform to adopt Wright's policy of insurrection,
he would vacate his seat in the Senate.
Wilson was also disturbed at Lysander Spooner who had planned to publish
a letter that Seward had written five years earlier praising Soooner's book.
Wilson wrote John Andrew and asked him to use his influence to change Spooner's
mind. He feared that Seward's Southern enemies would use the letter to
increase their attacks on the leading candidate for the Republican presidential
nomination. To Wilson this was but another example of how the abolitionists
26
helped the slavery forces abuse antisl avery statesmen.
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In an especially vituperative speech in January, Wendell Phillips
had called Wilson a man whose soul could be "made out of the sweepings of
a caucus room." This attack prompted Wilson to write a long and revealing
letter to James Freeman Clarke in which he spoke of the pain inflicted by
his impatient constituents. Our antislavery people at home, he wrote, do
not understand what we must endure year after year in Washington. They
speak at home "surrounded by sympathetic throngs." We face a hostile
majority lead by men of great talent and walk through streets and live in
hotels filled with men who "pour upon our heads bitter curses." We must
moderate our language because many of the men who stand by our Republican
principles come from "dark sections of the country" like Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Illinois, where people are coming to our position but coming
slowly. "If we sometimes explain a word or act, or fail to speak all our
hearts send to our lips, because we want to aid our true friends who have
districts five or ten years behind us . . . our friends at home see nothing
in our action but timidity."
One additional threat hung over the Republicans. Shortly after the
Harpers Ferry raid, Virginia Senator John Mason had demanded an investigation
to look into the source of Brown's support. Republicans, not wanting to
appear as if they had anything to hide, reluctantly went along with Mason,
but were fearful that the committee's Democratic majority might attempt to
portray Republicans as the secret sponsors of abolitionist violence. Wilson
worried that they could "cast a drag-net over the North." Knowing the impetu-
ous qualities of his antislavery constituents, Wilson was concerned about what
28
the committee might uncover.
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III
The Republicans were not alone in fearing the probings of the Mason
Committee. Conservative industrialist Amos A. Lawrence found himself
suspected of complicity with Brown and likely to be called before the
Mason Committee. These accusations stemmed from Lawrence's service as
treasurer of the New England Emigrant Aid Society in the mid 1850's, at
a time when many conservative New Englanders had become indignant at the
national government's proslavery policy in Kansas. By 1859, Lawrence
thought that his an ti slavery activity was a closed chapter of his life.
He had resigned the post, the experience of working with the radicals of
the Massachusetts Kansas Committee leaving him convinced that they were an
untrustworthy and dangerous group. Furthermore, the Kansas troubles had
subsided and Lawrence was now concerned with building a conservative alterna-
tive to both the Republicans and the Democrats.
But Lawrence knew that trouble was ahead when reports identified the
Emigrant Aid Society as the source of Brown's arms. He was reminded that
he had once called Brown "the Miles Standish of Kansas" and had sent him
sizable sums for his personal use. Now Lawrence heard Southern politicians
denounce him as "the cotton speculator who employed Brown to do his work."
This was truly unfortunate for Lawrence as he was both a purchaser of
Southern cotton and a leading supplier to its textile market. As a leader
of conservative businessmen, it was unseemly to be identified with a danger-
ous radical like Brown. To blunt these accusations, Lawrence now dedicated
his energies to proving to the South that he and Massachusetts were dependably
30
conservati ve.
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Shortly after Brown's capture, Lawrence wrote to Governor Wise,
warning him that it was imperative that Brown receive a fair trial lest
he become a hero in the North. If he were executed under any other condi-
tion, "an army of martyrs would spring from his blood to emulate his activi-
ties." Lawrence added that the people of Massachusetts respected Brown not
because they approved of his violence but because of his piety and bravery;
he asked Wise to do all he could to avoid any additional conflict between
North and South. And, of course, he emphasized that the aid he had given
Brown was merely out of respect for his past sufferings and that he had no
knowledge of plans to attack Virginia.
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The Union meeting at Faneuil Hall was precisely the kind of demonstration
that Lawrence believed was needed to prove that "the dreams of the philanthro-
pists" did not govern Massachusetts. He had hoped to use the meeting as a
forum to demonstrate his own political soundness. Lawrence planned to intro-
duce a resolution that called on Governor Banks to offer the Massachusetts
militia to any Southern state faced with an armed attack against its institu-
tions. Though preempted by Banks' assertion that the offer had already been
made, Lawrence was enormously pleased by the proceedings at Faneuil Hall.
"Massachusetts folks are peculiar," he wrote; "but on the great question of
3?
the Union they are sound."
Lawrence's first objective was to avoid testifying before the Mason
Committee. He wrote to Jefferson Davis, a member of the committee, whom he
had known from Davis' 1859 trip to Boston. Lawrence told Davis that the
Senate had been "duped by vile fellows" to believe that he was involved in
the Harpers Ferry project and expressed his aversion to testifying.
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Apparently the appeal was successful, for the committee never called
Lawrence to Washington. But the affair taught Lawrence a lesson in
prudence that he would not soon forget. 33
IV
Although the Mason Conmittee treated Lawrence gently, its members
were not so charitable towards those of a more definite antislavery per-
suasion. The conflict between the committee and those whom it wished to
question would engage Massachusetts' attention for several months, and
would increase an already widespread distrust of the federal government.
State's rights was an argument that could be used on both sides of Mason
and Dixon's line. As long as Washington was in the hands of the "Slave
Power," many in Massachusetts would challenge the right of federal authori-
ties to intrude in local affairs.
Even before the Mason Committee began its proceedings, some Massachusetts
Republicans feared that one of Brown's raiders might be turned over to the
federal judiciary for trial. This would allow the District Court of Virginia
to "ransack the country from Maine to Georgia," nominally seeking evidence
against the defendant, but actually hoping to tyrannize the antislavery men
of the North. Howe was particularly alarmed that, in such a case, he could be
extradited to Virginia where his life would be in the hands of men pledged to
hang abolitionists on sight. Howe shrewdly played on Yankee suspicions in a
letter which he wrote to the Boston newspapers from his Canadian sanctuary.
He warned that among the statutes of the Federal Unio.i were weapons "concealed
as are the claws of the cat in a velvet paw." They seemed harmless, but were
in fact, instruments that compelled the Morth to uphold slavery. A Southern
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judge, on the basis of any white man's testimony, could force a
Massachusetts citizen to appear before a Southern court to meet an un-
certain fate. Howe asked the readers of Boston papers if their state was
"so trammelled by the bonds of the Union" that it could not protect its
34
citizens.
The appeal struck a sensitive nerve. The Worcester Transcript
declared it a disgrace that a distinguished individual like Howe was not safe
in his own home from a "mob of Virginia slaveholders and slavebreeders. " The
Massachusetts House passed a bill granting the writ of habeas corpus to
anyone arrested by federal authorities. Though the state Senate revised its
language to remove the specific challenge to the national government, the new
law made clear the state's distrust of the federal judiciary. 35
By February, the Mason Committee was conducting its investigation, and
Howe--large'ly on the advice of Andrew—decided he could safely go to
Washington and testify. Andrew's advice may have been influenced by pressure
from Republican politicians such as Henry Wilson. Wilson, who blamed Howe
for the subpoena he himself had received from the committee, was indignant
that Howe had initially refused to testify. Wilson believed that such action
only played into the South's hand by making charges of conspiracy more credi-
ble. 35
The Mason Committee posed its questions so loosely that Howe could de-
ceive its members without actually lying to them. The interrogation of
Wilson was equally unrevealing, though in this case because Wilson had nothing
to reveal. Andrew, questioned because of his role in the Brown defense, testi-
fied under protest. He claimed that the proceedings had no legislative
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purpose but were an exercise in political harassment. But both Republicans
were careful to emphasize that, while they admired Brown's character, they
deplored his attack on the residents of Virginia. Others whom the committee
tried to question were not so cooperative. John Brown, Jr. and James Redpath
dropped out of sight; while Frank Sanborn and Thaddeus Hyatt directly chal-
lenged the Senate's authority.
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Sanborn, after a hasty trip to Canada, returned to his Concord home to
wait for the Senate's next move. But Hyatt, a New Yorker who had been the
president of the National Kansas Committee, went to Washington to confront
the Senators on their own territory. His lawyer, Andrew, prepared an elaborate
argument for the case which he showed to Sumner suggesting that it "will
enable a good debator to shake the Senate and stir the country." Sumner
drew on this material and delivered an impassioned Senate speech condemning
the committee's behavior as a violation of the separation of powers. He com-
pared the behavior of his colleagues to that of the Jesuits "at the period of
their most hateful supremacy. 1,38
Hyatt's object was to dramatize the contention that the Senate was a tool
of the Slave Power. He was not unhappy when the Senate found him guilty of
contempt and threw him into jail. At least one Massachusetts Congressman
was moved by Hyatt's plight. Charles Francis Adams visited this latest of
anti slavery martyrs; and, while he concluded that Hyatt was "a natural
enthusiast" whose "logical facilities do not keep up with his moral sensibili-
ties," he was appalled that the Senate chose to "wage war" on such an essential-
ly harmless individual. Surely this was evidence that the Senate was tending
toward Star Chamber proceedings. But Hyatt's plight did not stir
Massachusetts. Sumner's abolitionist friends complained that Reoublican
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politicians were not eager to have his speech on Hyatt's case publicized
and that the Boston papers had ignored it. Only when the arm of the
Senate reached into Massachusetts itself would the Bay State be aroused. 39
V
Frank Sanborn was in his Concord home on the evening of April third,
sitting at his desk with his slippers on. Answering a knock at the door, he
discovered a boy who presented a note that described him as being in need of
employment. As Sanborn began to read the letter, a tall grey-haired man
rushed through the open door, placed handcuffs on Sanborn's wrists-, and
whistled to four associates lurking in the bushes. "I arrest you," cried
one of the men. "By what authority?" replied Sanborn. "By the authority of
the United States Senate," responded the figure who identified himself as a
federal marshal and read an arrest warrant issued by the Senate's Sergeant-
40
at- arms
.
Sanborn was in no mood to go without a fight. He wrestled with his cap-
tors until they lifted him off the ground and carried him to a waiting
carriage. The noise of the struggle alerted his sister who, after rousing
the neighbors, grabbed one of the federal agents by the beard and forced him
to release Sanborn. The entire village of Concord sprang to life at the news
that the national government had come into their midst to seize one of their
own. Sanborn's pupils ran from door to door carrying the disturbing news,
church bells sounded, and soon a crowd of townsfolk arrived to confront the
federal authorities. Man of all political views came with clenched fists to
protect their neighbor. A group of Concord ladies climbed into the marshal's
carriage to prevent him from carrying his captive off to Washington. Even
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George Haywood, known as "an old ultra-conservative hunker," was so en-
raged at this "kidnapping" that he hit one of the marshal's assistants.
Judge Ebenezer Hoar of the the Massachusetts Supreme Court, who lived
only a hundred yards from the scene of the commotion, quickly issued a writ
of habeas corpus
.
When the federal agents refused to obey the order to sur-
render their prisoner, the Concord deputy sheriff formed a posse from the
crowd, snatched Sanborn from his captors and chased them halfway back to
Boston. Sanborn, recognizing the drama of the moment, turned to his rescuers,
held his handcuffs over his head and exclaimed: "Citizens, look and see what
the United States Senate have done for me!"
In the Massachusetts legislature the next day, the Sanborn arrest was
the topic of debate. John Griffin compared Concord's rescue of Sanborn to
the events of April 19, 1775. The British officers who marched on Concord
that day were supported by an outside authority but it was those who resisted
who are now revered as patriots. John Eldridge of Canton rejoiced that "the
whole power of the government was not able to take an unarmed man out of
Concord." And Concord's representative offered a resolution that directed the
state's attorney-general to represent Sanborn when he appeared in court on his
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writ of habeas corpus . The House supported the resolution by a wide margin.
Sanborn's lawyer was John Andrew, who rarely missed an opportunity to
strike a legal blow against slavery. In his argument to the court, largely
a repeat of his brief in the Hyatt case, Andrew warned th?t the powers claimed
by the Senate were greater than those that had been exercised under British
rule, Andrew argued that the Senate had no right to compel witnesses to testi-
fy, no power to arrest except in specific cases such as impeachment trials.
The court, under the leadership of conservative Lemuel Shaw, chose to avoid a
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direct challenge to federal authority. It ruled that the Senate's warrant
empowered only the Sergeant-at-arms to arrest Sanborn and that this authority
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could not be transferred.
Whatever the basis of the decision, Sanborn was a free man; the Senate
would soon decide that it was not worth the effort to pursue him any longer.
Sanborn returned home a hero, cheered by a crowd of eight hundred and saluted
by the Concord Artillery Corps. Concord citizens were proud that day, be-
lieving themselves the true heirs of the eighteenth-century minuteman.
Emerson recorded that he had overheard a man say a house in Concord was worth
more than one elsewhere because Concord people were willing to protect one
another. Only two men in town had supported the arrest—the postmaster and
an official of the Boston Customs House— and both of tnem were tainted with
the corruption of federal patronage. 43
This was a satisfying, if symbolic, victory for many chauvinistic
Massachusetts citizens. Friends of Sanborn commemorated the occasion by pre-
senting his brave sister with a Colt revolver engraved with the Pine Tree flag.
Charles Sumner condemned his colleagues in the Senate for trying to kidnap "a
quiet citizen engaged in the instruction of youth" and arranged to send a coded
warning should the Senate again try to arrest Sanborn. But the Boston Post
observed this anti federal sentiment with foreboding; it was nothing but the
celebration of a victory over the Constitution. From the Post 's point of view,
the Sanborn affair demonstrated that Massachusetts Republicans looked at
Washington as a foreign power. While Buchanan and his Southern allies were in
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office, the Post's comments held more than a grain of truth.
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CHAPTER VI
THE ELECTION OF 1860
In the early months of 1860, Massachusetts Republicans anxiously sur-
veyed the political skies for storm clouds that might upset their campaign
for the presidency. While Harpers Ferry was undoubtedly the most unsettling
episode for election-oriented Republicans, it by no means stood alone. A
real concern was that volatile issues could split the fragile coalition which
constituted their party.
Many Massachusetts Whigs had joined the Republican party when- they per-
ceived that it would become the focus of power in the Commonwealth. They
sought to influence the direction of the new orgniazation and, hopefully, to
make it resemble the old Whig party whose passing they still mourned. Charles
Hale, the editor and publisher of the Boston Advertiser and member of an old
Boston family with impeccable conservative connections, was the foremost
representative of this faction. He had fought the Coalition of 1850 and the
Know-Nothings, thinking them irresponsible radicals, and came over to the
Republicans only after the Kansas conflict left him with no other viable
political home. He used the Advertiser 's influence to encourage those of
similar inclination to join the Republican ranks and to act as a counterweight
to radical tendencies within the party. Hale's efforts culminated in his
election as Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. There he
fought extension of the state's Personal Liberty Law and led a divisive attack
on plans to build a statue of Horace Mann on the StatP House grounds.^
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But the conservatives were not alone in seeking to alter the direction
of Massachusetts Republicanism. The radicals, who considered themselves to
be the true and original Republicans, chafed at the timidity of many of their
colleagues. They looked at Governor Banks as an unscrupulous trimner and
resented Hale's conservative imprint on the legislature. Most of all they
worried lest their efforts to construct a new political organization end
merely as old and sour Whig wine in a new Republican bottle. When the 1860
legislature convened in January, the radicals enjoyed a stunning victory by
replacing Hale as Speaker and electing a more thoroughly antislavery replace-
ment.^
Hoping to pursue their success, the radicals proposed a strong new
Personal Liberty Law which would free any slave setting foot on Massachusetts
soil and impose heavy penalties on those trying to return a fugitive to his
master. But despite the pronounced antislavery leaning of the new legislature,
a majority of the representatives was dubious of taking such a provocative
step in an election year. More pragmatic Republicans substituted for the pro-
posed law a series of antislavery resolutions culled from the early addresses
of Caleb Cushing and Edward Everett. Through this clever stroke they avoided
legislation that would invite the charge of nullification and embarrassed two
3
political opponents by resurrecting sentiments they preferred forgotten.
Another threat to the unity of the Republicans lay in nativism. The
American wing of the Massachusetts party was still powerful; the previous year
nativists had succeeded in attaching the "Two-Year Amendment" to the
Massachusetts Constitution. This amendment required that foreign-born citizens
wait two years after naturalization before becoming eligible to vote. Though
this act was far less stringent than the twenty-one year waiting period the
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Know-Nothings had demanded earlier, immigrant voters in Massachusetts and
elsewhere resented it as unjust and insulting. Benjamin Butler recognized
the potential of this issue and told his Irish constituents that Republicans
supported unrestricted Negro voting while placing impediments on the white
immigrant. Even in distant Illinois a provincial politician named Abraham
Lincoln recognized the danger of the Massachusetts statute.
4
Massachusetts radicals also were attuned to the danger. E. L. Pierce
had written a pamphlet which he hoped would attract the self-interest of
Republicans. It was true, he wrote, that foreign-born voters in the Northeast
generally supported the Democrats and were often friendly toward slavery; but
in the West—where the coming election would be settled— the immigrants were
of substantial German and Scandinavian stock and voted for the Republicans.
Pierce argued that, by offending immigrant voters, Massachusetts Republicans
hurt their party's chances for the presidency and diminished the influence of
their own spokesmen in national affairs. Pierce's arguments reflected the
thinking of many Republican leaders, including Henry Wilson, himself a former
Know-Nothing. These leaders did not expect that Republicans would change
their attitude toward the Irish, for among the Massachusetts middle class dis-
like of the Irish was too deeply seated to be easily altered. They only asked
that these sentiments be subject to greater discretion and that they be kept
out of politics. But a substantial faction of Massachusetts Republicans were
unwilling to renounce or even mute their nativism. These "American Republicans"
were still an influential element in the party. Claiming Governor Banks as
one of their own, they had in the Boston Atlas and Bee a strident and effective
voice. And when the national party repudiated state legislation that restrict-
ed voting by the foreign-born, the Atlas and Bee angrily replied that
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Republicans ought to remember that more than half their victories were due
to nativist help. In Massachusetts the figure was undoubtedly higher.
5
Wary of the social and political implications of the transformation of
Massachusetts industry, Republicans found new reasons to be concerned in the
early months of 1860. In January, the huge Pemberton mill at Lawrence
crumbled into a pile of ruins when the poorly laid foundation gave way. As
a raging fire swept through the rubble, over one hundred persons died—almost
all of them Irish laborers. For days Massachusetts newspapers carried accounts
of rescue teams sifting through the debris uncovering mutilated bodies. No
industrial tragedy of this magnitude had ever occurred in New England, and
there was widespread shock at the negligence that could permit such a massive
tragedy. The Pilot spoke for more than merely its church when it condemned
the soulless and speculating proprietors who hid behind the shield of incor-
poration. It demanded that the mill owners be indicted for manslaughter.
6
Many Republicans inclined to the Pilot 's sentiments. After all, the
party had been built in large measure on opposition to the mill-owning class.
But Republicans recognized that a tragedy such as this had its political as
well as its ethical consequences. For example, the Democratic Worcester Bay
State asked why Lydia Maria Child--who was so eager to rush and comfort the
Harpers Ferry raiders—had not gone to Lawrence to assist the wounded Irish
mill hands. Perhaps, the paper suggested, it was because there was among
the victims no "fragrant, intellectual, ideal Negro." Though Child was no
Republican, the argument that anti slavery enthusiasts were more concerned
with black men than with whites touched a tender subject for Republicans, one
that might open a Pandora's box of resentments.''
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An article in the New York Herald helped put Republicans on the defen-
sive. James Gordon Bennett's inflammatory pro-Southern organ claimed the
Pemberton disaster demonstrated again that black slaves fared better than
Northern working men. Since a slave was valuable his master would shield
him from dangers. But Northern mill owners insured only their property and
cared nothing about the lives of their employees. The Atlas and Bee
, though
long a vigorous antagonist of the "silver spoon and white cravat aristocrats,"
quickly defended New England institutions faced with outside criticism. This
position was similar to the response of those Southerners who were discomforted
by slavery but who defended their region against abuse by Northern- abolition-
ists. Citing the schools, libraries, and churches built with corporate funds,
the Atlas and Bee argued that Massachusetts capitalists treated their employees
with a "liberality unequaled elsewhere." 8
Later in the winter thousands of Lynn shoemakers went on strike, dis-
tressed by their dwindling incomes and the new methods of production that
threatened their artisan status. They refused to pick up their tools until
demands for a stable wage scale were met. For weeks Lynn was the scene of
mass rallies and processions as the shoemakers achieved a sense of solidarity
seldom seen in the industries of antebellum New England. Strikers roughly
handled those few who defied the strike by attempting to send shoes to market.
When worse violence threatened, Stephen Phillips, Massachusetts' Republican
attorney-general, sent a force of Boston police to restore order.
As the strike spread to other shoemaking centers in the Commonwealth,
Republicans recognized the potential dangers of the situation. The shoemakers
were among the most stalwart supporters of Republicanism and an essential part
of the governing coalition of the Commonwealth. Now the cobblers were in
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deadly earnest, striking in defense of their very way of life. If the
Republicans failed to support them on such a crucial matter, would the
shoemakers retaliate and deal the party a severe blow?
The situation was rife with paradox. The shoemakers were acting to
defend their middle-class self-image. But in the minds of many Republicans,
the tactics which the cobblers had chosen disqualified them from middle-
class status. The shoemakers now revealed themselves as dependent on others
for their livelihood and as disturbers of the public peace. The bourgeois
sensibilities of most Massachusetts Republicans simply would not admit the
necessity for strikes. Though the Massachusetts middle class (like its
peers in most periods and locales) was highly class-conscious itself, it was
deeply apprehensive when other segments of society recognized the reality of
, 9
cl ass.
The Springfield Republican expressed such sentiments. It denounced the
strike leaders as demagogues and accused them of seeking to turn the conflict
to proslavery politics. The paper expressed great sympathy for the workers
and noted the forces that had transformed their occupation: "It is no longer
a trade ... as shoes are now made." But striking was no solution; those
who wanted to escape poverty and dependency should leave shoemaking and
settle in the virgin lands of the West.
®
Democrats were quick to see the possibilities in the Lynn conflict.
Again they argued that the black slave with "sufficient food, clothing, and a
patch of land for cultivation" was better off than the wage slave of the North
The reason for the shoe industry's problems, they argued, was antislavery
agitation. The Post quoted a Virginia legislator's appeal against wearing
shoes made by "bloody propagandists of antislavery." It argued that recent
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John Brown meetings in the shoe towns and widespread belief that Henry
Wilson was the archetypical Yankee cobbler caused a Southern boycott of
Massachusetts shoes. The Boston Herald also found a lesson in the strike:
"Let our mechanics vote for men in Congress who care as much for white men
as they do for niggers and they will not often be compelled to strike for
decent wages. '*
But even though Republicans remained cool to the strike, shoemakers
remained impervious to Democratic arguments. The cobblers refused comparison
with Southern slaves; they remained convinced that their problems lay with
New England capitalists rather than with antislavery orators. And they re-
tained their vision that a nation governed by Republicans would be invested
with virtue and would reward honest labor. But Republicans could not know in
March that the shoemakers would remain loyal to the party of free labor in
November; and the Lynn strike serve as another cautionary note in the early
months of the presidential campaign.
As Massachusetts Republicans began to elect delegates to the Chicago
convention, events in Rhode Island raised additional concern. There a coali-
tion of Whigs, Americans, and Democrats nominated a conservative Republican
William Sprauge for governor. This coalition gained a substantial victory
by convincing a majority of the voters that the Republican nominee, Seth
Padelford, was a dangerous radical. Here was an ominous precedent in a
neighboring Republican state that might be repeated in Massachusetts. Republi-
cans knew that Amos Lawrence--wi th great resources at his disposal --was at-
tempting a similar arrangement in the Bay State. Southern threats to boycott
Massachusetts commerce seemed timed to promote such a combination, as stories
appeared that names of "constitutional" and "unconstitutional" merchants
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would circulate in Southern newspapers. Charles Francis Adams was one who
saw a developing plot of "intimidating the moneyed interests among us and
persuading them to exert themselves to secure the triumph of the slave candi-
date."
12
A substantial majority of Massachusetts Republicans supported William
Seward as the logical choice for the presidential nomination. He was the
party's foremost spokesman and a man of broad experience and talents. But
even among the radicals, dedication to Seward's cause was thin. Shortly
before the Republicans met in Chicago, old Whigs and Americans had convened
as the "Constitutional Union" party and nominated John Bell of Tennessee.
Now conservatives who might find Seward's "irrepressible conflict" unpalatable
had an alternative. Even the tumultuous Democratic convention in Charleston
that had split the party in two, raised questions about the wisdom of nominat-
ing a controversial candidate. Could there be, some Republicans asked, a
plot to stalemate the election and place selection of the President in the
13
hands of the Senate?
The correspondence of two thoroughly antislavery Republ icans---E. L. Pierce
and Charles Francis Adams— indicated the drift of thought on the eve of the
convention. Pierce, a delegate from Adams' district, wrote that he would pre-
fer to vote for Seward if he were "as available" as any other candidate. But
after condemning those who would sell out Republican principles and nominate
John McLean or Simon Cameron, he emphasized that the party should select the
man most likely to win in November. "No one man owns the party," Pierce de-
clared; "it has done more for its leaders, more than they have done for it." ^
Adams, a personal friend of Seward, was distressed by the intrigues he
saw organizing against the New York Senator. But he also was upset by reports
of the scandals involving Seward's Albany cronies. He replied to Pierce with
100
a lecture on the grave responsibility which delegates to Chicago carried,
solemnizing that a victory not based on Republican principles would be
meaningless. Seward was still his choice as the most competent statesman
in America. "And yet," he added, "I am no partisan of his, nor shall I be
ready to sacrifice the probabilities of a victory merely to indulge my
notions of abstract propriety." In a final flourish, Adams revealed the
depth of his frustrations: "It is to be regretted that we have not some
popular young military man to stand in the gap just now." Of the other
Massachusetts radicals, Wilson was actively working against Seward, while
Sumner restricted his activities to urging Republicans to select "an old
15
and constant servant of the cause."
Many moderate and conservative Massachusetts Republicans hoped to
channel disillusionment with Seward's candidacy into a presidential bid for
Governor Banks. Congressmen Dawes and Burlingame, Boston Journal editor
Charles 0. Rogers, Charles Hale, Samuel Bowles, all hoped to make the Massachu-
setts governor a credible candidate at Chicago. Their strategy was to hold
the Massachusetts delegation for Seward in the early balloting and await a
deadlock. Then they would urge Banks as a compromise candidate and collect
their debt from Seward's allies. Samuel Bowles wrote Banks of the plan:
"Let us look on calmly and see the murders, and pray that the blood of the
martyrs shall be the seed of your church." Banks' friends sought to present
him as one Republican whose election would not alarm the Sou^h unduly. W. 0.
Bartlett urged Banks to remind the delegates that after his election as
Speaker of the House, South Carolina's largest slave owner escorted him to the
chair. And the Springfield Republican argued that Banks' Democratic antece-
dents would attract many voters who would otherwise support Douglas and that
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his nomination would answer the charge that the Republican party was merely
"Old Whiggery resuscitated." 16
But Banks' presidential hopes were short-lived. Radicals who had
little sympathy with their governor dominated the state and district conven-
tions that elected delegates for Chicago. These radicals remembered Banks'
attempt to turn the issue from slavery to the Pacific railroad during the
Fremont campaign, and noted his increasingly friendly relations with Massa-
chusetts' commercial interests. They also recalled his abortive attempt in
1858 to edge Sumner into retirement and replace him in the Senate. More
recently Banks earned their enmity for his second veto of a bill allowing
blacks to enroll in the state militia. Frank Bird wrote a stinging rebuke in
which he compared Banks' veto to Missouri and Arkansas' recent expulsion of
free blacks. All were based, he wrote, on the faulty premise that it was "a
right of the majority to proscribe ... the minority." Bird also accused
the Governor of forcing the legislature to adopt the Two-Year Law— "the anti-
American, undemocratic, odious, Know-Nothing amendment," Bird called it.
Bird's charge was somewhat overstated; but nevertheless, Banks' association
with the Know-Nothings eliminated him from serious consideration by a party
so intent on wooing the German vote. The governor's friends accused Henry
Wilson of leading the "Lager beer Germans" against him, but foreign-born
voters needed little encouragement to oppose Banks' nomination.
1 ^
A large majority of the Massachusetts delegation stood by Seward during
the three rounds of balloting, although four members did support Lincoln as
early as the first ballot. More might have voted for Lincoln had they not
felt bound to honor their constituents' preference for Seward. But all
Massachusetts Republicans felt Lincoln was a candidate they could accept
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even if some like John Murray Forbes worried about a repetition of the
log cabin and hard cider campaign of Harrison. As for Banks-he set his
sights lower, but received only a scattering of votes for the vice-
presidency. The Chicago delegates found. in another New Englander with a
Democratic background-Maine's Hamilton Hamlin-a candidate untouched by
Know-Nothingism. 18
II
Amos Lawrence was one man who worried Massachusetts Republicans
throughout the winter and spring of 1860. Still repenting his association
with John Brown, Lawrence was actively soliciting his wealthy acquaintances
to support the organization of a new conservative party. He hoped to build
upon the enthusiasm of the Union meetings that had followed Harpers Ferry
and to exploit the divisions within the Republican party. When the Republi-
can National Committee issued its call to the Chicago convention, Lawrence
noted its rejection of nativism; he saw this as an opportunity to split the
Banks Americans away from the Republican party. Looking further at the
Chicago call, Lawrence noted that "it contains nothing about the manufacturing
and producing interests of the country." Certainly America's businessmen
could be roused by such an oversight. Lawrence hoped to create a well-organ-
ized, anti-radical Union party that would nominate a Border State moderate.
He believed that such an organization could strengthen the hand of conserva-
tive Republicans and that they would lead their party to accept the Union
candidate. Lawrence was certain that John J. Crittenden could sweep the
nation and Massachusetts with it, and he worked hard to convince the Kentucky
19
Senator to accept the nomination.
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But Lawrence found that conservative Republicans were unreceptive
to his plans. Many blamed the Fillmore ticket of 1856 for the election
of Buchanan and did not want the Democrats to profit from another conserva-
tive movement. As one Boston businessman wrote, the Constitutional Union
party could only serve to play into the hands of the administration's
"nigger drivers." Pragmatists, these conservatives sensed success in the
Republicans but only failure in the Unionist movement. 20
Lawrence was further disappointed when the Constitutional Union conven-
tion in Baltimore chose John Bell of Tennessee as its presidential candi-
date and Edward Everett for vice-president. Everett's response to this
dubious honor further demoralized the Union effort in Massachusetts.
Everett had hoped for the presidential nomination; and when it went to Bell,
Everett wired his agent at the convention, George Hi Hard of the Courier
,
to withdraw his name from any further consideration. But the order miscar-
ried; and the convention, believing Everett's illustrious name would be
helpful to their cause, placed it on the ticket. Everett was furious,
believing the nomination an insult since he was placed behind a younger man.
(Everett was sixty-six; Bell, sixty-three.) Everett agreed to the nomination
only when he recognized that it might be more embarrassing to reject it, and
the chore proved as distasteful as he had imagined. Southern fireaters resur
rected Everett's youthful speeches against slavery and condemned him for havi
sent his son to a school that had a Negro pupil. By autumn he was weary of
accusations that he supported "amalgamation, political equality, and all the
horrors of abil i tionism.
'
The Massachusetts Union party--consi sting of old Whigs and conservative
Americans—found its notable men equally hesitant to stand for governor.
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Though William Appleton offered John Clifford a campaign chest of twenty
thousand dollars if he would run, the former governor declined. Only
after several others had refused to accept the nomination did Amos Lawrence
grudgingly agree to become the candidate. This disinclination of leading
conservatives to re-enter poll tics-"overfastidiousness" the Courier called
it-would seriously hamper the Bell-Everett cause in Massachusetts. The
Courier reminded conservatives that they had most at stake in the preserva-
tion of the Union and that, possessing wealth and education, they carried a
grave public responsibility. If these natural leaders abdicated their proper
role they invited demagogues to fill the gap. As a result, the Courier
warned, "a lower range of thoughts and a lower range of human propensities"
would govern, leading inevitably to anarchy and "the man on horseback. 1,22
The managers of the Massachusetts Union campaign showed that they never
understood why the Whig party had disintegrated in the crucible of recent
events. Their orators defended protectionism and the Southern trade without
understanding how narrow and antique this appeared in 1860. Sounding like
Federalists, the Bell-Everetts lauded their lack of a platform. Platforms,
they argued, debased political morals and brought into office the unworthy
and the unreliable. As in the days of Washington and Adams, voters ought to
select the most virtuous men and let them judge matters of substance. The
Unionists argued that they would stand on the Constitution pure and simple
and let their opponents-- like demagogues—woo the masses with promises and
23
policies.
This Olympian attitude opened the Bell-Everetts to penetrating Republican
criticism. Whose Constitution did they stand on? Wilson asked. Was it Clay
and Webster's or Taney's or Breckinridge's? Andrew attacked the conservatives
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for their simplistic belief that by merely declaring loyalty to the Union
the conflict over slavery would disappear. It was an insult to the popular
mind, Andrew declared, when party leaders taught that great issues should
OA
not be debated in public.
Republican ridicule of the Bell-Everett ticket bit deep. The Springfield
Re P ub1ican called ^ "worthy to be printed on gilt-edged satin paper and laid
away in a box." The Atlas and Bee compared attempts to resurrect the Whig
party to William Miller's prophecy of the end of the world. But despite the
ridicule and the Unionist organizational problems, the Republicans still
recognized the Bel 1-Everetts as a potential threat in the November election. 25
Ill
Massachusetts Democrats travelled comfortably to their party's convention
in Charleston on a boat specially chartered for the occasion. They brought a
brass band to help them pass time on their cruise South and to entertain the
delegates who would assemble in Institute Hall to select a presidential candi-
date. But when the band stopped playing and the business of politics took over,
little harmony prevailed among the Massachusetts delegates.
It was not the Massachusetts Democrats who were in a quarrelsome mood.
As a minority party, they recognized that their only chance for success lay in
maintaining their own unity while they hoped for divisions among their opponents.
But they were inevitably drawn into the bitter struggle between the friends of
Stephen A. Douglas and those of President Buchanan. Douglas had opposed the
administration's efforts to make Kansas a slave state and had steadfastly
maintained his allegiance to popular sovereignty. In return, the administra-
tion had waged a persistent campaign to defeat Douglas for re-election to the
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Senate; and, when this failed, Buchanan's allies in the Senate had stripped
him of his chairmanship of the Committee on the Territories. Douglas was
determined to be avenged; and with the support of a vast majority of Northern
Democrats he set out to win the Democratic presidential nomination. 26
The local conventions that selected the Massachusetts delegates ex-
pressed their overwhelming support of Douglas and expected their representa-
tives to vote for him in Charleston. But these delegates found themselves
between the conflicting demands of their constituents and of their patron,
Buchanan. It is not surprising that a majority of them chose the latter; for
Massachusetts voters rare]y elevated a Democrat to a lofty position. A
Massachusetts Democratic politician set his sights on the Post Office and the
Customs House. And Emerson's harsh remarks about federal office holders of
the period was not far off the mark. They were sneaks, he wrote, "who read
the administration paper every day and loudly defend the last measure of the
Government." On the first ballot at Charleston, only eleven of the twenty-
four Massachusetts delegates supported Illinois' "Little Giant." The rest
27
cast their votes for Virginia Senator Robert Hunter and for Jefferson Davis.
Delegates from eight Southern states seceded from the convention after
failing to get a platform favorable to a slave code for the territories.
After fifty-seven bitterly deadlocked ballots, the Democrats adjourned to
meet in June at Baltimore. Again many of the Southern delegates withdraw;
but this time they were joined by a number of Northerners. Among them was a
majority of the Massachusetts delegation, including its leading figures-
Caleb Cushing, Benjamin Butler, Benjamin Hallett, and George Loring. The
Massachusetts seceders maintained that they had left because of the conven-
tion's refusal to seat Hallett. (Butler added another argument—he could
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not sit in a body where the African slave trade was openly advocated.
Douglas supporters in the hall laughed raucously at Butler's sudden
scruples)
.
But these arguments were insufficient to explain why the Massachusetts
delegates-alone among New England Democrats-joined the anti-Douglas conven-
tion. A more plausible explanation concerns the influence of Caleb Cashing,
whose loyalty to the administration was reenforced by his ambition for a
seat on the Supreme Court. Shortly before the Baltimore convention the
administration had informed Cushing that his appointment to the Court was
likely, should an expected vacancy materialize. Here was a tangible prize
that a lame duck administration might tender to a faithful servant.
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Cushing had presided at Charleston and at the original Baltimore Conven-
tion; now he became the president of the seceders. His lieutenant, George
Loring, nominated Vice-President John Breckinridge for the presidency with
the promise that Massachusetts "will stand by the South in her struggle for
constitutional rights." On the evening of June 23, the rival Democratic
gatherings chose two separate presidential candidates—Breckinridge and
Douglas—leaving many office holders and voters with a painful decision.
Cushing helped the office holders in Massachusetts make up their minds.
His correspondence for the summer of 1860 was filled with reports on the
loyalty of federal appointees to the Breckinridge candidacy. Those who
wavered found themselves quickly unemployed. Butler also enthusiastically
endorsed this policy, maintaining that the removal of Douglas supporters
"would do us more good in organizing than anything else." Six Massachusetts
newspapers endorsed Breckinridge: in each case either its editor or publisher
30
held a federal office.
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The Boston Post was the leading Breckinridge organ. Its campaign
rhetoric took it far from the loco-foco egali tarianism that had once
characterized the Massachusetts Democracy. Unlike Republican papers which
lauded their candidate's humble origins, the Post ridiculed Lincoln as a
common rail splitter. In justifying slavery it cited the "same immutable
laws" that made some men kings and others subjects, some rich and others
poor. "Such social distinctions are the lot of mankind and doubtless permitted
by Providence for the good of society." Attitudes like this placed the Post
and its allies well beyond the tolerance of most Massachusetts Democrats.
Delegates who failed to support Douglas at the conventions returned to hostile
local constituencies. Democratic meetings throughout the Commonwealth de-
nounced the Breckinridge men as doughfaces who had bowed to Southern extremism.
When Butler tried at a Lowell meeting to explain his recent actions, angry
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Douglas supporters shouted him down.
Massachusetts' Douglas Democrats were so intent on attacking the
Breckinridge wing of their own party that they had little energy left to
assault the Republicans. The Boston Herald
, a penny-paper whose daily circu-
lation of 50,000 made it the most widely read newspaper in New England, de-
nounced the Vice-President as the candidate of the slave code and disunion.
The Pi lot
,
which labeled Buchanan as desperate and vindictive, warmly em-
braced Douglas as an old friend of the Irish. Douglas' popularity among the
Irish was evident when— avowedly on his way to Vermont to visit his aged
mother—he stopped for speeches in Boston and Worcester. Though the charge
by administration Democrats that Douglas was leading his followers into the
"pit of Abolitionism" was obviously far fetched, there was little doubt that
32
the Douglas Democrats would not suDport the Breckinridge stand on slavery.
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IV
"There is a crack in the Democratic Party," the Springfield Republican
crowed, "and there is a nigger in that crack, and the nigger cannot be got
out of it." Asserting that the Republicans would put "the nigger question
. . .
where the interests of the white man of this country demand," the
Republican assured its readers that their party was united on important
matters. But although Massachusetts Republicans attempted to keep their
differences from public view, radicals and moderates continued their struggle
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to shape the direction of the party.
The strain between the party's factions increased when, on June fourth,
Charles Sumner rose in the Senate to give his first major address in over
four years. "The Barbarism of Slavery," as Sumner called his speech, was a
comprehensive indictment of the Southern institution designed to place the
Republican party on a firm antislavery footing. Sumner argued that the
presidential campaign, like the struggle against slavery itself, was no
"holiday battle," but rather "a solemn battle between Right and Wrong,
between Good and Evil." Such a battle could not be fought with rosewater.
Sumner was confident that the Republican voters of the North were more' en-
lightered than many of their political leaders; now was the time to ensure
that a Republican victory meant more than merely a change in place-seekers.
He suspected the motives of many of those entrenched within the party organiza-
tions—men who "use principles as counters by which they keep tally." Better
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that the Republicans lost than that their ideals became prostituted.
"Barbarous in origin, barbarous in law, barbarous in spirit, barbarous
wherever it shows itself, Slavery must breed Barbarians." Sumner spoke
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passionately as Southern Senators sat glowering. Such rhetoric worried
Republican moderates. Would it invite another violent Southern response
that could upset well-laid political strategy? The uncompromising language
obscured the fact that the substance of Sumner's speech was well within the
bounds of acceptable Republicanism, for its primary thrust was a paean to
free labor. Sumner's arguments were familiar. Unlike the free institutions
of the North which promoted prosperity for all men, slavery-based on the
appropriation of all the toil of its victims-enforced ignorance, immorality
and a contempt for the dignity of labor. The South enjoyed a substantial
advantage over the North in navigable rivers, in climate, in arable land;
but its development had fallen far behind, "Slavery plays the part of the
Harpy, and defiles the choicest banquet," Sumner declared. Though the popu-
lation of the two sections had been nearly equal in 1790, the North now had
twice the inhabitants. Massachusetts alone, despite its small size, con-
tained more real property than Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida,
and Texas combined. The slave states lagged in all areas of education but
were most conspicuously negligent in providing public education for the common
man. A Northern Negro was more likely to receive education than a poor
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Southern white.
Outside of Sumner's own circle, Republican leaders in Massachusetts were
unenthusiastic about the speech. The Springfield Republican
,
though admitting
its eloquence, doubted the address' "present usefulness to the cause of
liberty." An acquaintance of Charles Francis Adams wondered if Sumner might
not have overdone his medicine considering "the delicacy of the patient's
stomach." And Adams, himself, though he refused to judge Sumner by the standard
of ordinary politicians, wondered about the expediency of the speech. Sumner
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was depressed by this lack of support, and perceived an effort to read
him out of the party. "I expect very little and ask nothing," he wrote
Pierce; "but it seems hard that there is not a single paper in Boston-
if in Massachusetts—which does by me as papers in other states do by their
Senators."
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But Sumner's friends were determined that the speech have the impact its
orator intended. Thaddeus Hyatt, Frank Bird,and E. L. Pierce mailed out
thousands of copies of the address, especially to rural areas of New England
and the upper Mid-West where Sumner was popular. Bird, though he held no
political office, enjoyed strong influence in the legislature which he used
to obtain a resolution praising Sumner for his "thorough, truthful, and com-
prehensive examination of slavery." The radicals mentioned Wilson in the
resolution as well; Pierce explained to Sumner that this would induce the
junior Senator "to maintain cordial support for you." By mid-summer popular
response throughout the rural North was strongly favorable to "The Barbarism
of Slavery," and Sumner was convinced he had enjoyed a great triumph.
Massachusetts' radicals longed to be rid of Governor Banks and replace
him with one of their own. But they doubted that a presidential year was an
opportune time for such a divisive intra-party contest. In a July column,
"Warrington" lamented that Massachusetts had never had a genuine antislavery
governor; Banks, he said, grudgingly yielded to the antislavery sentiment of
the state without ever sympathizing with it. "Warrington" suggested that John
Andrew would be an ideal governor but that 1861 should be the year to fight
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over the control of the Massachusetts Republican party.
But during the sumner Banks decided to accept a lucrative position with
the Illinois Central Railroad rather than to seek re-election. The governor
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wanted to keep his decision secret until the eve of the state convention,
hoping that he could retain control over the party and hand the gubernatorial
nomination to Henry Dawes, the moderate Congressman from Berkshire County.
C. Russell Train, an eastern Massachusetts Congressman privy to the plan,
advised Dawes to run: "Andrew will be urged by the Plug uglies; but his
nomination in my opinion would strengthen the Bell ringers by the thousands."
William Claflin, a state Senator and chairman of the Republican State Commit-
tee, heard of Banks' plans and immediately went to Sumner. The Senator
jumped from his chair exclaiming: "Give me my boots. John Andrew must be
the next governor of Massachusetts." Soon Sumner and other members of the
Bird Club were out convincing the delegates to the state convention of
Andrew's virtues. Their success, despite opposition from the major Republi-
can newspapers is testimony to the influence of radical antislavery at the
grass-roots level of the party. At the convention Andrew gained 723 votes,
his opponents 330. The radicals were ecstatic. Not only had they placed
one who shared their ideals within reach of the governor's chair, they had
on
delivered a rebuke to the "little joker" Banks.
Initially, the moderates- conplained about Andrew's victory. Samuel
Bowles, who had been active in promoting Dawes, wrote that the Republicans'
enemies would make much of Andrew's "John Brown sympathies and speeches, his
Garrisonian affiliations,
. . . his Negro-training predil ictions. " The
nomination, Bowles thought, should have gone to someone who had remained a
Whig until the formation of the new Republican organization; for this im-
portant element in the party was seriously under-represented in important
offices. The Republ ican ' s publisher complained that the old Freesoilers--
"bold, radical, clever and grasping"—now controlled everything of importance.
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The anti-Republicans inevitably played upon the theme of Andrew's
radicalism. The Pijot accused him of justifying "the torch of the incendi-
ary whenever there is a colored man who does not enjoy civil and political
rights equal to a white man." The Courier solemnly predicted that if Andrew
became governor he would appoint Wendell Phillips to the Supreme Judicial
Court. And Democrats sang an obscene anti-Negro jingle that ended:
Tell John Andrew
John Brown's dead.
In the face of this attack, Republicans thought it best to smooth over
their differences for the duration of the campaign. Henry Wilson persuaded
Dawes to speak in Andrew's behalf at a Boston Rally. Andrew, hoping to get
the endorsement of the conservative Boston Journal
, made assurances that if
he were elected he would keep Frank Bird in line. Out on the stump Andrew
assured the voters that he was radical "not in the sense of destructi veness
,
but radical in the honest cause of preserving
. . . the good and the true."
Conservative Republicans likewise saw the virtue in unity. The Advertiser
was soon making the implausible defense that Andrew was no more an abolition-
ist than most of the Be 11 -Eve re tts. 42
Republicans of all stripes were anxious to prove that their success would
not result in civil war and that talk of Southern secession was merely for
political effect. In a Framingham speech, Sumner listed seven occasions when
slave state politicians had employed the disunion menace: during the discussion
of the slave trade at the Constitutional Convention, during the Jay Treaty, the
Missouri Compromise, the Nullification crisis, the gag law controversy, the
Wilmot Proviso, and the election of 1856. Sumner assured his audience that
there was nothing to the threats "which should not be treated with indignant
contempt." Andrew echoed this theme. Such little disunionism as existed in
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the South was "stimulated by Northern speculators in national politics
practicing on Southern apprehensions." And should disunionists make an
overt move, the South had Union men enough to drive them into the Gulf of
Mexico without Northern aid. 43
Republicans also sought to blunt the Democratic claim that they sacri-
ficed the interests of white men in favor of Negroes. Some Republicans argued
that colonization was the best way to end the Negro question and suggested
Haiti as a likely destination for American blacks. This policy, they claimed,
would bear rich political fruit by attracting slaveless Southern whites to the
Republican party. Other Republicans emphasized their party's policy of allow-
ing each state to regulate its own Negroes without interference from the out-
side. A. M. Bullock, a Worcester Republican speaking at Faneuil Hall, turned
the Democratic charges against them. He argued that Republicans had attempted
to legislate in the interests of the white man. But "whenever we have en-
deavored to obtain a homestead bill, or a little encouragement for our domes-
tic industry," he complained, "they have filed before us, every mother's son of
them, bearing a Negro upon his back. They have kept him between us and our
business." We have had Negro administrations long enough, the Newburyport
Herald wrote; it is time the white man had his chance. 44
Radicals as well emphasized slavery's impact upon whites. Though they
eschewed the conservatives' racism, they sought to avoid the impression that
their primary concern was with blacks. Andrew continuously emphasized that
the real question of the campaign was whether "all poor men shall be slaves
or all slaves shall be made free." Nothing but universal white suffrage had
prevented the frank advocacy of the ownership of white labor; nothing but free
schools and the free press had prevented a Dred Scott decision for white men.
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Andrew warned a working-class audience in Boston that, if the Republicans
lost and the slave forces extended their influence, there might well come
a Supreme Court decision that, by permitting slavery in the North, would
ruin the white laboring man. "The power of the Supreme Court to argue the
colored man out of the Constitution," he advised, "may argue you out of it
and me out of it
. . . tomorrow." Henry Wilson, speaking to artisans in East
Boston pursued a similar theme. He presented himself as an example of the
benefits of a free labor system, but warned that slavery had "degraded the
white laboring man of the South and dishonored the white laboring man of the
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North."
During the presidential campaign, Charles Francis Adams visited Worcester
to speak at a political rally. While there he stayed at the home of John
Curtis, the proprietor of a clothing store and a staunch Republican. This
rather ordinary man inspired Adams to write a glowing testimony to the virtues
of the Massachusetts middle class. Adams noted that Curtis, who lived in his
neat, comfortable house with his intelligent wife and his one daughter, was
quiet and well mannered. "This is the type of a class which are scarcely to
be found outside of New England," the Massachusetts Congressman maintained;
they constitute the great buttress of our Republican organization."
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Adams' faith in the middle class' devotion to Republicanism was shared
by most of his colleagues. For the middle class understood the dignity of free
labor, was jealous of its free institutions and respected the moral influence
of the pulpit and the press. It suffered neither from the corrupting influences
of great wealth nor from the degradation of poverty and ignorance. The
Republicans' most enduring nightmare was that their diverse enemies--those on
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either end of the economic spectrum-might coalesce to provide a united
front of greed and immorality. Republicans anticipated a national alliance
of "the Cambridge scholar, the Southern slave-driver, and the Chicago bully."
On the local level they feared the "timid capitalists of Beacon Street join-
ing hands with the roughs of North Street and Pig Alley," the ruffled shirts
working with the no-shirts. The large cities were the most likely place such
an unholy alliance would emerge; for there lived large numbers of "dependent,
ignorant, vicious classes" as well as "silver spoon aristocrats." Republicans
were well aware that they had never carried a majority in Boston. Sumner
commented that the proslavery sentiment of the cities almost justified
Jefferson's sentiment that they were sores on the body politic. 47
Throughout the summer, Republicans watched as their opponents—especially
those in Boston—attempted to organize a fusion ticket. Ineffectual divided,
these anti
-Republicans had some chance for success if they combined. Their
historical model was the Coalition of 1850 which had driven the Whigs from
power and had ushered in a new era of political life in Massachusetts. Many
upper-class gentlemen overcame their long-standing distaste for the Democrats
in the face of what they perceived to be a national emergency. The Democratic
administration—bad as it might be—was a known quality, unlike the uncertain-
ties o^ Republicanism. Edward Everett, in particular, became a strong supporter
of a coalition with the Democrats; at least "there is a savor of nationality
about the Democratic party," he maintained. Noting that the Democrats had
muted their traditional economic radicalism, the Massachusetts business com-
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mumty was receptive to cooperation.
Many Democrats reciprocated in their desire for a fusion ticket. The
Pi lot even offered to join with former Know-Nothings to oppose the Republican
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menace. "When a house is on fire," its editor wrote, "all the neighbors,
without distinction of race or faith, rush toward it, to save life and
property." Even after the three anti-Republican parties selected candidates
for governor in early autumn (Bell-Everetts
, Amos Lawrence; Douglas Demo-
crats, Erasmus D. Beach; Breckinridge Democrats, Benjamin Butler), there was
hope for agreement on a common ticket. Both Beach and Lawrence were eager
to withdraw in favor of a suitable alternative. 49
But the bitter feud among the Democrats destroyed the possibility of a
common gubernatorial candidate or a united slate of presidential electors.
Douglas men were enraged by the administration's ruthless purge of the post
offices and custom houses. Caleb Cushing further antagonized them with
speeches that urged the South to resist by any means a Lincoln victory.
Benjamin Butler, believing that a Republican victory was inevitable, argued
that the primary objection of administration Democrats ought to be the preser-
vation of their organization. Consequently, he worked to frustrate fusion by
antagonizing potential allies. One of Butler's prime targets was Amos Lawrence
whom he attacked as John Brown's treasurer. And when the Boston Herald—noted
for its numerous advertisements by "no cure, no pay" physi ci ans--endorsed
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Douglas, Butler dismissed it as a "venal and venereal sheet."
Though the three factions could not agree on state-wide candidates, there
was fusion in several Congressional districts and in many local races. The most
important combination was in Boston. In one district, anti-Republicans sup-
ported Democrat Erastus Bigelow--inventor of the power loom and founder of the
carpet business that still bears his name--to oppose Congressman Alexander Rice.
In the second Boston district Whig industrialist William Appleton stood against
incumbent Anson Burlingame. The advocates of fusion argued that Boston would
be judged by the men that it sent to Congress and that her current
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representatives were ill-equipped to work in the city's interests. Their
"one idea policy" drove away business patrons, destroyed the home market,
and provoked non-intercourse movements in the South. The Anti-Republi cans
argued that the balance of power in the next Congress would lay with
Southerners, and that they would be unlikely to listen to a Republican's
appeal for assistance to Massachusetts' industry. Appleton's candidacy most
clearly resembled the coalition that Republicans had long dreaded. When the
Hera1d recommended this millionaire manufacturer to its Irish readers, it was
more than many Republicans could bear. Burlingame, a former Know-Nothing
whose political career had addressed itself to the anxieties of Boston's
native-born middle class, responded with a vigorous attack on Appleton's
wealth and his low born supporters.
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Another important contest involving a fusion candidate occurred in the
Worcester Congressional district. There, the anti -Republicans supported incum-
bent Eli Thayer, referred to by his critics as "the Benedict Arnold of
Massachusetts Republicanism." Thayer, the moving force behind the Emigrant
Aid Society, had once been a respected figure among anti slavery circles,
but, once in Congress, he began to support Douglas" popular sovereignty. He
voted for the admission of Oregon without explicit prohibition of slavery and
CO
opposed a Republican effort to repeal the New Mexico slave code.
Thayer defended his record vigorously, arguing that he was not obligated
to treat the party platform like the Scriptures. But Worcester County was
the most antislavery region in Massachusetts and its Republicans were deter-
mined to purge themselves of this "King of Squatters Sovereignty." At their
district convention, only eight of the 146 delegates voted for Thayer's renomi-
nation. The leaders of the Massachusetts Darty, Adams, Sumner, and Wilson,
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came to Worcester to speak against the apostate. Sumner, especially,
relished the task as a way of purifying the party's ranks. He warned
the district's voters that Thayer's record as their representative had
made them "parties to an odious crime" and urged them to elect the Republi-
can nominee, Goldsmith Bailey. 53
VI
On November sixth, Massachusetts Republicans enjoyed a landslide triumph.
Lincoln received 106,533 votes, about sixty-three percent of the ballots cast.
Douglas trailed with 34,370 votes, Bell received 22,332, and Breckinridge
6,105. In virtually every area of the Commonwealth, outside of Boston, the
Republicans received a substantial majority of the votes—more than ninety-
percent in some homogeneous rural communities. Despite predictions that
Andrew's radicalism would antagonize many conservative voters, the Republican
gubernatorial candidate came within two thousand votes of Lincoln and cap-
tured sixty-two percent of the vote. In Boston, Lincoln polled only forty-
seven percent, but received a plurality over each of his opponents. The
city's mercantile community" generally supported Bell; its Irish remained loyal
to Douglas. The only compensation for the anti-Republicans was William
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Appleton's narrow victory over Burlingame.
In the thirty years prior to 1860, Massachusetts had voted for the winning
candidate in only two presidential elections. She had been alienated from the
policies of the national government during most of these years and few of her
leading men had served in important federal posts. But with the election of
Lincoln, Massachusetts' relations with the national government would take an
abrupt turn. As a leading Republican state she would have new influence in
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Washington; her antislavery statesmen would now be eligible for offices
of public trust. The power of the national government which previously
had upheld slavery could now be used to promote the interests of the free
working man. Massachusetts Republicans were determined that this opportuni-
ty not be lost.
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CHAPTER VII
CONGRESSMAN ADAMS AND GOVERNOR ANDREW
During the month of November, Massachusetts Republicans, intoxicated
by their victories, refused to concede the significance of the events
that were unfolding in the Cotton States. They were in no frame of mind
to recognize the existence of a real national crisis. Most Republicans
believed the campaign argument that their party's victory would entail no
threat to the Union. To accept the premise that the election of a Republi-
can president in itself could create political chaos, would be to question
the very validity of the party and to strip the election triumph of its
sweetness.
On the evening of November 9— the very day that South Carolina had
voted to hold a secession convention—Massachusetts Republicans crowded
into Boston's Music Hall to celebrate the coming of the new administration.
Henry Wilson was one of the principle speakers, and as he went to the podium
he undoubtedly reflected upon the long years and ceaseless effort he had
committed for this moment. At such a time he was disposed to be neither
modest nor moderate: "Tonight, thanks be to God, we stand with the Slave
Power beneath our feet. That haughty power which corrupted the Whig party,
strangled the American oarty , and used the Democratic party as a tool, lies
crushed to the dust and our heel is upon it." Charles Slack, a leader of
the paramilitary Boston Wi de-Awakes, gave a speech rife with belligerency.
He warned that, if the Southern "farce" threatened the inauguration of
Lincoln, he and his men would "resume our arms and we will see him triumphant:
borne to his post." But neither Slack nor any other Republican present that
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evening suggested that anything had happened-or was likely to happen-
that required reaction from their party. Anson Burlingame remarked that
the Southern Congressmen resigning their seats were like men biting off
their own noses: "There is nothing in the Constitution to prevent this." 1
With engaging irony, Massachusetts Republicans glorified the constitu-
tional system that settled conflicts through elections rather than through
violence. Speaking in Concord, Sumner asserted that the past election would
be a lesson to the world: "It will be good news to Garibaldi in Italy, good
news to the French now subjected to imperial powers, good news to English
reformers." The Republican victory-one "not of the cartridge but of the
ballot-box"-was another step in the peaceful and orderly progress of civili-
zation. Republicans generally believed that Southerners would accept the
election of Lincoln as legally valid and with it the Republicans' anti-
extensionist position on slavery. Many hoped that sectional antagonisms
over slavery would now subside. As naive as these hopes appear from the per-
spective of historical hindsight, it should be remembered that Democrats had
earlier been given to similar expectations. Pierce and Buchanan had antici-
pated that the antislavery North would accept the Kansas-Nebraska Act and
the Dred Scott decision as the final solution to the territorial question.
2
Given these premises, it is not surprising that during November Republican
leaders urged that Southern hostility be allowed to run its own course.
Temporarily Southerners might be maddened by disappointment, but the fever
would soon dissipate. At worst secession would be confined to South Carolina,
which would establish itself as a contemptible republic in the Latin American
mold. Republicans believed they had no responsibility save that of avoiding
provocations that could aid the demagogues of disunion. The Advertiser aptly
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summarized this position: It rests with the Union-loving men of the South
itself to hold their section to its duty. Republicans were certain that
Southern Unionists would rise to the occasion. 3
Massachusetts' anti
-Republicans
, who had warned for months that a
victory for its adversaries would spell disaster for the Union, were quick
to perceive the reality of the secession movement. Some like Caleb Cushing
justified the South's actions. In a speech at his native Newburyport, Cushing
claimed the Republicans were attempting to reduce a white-man's country of
co-equal states "to the infernal depths of a black, red, or yellow consolidated
Republic." Referring to Wilson's recent speech, Cushing argued that, though
Massachusetts might be under the heal of abolitionist fanatics, the South would
rightly resist "until the soil of all sections was drenched with blood." But
for most Massachusetts Democrats, Cushing 's speech represented the treason they
had fought at the Charleston convention. They blamed Breckinridge men like
Cushing for causing Lincoln's victory and, hence, for the crisis which the
election had created. Some of Douglas' Massachusetts supporters— among them
the Boston Herald- - were not unhappy to see their most vocal antagonists depart
4from Congress.
But the great majority of Democrats and Old Whigs dreaded disunion. As
November progressed and five Southern states called secession conventions,
conservatives took no pleasure in the vindication of their predictions. Their
commercial interests, abandonment by their Southern friends, and genuine devo-
tion to the Union, precluded satisfaction. Perhaps these anti-Republicans
also felt a pang of guilt. They had so long warned of the unconstitutional
abolitionist principles of the "Black Republicans" that they may well have
played a role in pushing their Southern friends over the brink of secession.
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Now the Hunkers argued that Lincoln's views on slavery were essentially
those of the Whigs and that the Republicans had obscured this fact during
the campaign merely to keep the radicals in line. As a Westerner, Lincoln
was as different from Massachusetts Republicans as Henry Clay was from
William Lloyd Garrison. Edward Everett was among those taking this position.
If the South remained in the Union it would have nothing to fear. "It is the
standing policy of the Republicans," he observed, "to be ostentatiously
Constitutional at Washington and save their ultraism for electioneering use
at home." 5
Massachusetts conservatives urged the South to join with its Northern
allies and retain control over Congress. In this way Lincoln's office would
be empty of real power. It was especially important that anti
-Republicans
retain control of the Senate which could thwart the appointment of a radical
cabinet. Conservatives argued that, presented with firm Congressional opposi-
tion, Republicans would drop their anti slavery rhetoric in return for posses-
sion of an intact government. According to one Boston merchant, the Republi-
cans would soon be saying: "Damn our principles
,
give us your offices."
Democrats and Unionists hoped that the Republican coalition would fracture
in the crucible of the secession crisis. To this end the conservative press
emphasized every disagreement which arose among their opponents, every sign
of compromise or hesitation. Sometimes they invented differences where none
existed. Thus in mid-November, when Lincoln remarked that Republicans should
hold no harsh feelings against those who voted against him, the Courie r
trumpeted the incident under the banner "Massachusetts Republicanism Thoroughly
Ignored." The paper argued that to conform to Lincoln's views, Massachusetts
Republicans would have to deny votes to Negroes, forbid intermarriage, segregate
)0W
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the public schools, and repeal the Personal Liberty law. 6
II
The conservative strategy was aided by an escalating commercial panic
which was engulfing the entire Northeast. Boston's merchants-timid in the
best of times-had visions of their imminent ruin. Would the cotton supply
be terminated? Would Southerners repudiate their debts? Would the South n<
deal directly with Europe? Like their peers throughout the North, the
Massachusetts commercial community responded to these unsettling questions by
calling in debts, holding on to hard currency, and refraining from- new ventures
until their questions were answered. As a result, borrowers had to pay from
twelve to eighteen per cent interest as the specie reserve of Boston's banks
shrank to dangerously low levels. By December first there was widespread
fear that the Bank of England might suspend specie payments to the United
States, an action that could precipitate a disaster far worse than the calami-
tous panic of 1857.
7
Despite these alarming signs, Boston did not suffer from the financial
chaos that affected New York. The Springfield Republican attributed this to
the fact that there was "more speculation, more recklessness, and more thought-
lessness on Wall Street than on State Street." But a more likely explanation
was that the Massachusetts economy was not so thoroughly dependent on the
Southern trade as New York's. On the Boston stock market Massachusetts' banks
and railroads lost little value, though few shares were traded. The stock of
several leading textile companies dropped from fifteen to thirty per cent,
but this decline reDresented fear for the future rather than current distress.
In December the New England mills were able to purchase huge quantities of
cotton at prices that ware actually lower than they had been the month before.
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Though a few mills ran on half or three-quarters time, there were no major
failures and no widespread unemployment. Most mills enjoyed heavy orders
from the West and were able to pay shareholders their regular dividends.
Merchants in the export trade found their ships filled with Western grain due
to the poor harvests in Europe. But to the shoe industry, already suffering
from a serious depression, the secession crisis was a further blew. The Boston
Commercial Bulletin reoorted that during the closing weeks of the old year
"scarcely a hammer struck" in the Massachusetts shoe towns.
8
Thus conditions varied in the Massachusetts economy during December.
Certainly business was not as prosperous as in normal times, but neither was
it in a state of collapse. The atmosphere was one of apprehension, and this
uncertainty bode ill for Republicans. Conservatives offered visions of a
ruined New England— its factories competing with the pauper labor of Europe,
its ships rotting at their wharves, its streets filled with unemployed workmen,
all because of the fanaticism of antislavery agitators. In a heated address
Caleb Cushing asked his commercial audience:
Have your stocks fallen?
Have you no market?
Do you have to pay two per cent
per month for the use of money?
All these evils, he suggested, were the result of Republican intransigence over
, 9
slavery.
Such rhetoric brought heavy pressure on Republican Congressmen to compro-
mise with the South. Henry Gardner, writing to Charles Francis Adams, inac-
curately portrayed the economic situation in Boston as worse than 1857 and
warned that the panic would "engulf everyone who owns or owes anything." Another
correspondent warned Adams that soon the value of New England real estate would
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be but one-third its present value. Adams, himself, knew that times were
tight. The empty federal treasury was unable to pay full Congressional
salaries and Adams was hard pressed to meet his mortgage payment on some
Boston property. But responding to a mill owner who urged compromise, Adams
advised that the money panic "is sheer fright and has no necessary connection
with the political struggle. People must eat and drink and wear clothes in
any event." He predicted that the manufacturer would soon rehire the workers
he had discharged. Adams' comments were representative of the Republican
view of the panic. But though they might argue that all the economic diffi-
culties stemmed from unscrupulous speculators and that the "bonds of commerce"
would withstand any crisis, Republicans recognized that if the economy should
worsen, they would be in serious political jeopardy. 10
At the height of the economic panic, Boston's Garrisonian abolitionists
scheduled a meeting to commemorate the anniversary of John Brown's execution.
Many Bostonians, who feared that they would spend a cold, hungry winter of
unemployment, saw the abolitionists as an obvious target to vent their frustra-
tions. Vehement editorials in the local pro-Southern press encouraged these
antipathies. The Pilot suggested that Andrew Jackson's threat to hang traitors
had settled the Nullification Crisis. Would not the silencing of treasonous
abolitionists settle the current difficulty? Leading Republicans such as
Wilson and Andrew recognized the hazard of such a gathering, declined invita-
tions to attend, and urged its sponsors to cancel their plans. Massachusetts'
Governor-elect
,
fearing violence, wrote that the meeting was "uncalled for,
wrong, and in fact a crime in the present aspect of our public affairs."
Republican newspapers had agreed not to report the proceedings.
11
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But the abolitionists continued with their plans; and on the after-
noon of December 3, the John Brown meeting convened in a crowded Tremont
Temple. Among those in attendance were one hundred blacks, including
Frederick Douglass and J, Sella Martin, Boston's foremost Negro cleryman,
and white reformers such as Frank Sanborn, James Redpath, and Parker
Pillsbury. Also present were men whose sympathies did not often lead them
to attend such events: wealthy Salem merchant, William C. Rogers; Watson
Freeman, the marshal who had arrested Sanborn at Concord; Christopher
Plunkett of the Customs House; and Amos Lawrence. Merchants, clerks, Irish
laborers-men who were anxious to let the South know that the Garrisonians
did not speak for Boston-filled a substantial majority of the seats. 12
The anti-abolitionists, leading cheers for Virginia's Governor Wise
while they waited for the proceedings to begin, were apparently well-organ-
ized. When the Reverend Martin opened the meeting by calling for Sanborn
to assume the chair, the "broadcloth rowdies" put forth Richard S. Fay, a
Lynn businessman, and declared him chairman. Fay lashed out at the aboli-
tionists and pointing at the blacks in the audience warned that, if the
crisis continued, white men would "hang these gentlemen as high as Haman."
Fay drew from his pocket a series of prepared resolutions which declared
sympathy with the South and asserted that Bostonians had too long allowed
demagogues to disturb the peace of the city. "They have become a nuisance,"
he declared, "which in self-defense shall hencetoforward be summarily
abated." As he spoke the mob roared its approval.
Frederick Douglass elbowed his way to the podium and tried to speak. "I
know your masters," he shouted to the anti -abolitionists ; "I have served the
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same masters as yourself." A counting-house clerk in the front row cursed
the speaker as a "nigger." "If I were a slave-driver and got hold of that
man for five minutes," Douglass exclaimed hotly, "I would let more light
through his skin than ever got there before." "He said the naked truth,"
replied Fay, "for the Negro slave-driver is the most cruel in the world."
Douglass retorted: "Just as a Northern dough-face is more contemptible than
a Southern slaveholder." Fighting broke out in the audience as Sanborn,
taunted as a "white negro," tried to speak. The manager of the Temple feared
for the safety of the building and summoned the police, who restored order by
ejecting Sanborn and Douglass.
Later in the day the abolitionists reassembled in a Negro church on Joy
Street. Wendell Phillips remarked how fitting it was that they should find
refuge there. He denounced the city government for failing to provide pro-
tection, but noted that "we abolitionists are accustomed to live without a
government." Lydia Maria Child applauded so passionately that she snapped
her wedding band. The meeting passed resolutions against the afternoon mob
of "merchants and other well-dressed people," and condemned the Boston police.
John Brown, Jr., sporting a brace of pistols, urged the abolitionists to
resist their antagonists with force; but when the assembly disbanded the
participants slipped out a back door. For outside the building were a thousand
persons, some drunk and throwing bricks, others chasing and beating passing
Negroes, and still others urging that the church be burnt to the ground.
Despite the violence, the Boston police made only one arrest, seizing a Negro
1
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boy who had tried to prevent whites from breaking the windows on his house.
"The Abolitionists Squelched by the Conservative Masses of Boston Who
Desire to be No Longer Misrepresented." Under this headline, the Boston Post
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of December 4 reported the events of the previous day. Conservatives ap-
proved of the suppression of the meeting as proof that the city had no love
for Brown and that it was willing to defend Southern interests. In times of
crisis, they argued, preservation of social order took precedence over free
speech. "Violence is often just," the Pilot remarked. Republicans were
aghast at what had happened. Such incidents only bolstered Southern predic-
tions that secession would create a breakdown of law and order in Northern
cities. This would encourage the South to believe that the North would be
unable to withstand the challenge of the coming winter. The abolitionists
would gain by becoming martyrs to the cause of free speech and the Hunkers
would portray themselves as defenders of the Massachusetts economy. Only the
Republicans and their strategy of cooly weathering the political storm would
lose.
During December, Massachusetts Republicans faced a series of municipal
elections which their antagonists sought to turn into referendums on compromise
with the South. Anti-Republicans hoped conservatives who had supported the
Republicans in the presidential election would regret their votes and repudiate
the party that had caused the current panic. A harbinger of their strategy
was a run-off election for state representative from Middlesex County. On
November 6, the contest had ended in a tie; but in the special election of
November 26, the conservative fusion candidate defeated the Republican, and
15
captured sixty-two per cent of the vote.
Anti -Republicans in Boston agreed on a strong mayoral candidate in Joseph
Wightnan, a manufacturer of "philosophical aDparatus," who was the Democratic
chairman of the city's Board of Alderman. This fusion arrangement marked an
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abrupt departure from the traditional alignment of Boston municipal politics.
In the past the "Parker House CTique«~a committee of merchants-chose a
candidate to run against the Democratic organization. But in the current
crisis both factions were willing to put their differences aside. As
Wightman noted, it was essential that the "metropolis of New England" demon-
strate to the country that "the great heart of her citizens is sound and
conservative." When the Republicans nominated Moses Kimball-a strong anti-
slavery man who had once voted to deny Daniel Webster the use of Faneuil
Hall— the issues were clearly drawn. The Post declared that a vote for
Wightman would be a vote against making Boston "the headquarters of Negro
meetings, a Negro militia, and the advocates of John Brown's raid."
16
The anti-Republican tactic proved successful. On December 10, Wightman
defeated Kimball handily. The Republicans, who had received forty-seven
percent of the Boston vote a month earlier, fell to thirty-nine percent. Other
Massachusetts ci ties—Worcester, Springfield, New Bedford, Lynn, and New-
buryport— all of which had given Lincoln a majority, elected non-Republican
mayors. The impact of such perennial local issues as taxes and "grogshops,"
as well as the presence in some cities of "Citizens" and Temperance tickets,
make it difficult to draw any clear inference from these elections. And
Republicans reassured themselves by remembering that their true supporters
lived in the countryside. But clearly these elections did strengthen the hand
of those seeking to undermine the Republican position. Along with the financial
panic and the recent violence in Boston, they added a real burden to the
Massachusetts Congressional delegation in the early weeks of their new session
at Washington.
1
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III
The Republicans who gathered for the second session of the Thirty-
sixth Congress labored under conditions that were unique in the history of
American politics. Belonging to a minority party, they controlled neither
the House nor the Senate. A hostile administration would control the execu-
tive branch for another three months. Forged as a party of dissent, united
more by common antipathies than by common goals, they had little experience
in positive government. Nevertheless, because they had made an obscure as-
sociate from the West the president-elect, the nation's attention turned to
their Congressional caucus for some solution to the sectional crisis.
Massachusetts' Congressmen, as well as their colleagues from other states,
were now unsure of the exact nature of events that confronted them. Were
they witnessing the disintegration of the Republic? Or were Southerners try-
ing to win by bluff what they could not achieve by the ballot? Were they at
a crucial junction in the history of the nation or merely repeating the old
cycle of confrontation and compromise? Massachusetts Republicans were less
certain in December than they were immediately after the election, but they
held to certain premises. They remained suspicious of the South' s motives,
especially when they read statements like that of Mississippi's A. H. Handy
who wrote that "secession is not intended to break up the present government,
but to perpetuate it . . . Our plan is for the Southern States to withdraw
from the Union for the present, to allow amendments to the Constitution to be
made guaranteeing our rights." Republicans also hoped that secession would
remain limited to the deep South. These states would be inherently unstable
outside the protection of the Union as they attempted to contend with their
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large servile populations. Few Republicans would miss their hot-blooded
representatives in Congress. 18
From the Massachusetts perspective the most critical problem was in
Washington rather than in Charleston. Henry Adams, who had accompanied
his Congressman father to the capital, reported the conditions to his
brother in Boston. The people of the city were in a state of panic, be-
lieving that either Southerners would attack or the slaves would revolt.
"In any contingency," young Adams wrote, "they feel sure of being ruined
or murdered." Massachusetts Republicans feared that in such an atmosphere
their tender-hearted colleagues might forfeit the substance of their well-
earned victory. Likewise, traitors within the Buchanan administration might
destroy the capacity of the government before Lincoln's inauguration. 19
The Massachusetts Congressional delegation was proud of its own firm-
ness. Eli Thayer would plead for compromise, but his colleagues no longer
considered him a member of their party. Alexander Rice might wobble under
pressure from his Boston merchant constituency; but on the whole Massachusetts'
Congressmen were concerned with their colleagues from other states. With
the exception of Republicans from Vermont and Wisconsin, few appeared to pos-
sess the Puritan steadfastness necessary for the occasion. "Things are in a
terrible state here," Henry Dawes wrote his wife. "Our people are shaking at
the knees and there is a great danger that the Republican party will split
all to pieces before the fourth of March." He expressed his contempt for
those who chattered their teeth and shook in their boots, but assumed his
wife that "with the toothache and corns I find it very difficult to do
either." The problem with his weak-kneed associates, Dawes concluded, was
20
that they lacked character.
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Republicans listened with ears of stone when Buchanan delivered his
address on the sectional crisis. The aging President denied the legality
of secession but disavowed any authority to prevent it. The Republicans
were far more interested in the intentions of their president-elect; and
until they received some indication of his views, most were content to agree
on a policy of "respectful and fraternal silence." But this policy of si-
lence left public attention free to focus on those who urged compromise.
On December 11, John J. Cri ttenden-hoping to fill the place of his fellow
Kentuckyian, Henry CI ay—proposed a comprehensive program for peace which
demanded that Republicans abandon the central tenants of their Chicago plat-
form. Senator Crittenden urged a perpetual guarantee for slavery in the
South, the repeal of all personal liberty laws, and Congressional approval
of human bondage in all territories south of the Missouri Compromise line,
presently held or "hereafter acquired." In the House of Representatives Eli
Thayer resurrected the old panacea of popular soveriegnty. He urged that
no more territories be acquired and that those presently held be allowed to
deal with slavery as they wished. Finally, in a December 17 letter to
Thurlow Weed (reported five days later in the Mew York Tribune ) Lincoln made
known his opposition to Crittenden's proposals. This strengthened the hand
of those opposed to concessions, but still left Republicans without a positive
program. Congress had established two forums to seek a resolution to the
crisis: a committee of thirteen in the Senate and a committee of thirty-three
in the House. But when these two bodies convened in mid-December, their
21
Republican members remained divided and leaderless.
Massachusetts Republicans were delighted when Speaker of the House
Pennington chose Charles Francis Adams to be the Commonweal th 's representative
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on the Conrnittee of Thirty-three, the House's vehicle for sectional media-
tion. They were certain that unlike Eli Thayer (who had lobbied for the
appointment) Adams would remain true to Republican principles. His anti-
slavery credentials were impressive; along with Wilson and Sumner he was
an acknowledged leader of the Massachusetts party. He had been in the thick
of the anti-Texas fight, had edited the antislavery Whi£, and had been the
Free-Soil nominee for vice-president in 1848. But though Adams was popu-
larly identified with the radical wing of the party-largely because of
his close relationship with Sumner-his reputation as a radical was largely
undeserved. "I wish I could be an entire abolitionist," he once wrote,
"but it is impossible. My mind will not come down to the point." Adams
was attracted to antislavery not by the plight of the slave, but by attacks
on the civil liberties of white men. The mobbing of Garrison, the murder
of Elijah Lovejoy, and the silencing of his own father in the petition cru-
sade all had great impact on him. But, on most social issues, Adams was a
dedicated conservative. He had fought against the abolition of both capital
punishment and imprisonment for debt. He was suspicious of the Coalition of
1850 and opposed the loco-foco constitution of 1853. And he inherited from
his father a tenacious nationalism that was notably absent from most of the
22
Massachusetts radicals.
Adams never forgot the presidential blood that flowed in his veins. A
childhood at St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, an adolescence in the White
House, left Ihim with a sense of distance from the common man. He disciplined
himself with standards of probity difficult to imagine in the age of Watergate
But he was bitterly frustrated that he had not done more to uphold the Adams
name. During the 1840's and 1850's his antislavery views precluded a federal
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appointment; at the same time he was reluctant to appear too grasping in
the pursuit of elective office. Nevertheless, he did serve five terms in
the Massachusetts legislature and accepted the Free Soil vice-presidential
nomination as an honor which placed him "somewhat near the level of mv
2?
fathers."
0
During most of the 1 850 1 s Adams withdrew from politics to devote his
attention to his grandfather's papers. In 1858, local Republicans offered
him the nomination for Congress. He accepted and won the election easily.
But the fifty- two year old freshman Congressman was not happy in a capital
which he described as an "abomination of desolation." In April 1860, he
expressed his frustrations in his journal: "I feel as if I ought to be more
useful and yet the opening to such an effort does not appear. I feel as i £
more was expected of me than to be a silent member and yet I cannot enter
into a miserable scramble for the floor to talk about little things." Adams
saw his appointment to the Committee of Thirty-three as an outstanding oppor-
tunity to make his mark. With some justification, he believed himself to be
one of the most able members of the House and hoped that through the committee
24he could give the floundering Republicans the leadership they needed.
Initially, Adams' response to the secession movement had been indistin-
quishable from many of his colleagues. "Let them secede from Congress long
enough to enable the Republicans to establish their authority in the federal
government," he wrote, "and the whole game is played." Even after the commit-
tee had begun its work, Adams retained his belief that the crisis was manu-
factured merely to frighten the North and that the South would soon accept the
legitimacy of the Lincoln government. He was adamantly opposed to a constitu-
tional amendment that would guarantee the perpetual existence of slavery.
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"To sanction such a change," Adams wrote, "in this, the nineteenth century,
in the face of the civilized world would be a degree of moral degradation
which I would not accept even at the cost of the Union." Furthermore, he
believed that any retreat from the Chicago platform would only encourage
further confrontations in the future.
Adams* first concern with his fellow Republican committee members was
that they might prove to be excessively pliable. He strongly dissented when
eight of the Republicans supported a resolution calling upon Congress to
grant concessions "promptly and cheerfully" to the South whether or not their
grievances were just. This was rhetoric to be sure, but for Adams it was
rhetoric that would only encourage the secessionists further. Adams likewise
opposed a series of measures—similar to Crittenden l s—put forward by
Representatives Rust of Arkansas and Nelson of Tennessee.
But Adams came to see the importance of preventing Southern unity. The
Cotton States alone would be incapable of self-government; but with the support
of the upper South—especially Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky— an independent
slave-holding confederacy would be a formidable antagonist. Adams consulted
closely with William Seward* during the early weeks of the secession crisis and
they both agreed that it was essential to keep the Border States within the
Union until after Lincoln's inauguration. They hoped that, once the new
president was safely in office, the crisis would subside as Southerners recog-
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mzed that he had no aggressive intentions.
On December 20, Henry Winter Davis, a Marylander with Know-Nothing ante-
cedents, offered a proposal to the committee which— in Adams' words—
"gravelled" the other Southern members like "a cannon shot clear through the
line." Davis proposed to avoid the territorial question entirely by admitting
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New Mexico to irrmediate statehood. This would grant to the South all the
territory south of the Missouri Compromise line which they had demanded,
but would not open land "hereafter acquired" to slavery. Adams was cool to
the plan at first, but after conferring with John S. Watts, a judge who had
lived in New Mexico for several years, he saw its merits. Watts convinced
him that New Mexico was totally unsuited for slave labor and that secession-
ists, aware of this, would refuse the offer. Thus, Davis' proposal would fit
neatly into the Seward-Adams strategy of dividing the South, and would expose
the fact that the secessionists were not interested in the territorial ques-
tion but were after political power. It could serve as the Republican answer
to the Crittenden compromise, allowing the party to appear conciliatory with-
out sacrificing the substance of the Chicago platform. On December 29, as
the most distinguished Republican cn the committee, Adams formally sponsored
the proposal. He received the backing of eight of the committee's fourteen
Republicans. More significantly, two representatives from the slave states
supported him, laying the way for the breach in the Southern ranks for which
Adams had hoped.
u
Adams would achieve his tactical victory at a heavy psychological price.
Although a few of his Massachusetts colleagues supported him (notably Wilson,
Train, Delano, and Rice) most of Adams' friends were shocked that he would
endorse such a concession. Frank Bird bluntly accused him of selling out
Republican principles and warned him of the isolation he would bring upon
himself. "Of all your truest friends," he wrote, "there is not one, with
possibly the exception of Andrew, who does not condemn the proposition to
admit New Mexico with a constitution allowing slavery." E. L. Pierce was
even more unkind as he expressed his contempt for trimmers and reminded Adams
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of an incident from his grandfather's life. It had been one of the great
days of John Adams' life when, during his stay in Philadelphia, John
Dickinson-who had lacked the courage to support independence-turned to
avoid looking him in the eyes.
-An Adams never won fame in making compro-
mises," Pierce cruelly taunted.
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For Adams the most painful criticism of all came from his son, Charles
Francis, Jr. The younger Adams was bewildered by what appeared to him as
an abrupt reversal of his father's antislavery stance. As he walked the
streets of Boston he saw dark expressions on the faces of his friends and
heard them curtly wonder if it were possible to send a firm man to Congress.
He and his brother John engaged Faneuil Hall and planned to denounce his
father's position unless an explanation was quickly forthcoming. He pleadingly
asked his father if he, too, were going down Webster's unhappy path. Was
Henry Winter Davis some kind of sorcerer that he could convince an Adams
to support a measure that struck at the very vitals of Republican doctrine?
The son warned his father against pursuing a compromise "which must wholly
cast me off from you." Adams was able to convince his son of the wisdom
behind the strategy, but not without a strain on the family ties. "I see
you have faith even as a grain of mustard seed," Adams wrote his son. "I
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regret this more for your own sake than for mine."
Adams wrote numerous letters in an attempt to justify his course to
friends at home. He explained his attempt to buy time for Lincoln and his
hope of exposing the hypocrisy of the South. He argued that Southern hostility
to the New Mexico plan proved that it offered them nothing they did not have
by the Compromise of 1850. He chided his correspondents for not recognizing
that true statesmen did not stand equally stiff on great issues and little
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points and assured then that his comment to the plan was temporary and
that he would abandon it once his objective of dividing the South was
achieved. But Adams' ultimate argument was to lay his reputation on the
line. As he told one Massachusetts radical: "it will be necessary for
my friends to trust me, on the strength of my former life." To another he
allowed a tone of self- P ity to emerge. "It is a matter of regret to me,
he wrote, "that after twenty years of service in support of the principles
of freedom, the larger part of the time at the sacrifice of all expectations
of mere political advancement, any of my friends should entertain doubts of
my fidelity."
Despite his best efforts, Adams changed few minds with these appeals.
During the early winter his support came almost exclusively from conservative
Republicans like the editor of the Advertiser and-to Adams' embarrassment-
from Bell-Everetts. But with the exception of William S. Robinson, who wrote
a friendly article in the Springfield Republican
, and John Andrew whose
support regained private, the Massachusetts radicals continued their feverish
attack on Adams and his New Mexico proposal. On one level it is difficult
to understand the bitterness of the radicals' response, for Adams' objectives
were essentially the same as theirs. For example, in a letter to Charles
Sumner, William Claflin, the president of the Massachusetts Senate, denounced
Adams for abandoning Republican principle. He asserted that he would prefer
to see the dissolution of the Union before yielding to the South' s demands.
Then he summed up the feelings of his radical associates: "They would like to
save Virginia, Missouri, and Maryland, but do not care for the rest." Of
course, this distinction between the upper and the lower South was precisely
at the heart of Adams' strategy. But the radicals' rage at Adams went deeper
than a mere difference over tactics.
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The Massachusetts radicals shared many of the traits of the Garrison-
ians. Moral perfectionists, they were- inflexible when they believed
matters of sin were involved. Their first commitment was to the extirpation
of inmorality rather than to the governing of a pluralistic society. They
differed from the Garrisonians in that they were willing to seek political
remedies to moral ills; for the most part, they were not pacifists. Further-
more their keystone was not the immediate abolition of slavery, but barring
its extension to the West with an eye to its eventual extinction. But having
seized on the territorial question as their fundamental principle, the radi-
cals adhered to it with a tenacity worthy of the most militant abolitionist.
The November election had been the radicals' great vindication. They
refused the contention that the source of the Republican victory had been
complex and varied; for them it was a simple referendum on the extension of
slavery. Lincoln's triumph, in Sumner's words, meant simply that all the out-
lying territories, "so immense in extent, and destined to the support of un-
known millions, shall be consecrated to Freedom, so that the vast outstretched
soil shall never know the footprint of a slave." Thus when Adams—whom the
radicals considered one of their own—offered to make a large section of
this territory into a slave state, they attacked him not as one who had made
an error in political judgment but as an apostate. "I have never experienced
a more painful wrench than that caused by the intelligence that Mr. Adams
proposes to surrender New Mexico to slavery," wrote a Northampton woman to
Sumner. "For God's sake send me something contradictory." E. L. Pierce wrote
the Senator in a similar vein: "If ever I had occasion to feel about you as I
do about Adams, I should feel I had lost the use of my faculties." Adams'
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argument that he neither wanted nor expected the South to accept his pro-
posal did not help him with the radicals. They argued that it was morally
debilitating to make an offer one was not willing to accept.
32
One casualty of the secession winter was the old friendship between Adams
and Sumner. The bachelor Senator dined with the Adams family on Sundays and
emjoyed their civilized companionship. But as the political divisions grew,
the once-pleasant conversations became heated. Adams was annoyed with Sumner's
intransigence as Sumner was with Adams' conciliation. The Massachusetts
Congressman began to speculate that the Brooks attack had affected Sumner's
ability to reason, and observed that the Senator appeared to welcome the rush
to civil war with a "grim satisfaction." "The more I see of Sumner's political
course," he wrote, "the more I become convinced of his inability to act a
real part on this great stage of human affairs." The two men clashed over a
proposed modification in the Fugitive Slave Law. Adams urged the change but
Sumner would accept nothing less than total repeal of the obnoxious statute.
This added to Adams' suspicions. "He seldom studies the relation of measures,"
the Massachusetts Congressman wrote. "The question here is not how good the
bill is in itself, but how it compares with the present Fugitive Slave Law."
On January 12, Seward gave a speech which, though short on specific proposals,
was heavy with conciliatory phrases and extravagant praise for the Union.
Adams liked the speech; not unexpectedly, Sumner did not. After listening to
the Senator's harangue against it. Adams lost his patience. "Sumner," he
exclaimed, "you don't know what you're talking about. Yours is the very kind
of stiff-necked obstinacy that will break you down if you persevere." Re-
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lations between the two old friends were never again the same.
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IV
As Massachusetts radicals began to regard Adams as a fallen angel,
they looked toward their new governor, John Andrew, as a source of unim-
peachable firmness. E. L. Pierce expressed these parallel sentiments in
a letter to Sumner. He grieved over Adams' apostasy but rejoiced in
Andrew's inauguration. "A man was wanted for the hour," Pierce wrote, "and
God sent him." But Adams and Andrew were in closer harmony than Pierce or
the other Sumne rites realized. 34
Shortly after the November election, Andrew had suffered a stroke of
apoplexy, the disease that would end his life prematurely in 1866. But
following a painful, primitive operation known as "plugging," the indomi-
table Andrew was on his feet and eager to play his role in the unfolding
national drama. He hurried to Washington to confer with the Massachusetts
delegation and discover the drift of events and found the city seething in
rumors and fears. The men he talked with told of armed men drilling in the
suburbs and government employees who boasted openly that Lincoln would never
be inaugurated. Many Republicans believed that high officials in the
Buchanan administration—especially Secretary of War, John B. Floyd—were
sabotaging the ability of the government to defend the capital.
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Andrew sought out James Mason, the Virginian whose Senate committee
had recently interrogated him on the Harpers Ferry raid, in order to measure
the South's commitment to secession. Mason told him bluntly chat Southerners
would never live under an antislavery national government and that the dissolu-
tion of the Union was inevitable. Perhaps, the Senator suggested, the country
could be reconstructed, but only when the Northern states agreed to accept
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slavery within their own borders. For Andrew this was confirmation not
only of the reality of disunion but also of the imminence of war. This
realization led him to appreciate the wisdom of Adams 1 strategy of accom-
modating the Border States; for surely if they remained loyal, the fate of
the Cotton States was sealed. Though Andrew did not publically endorse the
New Mexico proposal, he and Adams came to a confidential working arrangement
that would soon prove important. 36
One issue on Andrew's mind was the Personal Liberty Law, the Massachu-
setts statute that impeded the recovery of fugitive slaves. Massachusetts
conservatives were agitating for its repeal and Andrew wanted Adams' views
on the response which Republicans ought to give. Andrew received the answer
he had wanted, for Adams believed that the laws were of small importance in
the sectional dispute and that the state should hold the line on the issue.
When Andrew returned to Boston he was enraged to discover that Banks was
planning to deliver an unprecedented valedictory address in which he would
sum up the achievements of his administration and offer advice on the national
crisis. Many of Banks' conservative friends had urged him to use this oppor-
tunity to force his successor's hand. When the outgoing governor spoke on
January 3, he urged the legislature to repeal the Personal Liberty Law which
37he denounced as unwise and unconstitutional.
But Banks, off to make his fortune in Chicago, was unlikely to influence
Andrew. In the previous few days, President Buchanan, to the surprise of most
Republicans, had showed his resolution by upholding Major Anderson's move to
Fort Sumter and by reconstructing his cabinet with solid Unionists. If a
doughface like the "Old Public Functionary" could muster some courage, Andrew
felt he could do no less. After completing the routine portion of his January
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inaugural address, the new governor turned to the matters which his audience
had come to hear. He referred sarcastically to Banks' veto of the Negro
militia bill, and warmly defended the Personal Liberty Law. He denied that
the Massachusetts statute was subject to the opinions of other states: "It
is a naked question of right between private persons, and of duty between the
Commonwealth and its subjects." Massachusetts, he declared, was blameless
for the events which were shaking the Union. The sole source for the crisis
was the reactionary elements in the South who would not accept defeat in an
honest election. "Those who declare they will not live peacefully within
the Union," he warned darkly, "do not mean to live peaceably out of it." 38
On the same day that he delivered his inaugural address, Andrew received
an alarming letter from Adams. Written at the request of Seward, the letter
warned the new governor of a turn in the crisis. "It is beyond a doubt,"
Adams wrote, "that the revolutionists have determined to take forcible pos-
session of the Government at Washington before the fourth of March, and per-
haps within thirty days." The Congressman urged that Massachusetts immediately
ready its militia to defend the capital and that on January 8-- the anniversary
of the Battle of New Orleans—the state fire one hundred guns in honor of
Andrew Jackson and the latest national hero, Major Anderson. Adams explained
that this demonstration could serve to rally the patriotism of all parties.
But Adams also warned that these requests not be traced to him or to anyone
in Washington lest Maryland and Virginia interpret them as aggressive acts.
"The proceedings should emanate spontaneously from the States, and not be
traced to suggestions from this quarter," he urged.
Andrew would strictly respect Adams' request for confidentiality. As a
result, the two men, though in active collaboration, would appear to be on
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very separate courses. Radicals considered Andrew "firm," conservatives
felt he was "incendiary;" likewise observers labeled' Adams "statesmanlike"
or "vacillating" according to their politics. Few knew how inappropriate
their classifications were. Andrew immediately set to work making Massachu-
setts ready for war. He sent couriers through a raging snowstorm to inform
the other New England governors of the threat to the capital and urged them
to join with Massachusetts in preparing their militias. He issued orders
for the military salute, telling his friends that it was necessary to get the
people "accustomed to the smell of gunpowder."40
Sharp entrepreneurs recognized that a profit might be made in the in-
creasing militancy. "CIVIL WAR IMPENDING," read the advertisement in one
Boston paper: "Are you familiar with the use of arms? If not you can be
taught at the Rifle and Pistol Gallery over Morgan's Billiard Room at Bowdoin
Square." The Boston fencing club turned from foils and epees to a class in
military drill. At the same time there was a considerable fear that the
state might be left without sufficient arms. Many believed that the Secretary
of War had emptied the armory at Springfield and sent the muskets to the
South. On January 8, popular belligerency increased when South Carolina
artillerymen fired on the Star of the West , a federal steamer sent to re-
enforce Fort Sumter. Many believed war had begun. "Now let the laws against
treason be enforced," exclaimed the Haverhill Gazette . "The secessionists
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have denced, let them pay for the music."
Andrew shared the assumption that war had begun and immediately offered
the services of the Massachusetts militia to Winfield Scott, the highest
ranking general in the United States army. Scott rejected the offer, calling
it premature and adding that he was embarrassed to have such a proposal come
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to him rather than to the President. But Andrew pursued his objective of
preparing Massachusetts for any emergency. He was assisted in this end by
the state's Adjutant General, William Schouler, the editor of the Atlas and
Bee and an important political figure in his own right. During the waning
days of the Banks' administration, Schouler had drafted a plan by which the
state's active militia (numbering about 5,500 men) would become the nucleus
of an army that would suppress rebellion. This plan became the heart of a
proclamation issued by Andrew, known as General Order Number Four. Under its
provisions each militia officer was to examine his roll and determine the
number of men he had available for active duty. If his company was below
strength he was to fill the vacancies; he was not to grant discharges. He
was to drill and uniform his men and ready them for a call by the President.
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There was some opposition to Andrew's order. The Courier called it the
first step toward a military despotism; the paper claimed that Andrew's real
motive was to purge the militia of those who differed with him and use it to
silence opposition in Massachusetts' cities. One militia company, the Salem
Light Artillery, refused to comply with the directive, arguing that it was
illegal to coerce a state to remain in the Union. But for the most part the
militia hastened to respond, and Massachusetts became one of the first
Northern states to prepare itself for war.
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Five days after he issued General Order Number Four, Andrew sent a message
to the Massachusetts legislature indicating that he wished to make a signifi-
cant presentation. In 1859 when Theodore Parker departed for Italy, knowing
that he would never return home, he left an old musket in a fireproof room
of the State House for safekeeping. The weapon had belonged to his grandfather,
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captain of the Minutemen that had fought the British at Concord bridge;
it had fired one of the first American shots in the War of Independence.
Parker had willed the relic to the Commonwealth and asked that it be
placed in the Senate Chamber as a symbol of the state's heroic past. Andrew
recognized the symbolism that the musket held at a moment when Massachusetts
men were readying themselves as "Minutemen of '61" to save the nation's
capi tal
.
Andrew later confessed that, as he drafted his address to the session
of the legislature which would accept the musket, his feelings overwhelmed
him: "I sat down, yielded to a perfect tempest of emotions, and wept as I
had not done for years." One spectator reported that cold chills ran over
him as Andrew exhorted his audience to be faithful to Massachusetts traditions
"And if in any degenerate hour Massachusetts should falter or quail," the
Governor exclaimed, "may some weird hand beat the old drum that hangs beneath
the root-tree of the Senate, give aim to this arm which spoke for liberty on
the morning of the 19th of April, '75, and may it march before the conquering
hosts of rekindled patriotism and reinvigorated purpose." As he finished
his speech, Andrew—who until recently had considered himself a pacifist—
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raised the musket and kissed its barrel.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE ABOLITIONISTS' VICTORY
Andrew's emotional presentation of the Parker heirloom reflected a
mutuality of sentiment between Massachusetts' radical Republicans and
abolitionists that too often has been overlooked. Historians-following
the arguments of Republicans who feared identification with unpopular
agitators-have emphasized the differences between the two groups, often
to the point of obscuring their true relationship. To be sure the
Garrisonians were disunionists who refused to vote because they believed
that, by participating in an election under the Constitution, they would
acknowledge its authority over them. They were suspicious that all politi-
cians, even those of the Liberty, Free Soil and Republican parties, were
tainted by the institutions within which they contended. It is equally
true that even the most radical Republican reminded his constituency—at
least at election time—that he was not an abolitionist.
But disagreement—even violent disagreement— is not necessarily a sign
that the parties involved do not hold many values in common. Certainly
Republicans argued vigorously among themselves. And few quarrels were con-
ducted with the vituperation that marked those within the abolitionist
movement itself. Indeed, it may be argued that, under certain circumstances,
the bitterness of a controversy increases as the opinions of participants
converge.
In their calmer moments, both the radical Republicans and the abolition-
ists recognized that they were working for similar goals and that the work
of each was indispensable. Charles Follen aptly described this relationship
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in a letter to Sumner. "While you are seeking this (the advancement of
anti-slavery principles) partly through the medium of politics, we
Abolitionists are working for it by direct instruction and appeal. We
honor and value your position and I feel sure that you appreciate ours."
Both groups agreed that slavery was a moral and economic disaster for the
entire nation. They also shared a mutual distaste for large cities, the
Catholic church, and conmercial greed. Some Republicans had a foot in each
camp. "I am a Republican who is also an abolitionist," declared Frank
Bird who chaired the 1857 disunion convention at Worcester. "Liberty first
and Union afterwards, if need be," he declared; "Or Liberty out of the
Union and over the Constitution, if it must be." Sumner had many friends
such as Howe, Stearns, and the Childs who were active abolitionists; and
Andrew's legal work kept him in close contact with all elements of the
antislavery cause. On many occasions radical Republicans and abolitionists
shared the platform at public meetings.
1
Garrison saw the rise of the Republicans as a sign that popular opinion
was turning against slavery. During the 1850's he increasingly reprinted
the addresses of leading Republican politicians as if to demonstrate his
approval. "If there were no moral barrier to our voting and we had a mil-
lion ballots to bestow," he wrote during the Fremont campaign, "we should
cast them all for the Republican candidate." Such sentiments created ad-
ditional friction within the already badly fragmented abolitionist movement.
Abbey Kelley Foster criticized Garrison for becoming "Republicanized :l and
even chided Wendell Phillips for being soft on Republicanism. By 1860
Foster and her husband Stephen formed the nucleus of a political antislavery
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movement that sought to oppose the Republicans at the polls. Little
came of their efforts; though it must have been a strange experience for
Garrison to be critiziced by political abolitionists as a compromiser.
For his part, Garrison accused the Fosters of being "unjustly severe" on
the Republicans, and disapproved of any project that might siphon off
2
votes.
In a letter to Parker Pillsbury, Garrison wrote that the Republicans
were "the hope of the country.". By this he meant neither their political
leadership nor their principle of non-extension. But he expressed confi-
dence in the party's following which he believed embodied "the intelligence,
virtue, moral sentiments, and political antislavery feeling of the North."
Garrison argued that the party was but a manifestation of the impact that
he and his allies had made upon Northern sentiment. The genius of the
people would continue to rise until Republican politicians adopted aboli-
tionism or were turned aside for men who had. Still a disunionist, Garrison
retained his belief that the Constitution was a document "saturated with
the blood of human bondage." As the election of 1860 approached, he became
convinced that an apocalyptic moment was at hand. While the issue was os-
tensibly the further extension of slavery, there was in fact a greater
struggle which "must ripen into more decisive action." The South was grow-
ing more desperate, more savage, more criminal; "all of this," Garrison
believed, "is a sign that the end is rapidly approaching." The Republicans
would win the presidential election, the Union would dissolve, and slavery--
no longer shielded by the Consti tution—would perish. Garrison was parti-
cularly encouraged by the nomination of Andrew who represented "the highest
3
phase of political antislavery feeling as yet developed."
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Lydia Maria Child also placed great faith in a Republican victory.
"If you will enclose the monster," she wrote Sumner, "we will kill him."
Her criticism of the party was in the same vein as that of the radical
Republicans. Thus, she was enraged when moderates failed to rally to Sumner
after his "Barbarism of Slavery" address. And her estimate of Wilson was
very much like Sumner's. "He has borne brave and able testament to the
truth," Child wrote, but he was forever "looking into the immediate effect
on some party, or some measure, not to the ultimate and universal effect
on the character and motives of the country." She would later share Sumner's
rage at Adams' apostasy.
Wendell Phillips was more vocal in his criticism of Republicans than
either Garrison or Child. He even chided Sumner and Wilson although he
recognized them as "the very best specimens of the Republican mind." "Have
they ever avowed their purpose to seek, as a distinctive end, the abolition
of slavery?" Phillips argued that the abolitionist's mission was still
what it had been thirty years earlier--to create a climate of public opin-
ion in which public men could openly call for the end of slavery. "We
have not emancipated William H. Seward, much less the black slave," said
Phillips, incensed at the New York Senator's comment that John Brown was
rightly hanged. He did not believe that Seward actually meant what he had
said but rather that his presidential ambition had required it. It was
Phillips' goal to create an environment in which Seward could speak the
truth. Phillips read Lincoln's nomination as a repudiation of Seward's
pre-convention temporizing. Lincoln, he believed, was not necessarily
"better" than Seward, though he was "cleaner." But when Phillips discovered
that Lincoln had once proposed an emancipation bill for the District of
Columbia which included a provision for the return of fugitive slaves, he
154
indignantly labeled the Republican candidate the "Slave Hound of Illinois."
Lincoln, he argued, would be willing to hunt slaves "so long as the Union,
the party, and the White race seem to need it."
5
At one point before the 1860 election, Phillips had argued that it
would be better for the antislavery cause if Lincoln lost. The Republicans,
he suggested, who agitated when they were out of power, would be more likely
to compromise when they were in office. But after Lincoln's victory,
Phillips was jubilant. "For the. first time in history the slave has chosen
a President of the United States," he told an audience in Tremont Temple.
He retained his low opinion of Lincoln whom he now described as a "pawn on
the political chessboard." But "with fair effort," he declared, "we may
soon change him for a knight, bishop, or queen, and sweep the board."
Lincoln will appear to govern, Phillips predicted, but he will only reign;
"Lincoln is in place
, Garrison in power ." Phillips was also enthusiastic
over the Massachusetts election, and here he had high praise for the Republi-
can victor. For the first time in memory, he declared, the governor of
Massachusetts will be a "frank, true, wholesouled, honest MAN."
The Massachusetts abolitionists clearly believed that the Republican
victory was their victory as well. This conviction extended to the dispen-
sation of political offices. Garrison felt free to ask Andrew to find a
clerkship in the Customs House for a friend, and Phillips told Sumner that
his nephew would like a consulate in Chile. David Lee Child wanted an
appointment himself in Portugal. In addition abolitionists offered political
advice which often mirrored that of Sumner's own political circle. Garrison,
for example, displayed the same shock and disappointment at Adams for his
New Mexico plan, and Howe expressed his regret when Andrew decided to send
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a delegation to the Washington peace convention. When the Personal
Liberty Law was threatened, Phillips went before a legislative committee
and delivered a long, eloquent defense. The Massachusetts abolitionists
now considered themselves as men with access to those in power. 7
II
Many years after the Civil War, Oliver Johnson, Garrison's close as-
sociate on the Liberator
, reminisced about the turbulent days of the se-
cession crisis. It was the moral influence of the Garrisonians
, he asserted,
that prevented the Republicans from bending under the pressure of the moment
and submitting to the South' s demands. In explaining the nature of this
influence, Johnson recalled that in the early days of the movement he and
his colleagues wondered why the antislavery men who were elected to Congress
found it difficult to "keep their footing" once they went to Washington.
They finally recognized that "popular idolatry of the Constitution" was
the cause. Between what the Constitution required in the way of the pro-
tection of slavery and what it forbade in the way of opposition, there was
very little ground on which an antislavery man could stand. "Under such
conditions," Johnson maintained,
Congress became a sepulcher, where free souls could hardly
draw a breath of life. If Sumner, and Wilson, and Chase and
Hale did breath and do noble work there, it was only because
they found a way to break through the web which the Constitution
wove around them .... That they were able to do this may have
been owing largely to the influence of the Garrisonian movement
in diminishing popular reverence for the Constitution.
Many conservatives would have agreed with Johnson's evaluation. When
Caleb Cushing spoke of a band of "drunken mutineers" who had seized the
Massachusetts ship of state, he was referring not merely to those who had
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won elective office but also to those whom he believed lay behind their
success. Conservatives feared the impact of radical agitation on those
basic pillars of orderly society-respect for the Constitution and love
for the American Union. This fear was one of the motive forces behind
their disruption of the John Brown meeting at Tremont Temple.
Though indignant at the violation of their civil liberties, the ab-
olitionists considered the Tremont riot a great victory. "The storm seems
to howl more fearfully than ever," wrote Maria Wescott Chapman, "but it is
a comfort to have it raging where the North can see and understand." From
the earliest days of their movement, the abolitionists recognized that the
issue of free speech was their strongest card. Northern whites who had
been slow to comprehend the brutality of Negro slavery had more readily
understood the Congressional gag laws or the murder of Elijah Lovejoy. The
Liberator thanked the rioters for demonstrating so clearly "the incompati-
bility of the slaveholding spirit, as well at the North as in the South,
with the freedom of speech and Republican institutions." The riot occa-
sioned Phillips to make one of his most eloquent comments on the nature of
a free government. "Governments exist to protect the rights of minorities,"
he declared. "The loved and the rich need no protection .... The com-
munity which dares not protect the humblest and most hated member in the
free utterance of his opinions ... is only a gang of slaves." When
Phillips finished this address a phalanx of friends escorted him through
g
hostile streets to his home.
The secession winter was an exhilarating season for the Massachusetts
abolitionists. Thirty years had passed since the Liberator had first
opened its doors--thirty years of struggle against overwhelming odds. This
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small band of moral reformers had fought the forces of organized religion,
and political authority, the wealth and respectability of the commercial
interests, and (in Garrison's words) "the universal brutality and ruffian-
ism of the country." Garrison reflected that, during these thirty years,
he and his associates had been the targets of popular scorn and violence
and were branded heretics and fanatics. They had been mobbed, misrepresented,
injured in business, cut off from all preferments. Half the states in the
Union had declared them outlaws. But now their work was vindicated. The
Union which had upheld slavery was disintegrating. In the chaos that would
ensue the South itself would abolish slavery and humbly beg to rejoin the
North in a free society. "At last the covenant with death is annulled,
and the agreement with hell broken," Garrison exclaimed. "Hail the ap-
proaching jubilee, ye million who are wearing the galling cnain of slavery;
for, assuredly, the day of your redemption draws nigh."
10
But concern for personal safety tempered the jubilation. Abolition-
ists heard rumors of a secret organization, pledged to preserve the Union
by silencing an ti slavery agitators. They saw in the advertising columns
of the Courie r drawings of bundled sticks which were said to call conspira-
tors to meet. Certainly the Courier was leading a campaign of vilification
against Wendell Phillips. Its editors had always detested Phillips as a
traitor to his class, as one who squandered his Ciceronean talents on base
ends. His speeches, the paper declared, were like tripe and onions served
on a silver platter. The Unionists asked Bostonians to view the abolition-
ists from the Southern perspective. What if Roman priests incited the
Irish to poison the families they served? What if Southern incendiaries
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urged workers to burn factories or raid banks? And on the day before
the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society was to hold its annual meeting,
the Courier warned that, unless city officials halted the licentious
gathering, embittered citizens would take the regulation upon themselves. 11
Garrison's concerns increased when he heard that clairvoyant Mary Ann
Johnson had foreseen a plot to murder Phillips. The editor of the
Liberator took the warning seriously and questioned her husband, Oliver, as
to the time and place the assault would occur. Howe and Pierce formed a
bodyguard~"voluntary police," they called it-which followed the embattled
orator through the streets and slept before his door. After one inflam-
matory speech it took a posse of a hundred men to get Phillips to his home
on Exeter street. Phillips began to carry a revolver and one friend
asked him if he would use it if a mob burst into his house. Yes, the re-
former replied, "just as I would shoot a mad dog or a wild bull." 12
Mobs disrupted abolitionist meetings in several towns during the se-
cession winter. In Westfield, Massachusetts, anti-abolitionists put
pepper on the meeting-house stove to drive out agitator C. C. Burleigh;
later they burned the building to the ground to ensure that he would not
return. In Philadelphia, the mayor told George W. Curtis that he could
not speak safely in his city. Mobs prevented abolitionists from speaking
in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and in Syracuse, Auburn, and Albany, New York.
The new mayor of Boston, Joseph Wightman, virtually invited the city's
anti-abolitionists to attack the January meeting of the Massachusetts
Anti-Slavery Society. In a letter that was reproduced in the Boston news-
papers, Wightman refused the abolitionists' request for police protection
and informed the superintendent of the Tremont Temple that he and the
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officers of the Anti-Slavery Society would be held responsible for any
disturbance.^
A motley group filled the Temple on January 24, 1861: Breckinridge
men and Negroes, rum sellers and ministers, pickpockets and ladies, team-
sters, Garrisonians, Bell-Everetts, brokers, thieves, and state officers,
waited with anticipation as the meeting began. Fearful for the safety of
the women, the organizers of the meeting had them enter by a private pas-
sage. Young abolitionists with arms guarded the podium. Francis Jackson
began the proceedings with a letter from the ailing Garrison. The absent
leader reminded his followers that "the best abolition harvests" came from
meetings that were violently disrupted. As Jackson read, he was interrupted
by the "broadcloth rowdies" in the audience who shouted "Down with the
nigger" and cheered for South Carolina, John Bell and Charles Francis Adams.
(Sumner's friends would make note of this. "He has earned his laurels,"
wrote Lydia Maria Child. "It is to be hoped that the spirits of his father
and grandfather were not there to listen.") Some of the rioters in the
gallery threw down cushions while others sang the favorite ballad of the
1
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Massachusetts Hunkers: "Tell John Andrew, John Brown's dead."
James Freeman Clarke and Ralph Waldo Emerson tried to speak over the
tumult; the latter blamed his inability to be heard on the foreign ante-
cedents of the mob. Edmund Quincy, treasurer of the society, echoed this
theme. "I guess the Irish boys here will earn their holiday pretty well,"
he said. "Perhaps they are glad to be excused from sweeping out their
masters' shops." Higginson cried over the disturbance and baited his an-
tagonists as men who would "drag out and persecute the negro because they
do not dare meet a white man." Only one speaker—Wendell Phil lips—was
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able to finish his prepared address. The anti-abolitionists raised an
enormous howl when he came to the podium, but Phillips' tactics showed
him for the master publicist that he was. "I remember once, ten years
ago in Faneuil Hall," he shouted, "when we stood on the platform for two
hours and did not utter a word-and it was the best meeting we ever held."
Then he pointed to the reporters in the first row. "These pencils will
do more to create public opinion than a hundred thousand mobs. While I
speak to these pencils, I speak to a million men. We have the press of
the country in our hands. Whether they like us or not, they know that
our speeches sell their papers." Then he lowered his voice and spoke so
that only the reporters could hear him. The mob in the galleries, curious
as to what Phillips was saying, yelled at him to speak louder. He com-
plied and finished his speech without interruption. 15
But after Phillips finished, the mob reignited, and silenced the
speakers who came to the podium. Phillips and his bodyguard slipped out
the back door to ask Governor Andrew to quell the rioters with militia.
Phillips was confident Andrew would comply. "You know what I think of
Lincoln," he told a friend; "but Andrew I know well and I do not believe
mob law will be allowed to rule while Andrew is governor." But Phillips
would be disappointed. Andrew was wary that Mayor Wightman ("a concsntra-
ted mob himself," the governor thought) had refused to act in order to
trap him in an illegal act. The governor had just issued General Order
Number Four, and was aware that critics charged it was a move to suppress
urban conservatives. To use the militia now would only lend plausibility
to the accusation; it might cause a bloddy confrontation that could weaken
the state's ability to rescue Washington. Andrew took a copy of the
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Massachusetts statutes from his desk and handed it to Phillips. Show
me a law that gives me authority to use the militia without a request
from the mayor, he asked. Phillips argued that protection of free speech
was an inherent power of the governor; but Andrew only replied, "show
me the statute." After the meeting, Phillips angrily returned to Tremont
Temple. "I will never again speak to Andrew as long as I live," he ex-
claimed bitterly .
6
Andrew sent two of his aides to urge Wightman to preserve order at
Tremont Temple. The mayor warned against any interference in city af-
fairs; but not to appear derelict in his duty, he called in a police cap-
tain and, in the presence of Andrew's aides, ordered him to arrest anyone
disrupting the antislavery meeting. But when the Governor's men left,
the mayor ran after the captain and changed his instructions. The police
were to break up fights but were not to discourage anyone from harassing
the abolitionists J 7
As the afternoon progressed the scene in Tremont Temple degenerated
into total chaos. Finally Wightman appeared, and as he walked to the po-
dium, anti-abolitionists cheered him enthusiastically. He announced that
he had received a letter from the trustees of the Temple asking him to
clear the hall. Unhappily for the mayor, one of the trustees was at his
side and promptly branded Wightman's statement a lie. In truth they had
requested the mayor to protect their property and silence the rioters.
The meeting adjourned for supper; but when the abolitionists returned in
the evening, they found the doors locked and police barring the way. Cit-
ing an anonymous threat to murder Phillips, Wightman declared that there
1
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would be no more antislavery meeting that day.
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During the next few days the police raised little objection as
rowdies attacked Negroes and threw rocks through anti slavery windows.
A crowd milled before Tremont Temple to prevent the abolitionists from
returning and harassed passers-by with long hair or beards. ("Excess in
each," explained the Post, "being regarded as the badge of a philanthro-
pist.") A small band of abolitionists met in the offices of the Anti-
Slavery Society, but Quincy urged them to adjourn quickly as "the mob may
19
get here before we finish."
"They might as well think of extinguishing fire with alcohol," wrote
Lydia Child of the "Orthodox mob" that had disrupted the antislavery con-
vention. The mid-winter assaults had assisted the society in its fund
drives to such an extent that one Republican paper suggested that they
"could afford to hire the Courier to get up a mob every year." Radical
Republicans now believed that incidents like these made compromise less
likely and that, in particular, this violence would help save the Personal
Liberty Law. One Massachusetts legislator who had been present at the riot
stated that, though he had never considered himself one before, he was now
willing to be called an abolitionist. Along with sixty-eight colleagues,
he sponsored a resolution to allow the use of the State House for the anti-
20
slavery convention.
Failure of the police to suppress the rioters ignited the anti-Boston
sentiment of rural Massachusetts. Nothing could arouse the country folk
like a mob of cotton clerks and Irishmen. "Boston is always on hand when
there is any mean, dirty Union-saving to be done," the Hampshire Gazet te
indignantly stated, "but she has never disgraced herself more than on the
present occasion." Rural Yankees had long deplored (and perhaps envied)
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the drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution of the city and feared its
impact on their own sons and daughters. Wendell Phillips defined the
nature of this concern: "Do you say that the people of the country towns
have no interest in the streets of Boston? You tempt the virtue, melt
the resolution, and corrupt the morals of the Commonwealth. 11 Most scan-
dalizing to Boston's critics was the open manner with which illegal ac-
tivities were conducted. Though state law strictly forbade liquor shops,
the Boston police rarely interfered with their business. The state made
the law, was their attitude; let the state enforce it.
21
In fact, many Republicans were advocating that the state should enforce
the law in Boston. Even before the riots, a number of legislators had ar-
gued that Massachusetts should adopt a metropolitan police system which
would put the Boston police under the direct authority of a state agency.
According to one supporter, New York had recently adopted such a plan and
had enjoyed great success; "Mulligan is no more the terror of Broadway,"
Given Boston's composi tion--and especially as the Irish population grew—
it was unlikely that Republicans would ever control her government. Thus
many believed the metropolitan police proposal to be the only way to reform
the Commonwealth's capital. The January riots—which gave rural legisla-
tors visions of Hunker mobs storming the State House—lent impetus to the
plan.
A legislative committee convened in February to investigate the Boston
police and their behavior during the riots. Of particular concern to the
Republican members were rumors of a national conspiracy which sought to
create such disturbances in order to impair the military capacity of the
North. "Warrington" warned his readers to be vigilant. "People generally
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treat the affairs as a mere outbreak of rowdy young men," he wrote.
aThey are very mistaken. It was part of the Southern rebellion. The .
Northern cities are full of secessionists and traitors." He cited Caleb
Gushing, George B. Loring, and New York mayor Fernando Wood as being among
the leaders. John Murray Forbes reported that he had heard of huge sums
of money collected in the commercial districts to suppress antislavery.
And George Hayes, the superintendent of Tremont Temple, warned that Boston
conservatives wanted to forbid any meeting "in advance of the Crittenden
23
stripe."
The committee investigated a letter, written by a Boston politician,
that appeared in a Georgia newspaper. In it Lucius Slade, a provisions
dealer and one of the two Democrats in the state Senate, urged Georgians
to remain in the Union, promising that abolitionists would no longer disturb
their institutions. "A John Brown meeting cannot be held in Boston now ;
any more than it could be in Atlanta," he asserted. "We have got a most
powerful organization here." Slade assured the Georgians that his associ-
ation of merchants and working men would silence the agitators and return
fugitive slaves even if blood ran in the streets. The committee also heard
that merchant Richard Fay had pledged his $600,000 fortune for the suppres-
sion of the abolitionists and that he had received instructions from Secre-
tary Floyd. Witnesses alleged that distiller Jonas French had hired sailors
to join the mob and that Representative Cornelius Doherty had directed an
attack on Phillips' house. These men—along with Amos Lawrence, whom the
abolitionists believed was the real ringleader behind the mob—were summoned
to appear before the investigators. As with the Harpers Ferry committee,
°4
Lawrence was able to avoid the summons; but the others reluctantly appeared.
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The committee obtained little information from these recalcitrant
witnesses. If a conspiracy existed, none would admit it. They testified
that the Courier 's mysterious emblems were but sticks representing the
thirty-three states of an intact Union. Some acknowledged membership in
a secret organization but insisted that its purpose was merely social.
They described the mob at Tremont Temple as nothing but "a good natured
crowd." Despite a strong minority dissent, the committee reported against
the metropolitan police bill. The legislators had little love for the
Boston police, but they retained respect for the tradition of local con-
trol over municipal institutions. But the investigation had its effect.
One of Andrew's aides wrote that the threat of the bill ("it hangs by a
hair of Mr. Phillips' head") forced the police to become more respectful
of free speech. J. Sella Martin, the Negro minister, believed that the
hearings had prevented a purge of American officers in favor of Irish.
And in April the legislature gave the governor some control over Boston
mobs. Now he could dispatch the militia on the request of twelve ag-
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grieved citizens.
Ill
In the aftermath of the anti-abolition riots, Boston's blacks—some
of whom nursed wounds—reflected upon their status in the Puritan Common-
wealth. In some respects, they were among the most fortunate of America's
Negroes. Unlike their peers in most Northern states, they enjoyed virtual-
ly all the legal rights of whites. They could vote, own property, testify
in court, and ride in any railroad car for which they could pay the price of
a ticket. In the twenty years before the Civil War, the legislature had
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taken several steps to uphold Negro legal equality, including repeal of
the law against intermarriage and the banning of segregated schools. When
in 1859, Secretary of State Lewis Cass, citing the Dred Scott case, denied
a passport to a Massachusetts black, the Commonwealth issued one in its
own name. Increasingly the rights which the state guaranteed on paper
were transformed into reality. Thus two Worcester barbers in 1860 became
Massachusetts' first black jurymen. 26
In part, the favored position which Massachusetts blacks enjoyed was
due to their small numbers. The census of 1860 listed only 9,643 blacks
in the entire state, a figure that represented less than one percent of
the population and that was unlikely to unnerve white supremacists. Fur-
thermore, the proportion of blacks in the population had diminished in
every census Massachusetts had taken since the colonial period. In the
absence of any widespread fear that blacks would become a dominant force
in Massachusetts society, abolitionists and radical Republicans were able
to convince many citizens—especially those in rural areas—of the evils
of racial discrimination. But blacks themselves were an important force
in the removal of the vestiges of legal segregation. In the relative free-
dom of the Bay State, a small but viable community of prosperous and arti-
9 7
culate blacks arose to spearhead the struggle for equality.
This small group of ministers, proprietors, and professionals spawned
several memorable agitators. Among the first was Daniel Walker, a dealer
in second-hand clothes, who shocked the Union in 1829 with his appeal for
armed resistance to slavery. Less violent was William Nell an accountant
v/ho also wrote for the Liberator
. Nell lead a boycott of the Boston public
schools that began in 1849 and lasted until segregation ended several years
167
later. Allied in the same effort was Robert Morris, a one-time errand
boy, who studied with abolitionist lawyer Ellis Gray Loring, and was
admitted to the Massachusetts bar. Morris and Sumner challenged the
legality of Boston's segregated schools before the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court and were instrumental in prodding the legislature into
action. Similarly, blacks in the 1840's resisted the segregation of rail-
way coaches. Conductors had to enlist the support of white passengers to
eject Frederick Douglass and Charles Lenox Remond (the black president of
the Essex Anti
-Slavery Society) when they refused to move to the Jim Crow
car. The companies finally decided that it was simpler to discontinue
segregation than to attempt to enforce it.
But it was in resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law that the militancy
of the Massachusetts Negro found its most significant expression. When
the law passed in 1850, some fled to Canada; but a larger number banded
together for self-protection. In Springfield, John Brown enlisted forty-
four blacks into his League of Gileadites. They signed an oath and pledged
that they would shoot to kill anyone attempting to return a fugitive to
slavery. In Boston, Lewis Hayden , a clothier with connections to the
Republican party, was a leader of the Vigilance Committee which helped many
fugitives escape from bondage. Perhaps their greatest moment was in 1851
when fifty blacks burst into a Boston courthouse, rescued the fugitive
29Shadrach, and whisked him away to Canada.
The leaders of the Massachusetts black community showed little inter-
est in the fledgling pan-Africanism of Martin Delany and Henry Highland
Garnett. J. B. Smith, a black New Bedford minister, was the leading
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Massachusetts pan-African spokesman; but when he promoted a cotton-
growing colony in Central Africa, he found more interest among white
members of the Emigrant Aid Society than among fellow blacks, tag the
outspoken anti-colonizationists was John S. Rock. One of the most remark-
able men of his times, Rock at various times taught himself medicine,
dentistry, and law. Rock asserted that blacks would never allow whites to
drive them from the United States. He reminded blacks and whites alike
of the record of the black man in the American Revolution. "This is our
country as well as yours," he argued. "We have won our rights here, not
only by incessant toil but by shedding our blood in its defense." Pride
in the Negro's military accomplishments marked a difference between many
Massachusetts blacks and Garrison. The blacks might admire and respect
Garrison but they could not accept his views on non-resistance. They
adopted a policy of militancy to counteract the popular stereotype that
they were docile and submissive. And they sought to engender self-respect
through pride in blackness. It was the whites, they argued, that were
morally degraded by their complicity in slavery. Rock asked his brethren
to contrast "the fine, tough muscular system, the rich beautiful color,
the full broad features of the Negro with the delicate physical organization,
wan color, and lank hair of the Caucasian."
30
But it would be mistaken to suggest that most Massachusetts blacks
were prosperous and self-confident individuals like Rock and Morris, or
that they could avail themselves of the legal rights which the Massachusetts
legislature had granted them. Most blacks were inarticulate and impover-
ished, trapped in ghettos which, if smaller, were no less oppressive than
those of the twentieth century. Ante-bellum Boston knew the far side of
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Beacon Hill-the side away from the Common-as "Nigger Hill," and there
the majority of blacks lived a precarious existence. Most worked in
positions that made them dependent on white patronage and thus were hesi-
tant to join the vocal minority in demanding social equality. 31
Oscar Handlin, in Boston's Immigrants, argued that the city's
blacks enjoyed higher socio-economic status than the Irish. He bases this
on the occupational statistics of the census returns in which Irish work-
ers almost exclusively list themselves as laborers, while Negroes classified
themselves under a variety of trades. But Handlin fails to recognize
that the census reflected the stated occupation of an individual rather
than his ability to pursue it. Many blacks undoubtedly faced the experi-
ence of Frederick Douglass who, though a skilled caulker, worked as a
comnon laborer on the wharves of New Bedford for half the wage of his trade.
And during the decades before the Civil War, Irish were edging blacks out
of the positions which they once held. Rock spoke to this point on the
anniversary of the death of Boston's black martyr, Crispus Attucks. The
blacks were losing their places, he said, because the Irish could live on
less than any American. Once there were black stevedores all along the
Boston wharves, but now there were few left. A black mechanic was more
likely to find work in Charleston, South Carolina, than in Charlestown,
Massachusetts; and woe be it to an educated black in Boston. "The colored
man who educates his son, educates him to suffer," he proclaimed.
32
As the election of 1860 approached, Massachusetts blacks looked at
the Republicans with ambivalent feelings. On the one hand they had great
respect for men such as Sumner and Andrew who had worked to end
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discrimination in the Commonwealth. The legislative record of the past
decade indicated that antislavery politicians could also show concern
for blacks at home. Furthermore, blacks were naturally attracted to a
party that was suspicious of its own antagonists, the Irish immigrants.
But blacks were enraged when Governor Banks vetoed the bill dropping the
color bar in the militia, and they were well aware of the racist elements
within the Republican party. The Liberator copied a specimen of Republi-
can negrophobia in its "Refuge of Oppression" section. "What shall be
done with the darkies?" the Springfield Republican asked; they were not
wanted in the free states and should return to Africa. Indeed, the editor
remarked, the fact that Negroes were not eager to leave a society that re-
fused to accept them as social equals proved they lacked Anglo-Saxon self-
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respect.
Two influential blacks from outside the state called on voters to re-
ject the Republicans. Frederick Douglass urged Negroes to cast their
ballots for Gerrit Smith's radical abolitionist ticket; and H. Ford Douglas,
a black abolitionist from Illinois, told a massive July fourth meeting at
Framingham that Lincoln was no better than John C. Calhoun. But John Rock
took a more moderate attitude. He freely praised Republicans for thei^
work against the expansion of slavery, but warned that "they only go
against slavery so far as slavery goes against their interests." He ar-
gued that there was a substantial difference between the position of the
New England Republicans and those in the West, though he worried that the
former might lower their antislavery standards in the interest of party
harmony. A number of blacks were active in the Massachusetts party. Rock,
himself, had once placed second in the balloting for the Republican
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nomination to a seat in the state House of Representatives. Lewis Hayden
would receive a position at the State House for his efforts in behalf of
the Republicans. Others formed Wide-Awake battalions and paraded in sup-
port of the Lincoln ticket. Their reception in white cormiunities can be
gauged by a reporter's account of a march in Chelsea. They were "hardly
molested," he reported, as mud and brickbats were thrown on only two or
*u • 34three occasions.
Whatever their attitudes before the November election, blacks, like
white abolitionists, perceived that secession could advance their cause.
And lacking the paci fistic scruples of the Garrisonians
,
they could look
with enthusiasm to a war that might break the shackles of slavery. War
could be the theater for blacks to demonstrate their courage and to dis-
pute at the point of a bayonet the myth of their docility. Earlier, John
Rock had prophesied this moment. "Sooner or later," he maintained, "the
clashing of arms will be heard in the country and the black man's services
will be needed." A force of a million blacks enthusiastically bearing arms,
Rock argued, would be a force that white men would be "bound to respect."
In mid-December, when Union-loving whites held a prayer meeting in Tremont,
blacks rushed in and shouted that the nation would have no peace until it
had done justice for all its people. It was a warning that few whites
heeded.
^
But if blacks saw opportunities in the crisis, they were also painfully
aware of the dangers. The mob spirit which had bloodied Negro heads in
Boston was but one manifestation of a more insidious threat. The compromise
advocated by conservatives struck deeply at the lives of Northern blacks.
Even radical Republicans and white abolitionists could not appreciate the
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blacks' foreboding. The Personal Liberty Law might seem a small thing
to whites who could argue that it was rarely invoked; but to a black man
it was a guarantee that a slave catcher would not seize him as a likely
field hand. The security that blacks felt was not in the employment of
the law but in its very presence. When some Republicans suggested that
the law be repealed as a gesture of conciliation to the South, blacks felt
so much closer to bondage. Virginia's call for a peace conference in
Washington was similarly ominous: white politicians could meet behind
closed doors and barter away the rights of the black man.
36
In the eyes of Massachusetts blacks the gravest threat was the pro-
posed Crittenden compromise and the widespread support which it had
gathered in the Commonwealth. Not only would it expand the domain of
slavery and guarantee its existence in the Southern states, Crittenden's
plan would also require the Northern states to repeal their personal lib-
erty laws and deny blacks the right to vote. Agitated, Massachusetts
blacks gathered at the Joy Street church to discuss their response. George
T. Downing, a substantial caterer, warned that the compromise was a pre-
lude to an effort to deport all free blacks. The North, he feared, "would
sacrifice the whole race of colored people to save the Union." J. B.
Smith warned his associates not to rely on whites to deliver them through
the crisis, but to ready themselves for their own defense. One woman emo-
tionally cried out that she hated the white man worse than a dog. Those
attending the meeting petitioned the legislature to reject the Crittenden
proposals and grant blacks "the most absolute equality in every respect."
They concluded their appeal in defiance: "We will never be driven from
37
the United States by any compulsion!"
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CHAPTER IX
GOD AND MASSACHUSETTS
During the secession crisis, the Massachusetts clergy was as deter-
mined as any group within the Commonwealth to influence the course of
events. Such participation came naturally; for during the ante-bellum
years they had pressed their views on temperance, immigration, slavery,
and all the issues which attracted concern. Though it is a moot question
whether the clergy molded opinion or merely echoed the sentiments of those
who owned the pews, it is unquestionably true that their pronouncements on
public issues are an important source through which to understand the popu-
lar mind of the nineteenth century. In the conflicts over slavery and
disunion, the divisions among the Massachusetts Protestant clergy reflected
those in society at large. Characteristic of the polarity that existed in
the Puritan Commonwealth were the views of two Boston ministers, Nehemiah
Adams and James Freeman Clarke. Their positions indicate the boundaries
within which the debate was conducted.
Salem-born and educated at Harvard and Andover Seminary, Nehemiah
Adams became the pastor of Boston's Essex Street Congregational Church in
1834. This stern neo-Calvinist ministered to his fashionable parish for
almost half a century and became an important figure with the American
Tract Society and the Board of Foreign Missionaries. He gained a local
reputation for his vigorous attacks on Uni tarianism, a sect whose doctrine
he considered blasphemy against Christ. But in the 1850's Adams discov-
ered the abolitionists as his new foe and acquired a notoriety that car-
ried well beyond the provincial interest in his theological disputes.
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Indeed, Adams and many Boston Unitarians would discover that they shared
many assumptions about the anti slavery movement.
1
Adams had disliked abolitionists for their unsettling methods and for
their attack on established religion, and as early as the 1830's he had
worked to minimize their influence within the Congregational Church. But
until he visited the South, Adams had never expressed affection for the
institution of slavery; in 1854 he had even joined the clerical opposition
to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Shortly afterward, however, he journeyed to
Georgia for his health and discovered in the slave society many qualities
which—as a conservative perplexed by the rapid changes he saw in Boston-
he found attractive. After the trip, he wrote A South -Side View of
Slavery, a book that was widely read and that won him a sobriquet that he
carried to his grave.
From the moment that "South-Side" Adams walked off his boat in
Savannah, he was impressed by the order which slavery maintained. A black
baggage handler came up to the Northern visitor, tipped his hat, and po-
litely asked if he could help. "What a contrast," Adams reflected, "to
that troop at the Albany landing on our Western Railroad." He noticed that
Savannah's streets were quieter than those of Boston, and attributed this
to a curfew that required blacks to be home by eight o'clock. Adams en-
thusiastically endorsed this manner of social control and suggested that
the Northern states prevent their working men from "unrestrained and pro-
miscuous roving.' 5 Adams described himself as a "lover and friend of the
colored race." But it is quite clear that he loved the Negro more because
he loved the Irish less. Believing that every society required a mudsill
class to carry out its menial tasks, Adams preferred that it consist of
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Protestant blacks under restraint than Catholic Irish at liberty. In
the South, "respectable, well-dressed, well-behaved colored men" served
as laborers, rather than Irish-a people for whom Adams expressed his
utter repugnance. There were no mobs of laborers in the South, no foreign
paupers lounging at public expense. Southerners did not suffer from un-
ruly foreigners who moved into American neighborhoods and assailed the
sensibilities of decent families, forcing them to move. 3
Adams also noted that the South lacked the "popular delusions and fanat-
icisms"~spirit rapping, second-adventism, Mormonism, and of course aboli-
tionism-which he so detested in his own society. The North, he wrote,
suffered from "active but unrestrained minds" which erected folly into
doctrine and held in contempt that which was sacred. But the South avoided
this "spawn of errors" largely because of the control which slavery kept
over the lower classes. How often in the North did one see a Christian
master reading the Bible to his laborers in order to foster correct beliefs?
Adams disliked some aspects of slavery, especially the slave trade with
its disruption of families; and he believed that the Fugitive Slave Law was
overly harsh. But he argued that for blacks, freedom in Boston was not
necessarily better than slavery in Charleston, and that abuses should not
obscure the positive aspects of slavery. He blamed the agitation of the
abolitionists for impeding efforts to correct slavery's defects.
4
During the secession crisis, Adams doubled his efforts to combat the
antislavery mcvement. He reissued A South-Side View of Slavery and hastily
wrote another tract supporting the Southern institution. The new work,
The Sable Cloud , which Adams had the misfortune to publish only days before
the firing on Fort Sumter, omitted his earlier reservations about slavery.
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A novel of sorts, the book portrayed slaves who wore kid gloves and
carried red morocco Bibles and an abolitionist who protested Southern-
bound geese flying over Bunker Hill. Adams argued that an institution
that made gentle Uncle Toms out of savage cannibals had the blessing of
God and that Negroes owed their services in payment for receiving the
blessings of civilization.
5
From his Essex Street pulpit, Adams warned of the disaster that would
occur if the Union were dissolved. The Union, he proclaimed, was the ark
of social order; without it, society would have little stability. God lay
behind the authority of the Constitution and neither the North nor the
South would have peace outside of it. Adams urged that the North accept
the scriptural truth that slavery was not sinful and halt the agitation of
abolitionist fanatics.
6
Among those Adams had in mind when he criticized "abolitionist fanatics"
was his old antagonist, James Freeman Clarke. When A South-Side View of
Slavery fl
'
rst appeared, no review was more devastating than that which
Clarke wrote for the Christian Examin er. Clarke argued that Adams' errors
stemmed from his "Orthodoxism," and that he was a prime example of how the
iron armour of dogma could make the heart turn cold and narrow. He might
know the "difference between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee in theology,"
Clarke asserted, but he could not understand that it was wrong to hold a man
in chains. Adams was concerned more with the evils of Unitarianism than
with the immorality of slavery; he opposed a Christian Union with dissenting
denominations but waxed sentimental over the bonds between North and South. 7
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Clarke attended Harvard only a few years after Adams; but his experi-
ence at Cambridge was not that of a beleaguered Orthodox Trinitarian in
a heterodox environment. As a liberal Unitarian, Clarke enjoyed the fresh
intellectual tides of the 1820's. His Harvard acquaintances included
Emerson and Palfrey; his major influence was William Ellery Channing. After
leaving the Divinity School, Clarke took a post at the Unitarian Church
of Lexington, Kentucky, where he saw slavery for the first time. Unlike
Adams, he valued freedom over order and believed that the essential lesson
of Protestantism was the primacy of private judgment over church authority.
There was nothing in the system of human bondage that attracted him; "1
learned my anti-slavery lessons from slavery itself," he later wrote,
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"and from the slaveholders around me."
While still in Kentucky, Clarke dreamed of returning to Boston to cre-
ate a new kind of church, one he hoped would speak "more to conscience
than to intellect, more to instinctive reason than to speculative under-
standing." In 1841, with the help of Channing, he opened his Church of
the Disciples. Unlike other Boston Unitarian churches, the new society
was organized on the voluntary principle, by contributions rather than the
sale of pews. Clarke wanted a church that was as free and open on Sunday
9
as the Boston Common.
Clarke also wanted his church to be more than merely a church of Uni-
tarians. Opposed to dogmas that separated men, he emphasized the similari-
ties among Christians rather than their differences. He allowed Trinitari-
ans to speak from his pulpit, a remarkable gesture for a Unitarian in ante-
bellum Boston. Clarke was concerned with gathering a congregation based on
rown
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"a coincidence of practical purpose" rather than on doctrinal unity.
The Church of the Disciples held regular meetings on such topics as
peace, slavery, prison and educational reform, inviting lecturers such
« Phillips, Andrew, Howe, Mann, and Samuel May. Clarke himself op-
posed the Mexican War, helped fugitive slaves, and admired John B
Though not a Garrisonian-because he believed in using the political sys
and was temperamentally opposed to Garrison's di visi veness-Clarke
mained on good terms with the city's abolitionists. In addition, he had
close ties to the Boston black community and strongly defended th
against their detractors. Thus it is not surprising that Boston's leading
Unitarian clergymen-whose parishes included the city's wealthiest and
most conservative citizens-should consider Clarke's church to be little
more than a "piratical flag."
10
Like his conservative counterpart Adams, Clarke actively preached and
pamphletered during the secession crisis. He exhorted his fellow citizens
to stand firm and remain loyal to their antislavery principles. Declaring
that blacks had as much right as anyone to the protection of the law, he
wrote a passionate defense of the Personal Liberty Law. In December, he
had demurred at attending the John Brown meeting. But after that assembly
was disrupted, he eagerly addressed the January meeting of the Massachusetts
Anti-Slavery Society. Free speech was a cherished right for a minister
who had spent his lifetime fighting dogma. Free speech, Clarke declared—
his voice rising over the clamor of tne anti-abolitionists—was the only
difference between the Austria of the Hapsburgs and Massachusetts.
11
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Clarke strongly advocated that the Southern states be allowed to
secede peacefully. Nineteenth-century Christianity, he declared, would
not allow a brothers' war. And the masses of the Northern people would
reject the unprincipled demands which was the price for the continuation
of the Union. Clarke believed that there was little basis for accord be-
tween Massachusetts and the states of the lower South. The latter had
abandoned the principles of the American Revolution and had lapsed into
a hopeless despotism. He looked forward to the creation of a new Union
of the Northern states-one which would be so strong that no one would at-
tack it, so just that it would attack no one else. At various times,
Clarke differed on whether the Southern states needed national consent before
they left the Union and whether they could retain federal property within
their boundaries. On at least one occasion he suggested that the new
slave-holding confederacy be permitted to take Washington. But during the
crisis Clarke was consistent in his belief that the Union was dissolved;
greed and timidity had sealed its fate. Had the North resisted the Slave
Power ten or fifteen years earlier, the nation could have lived in freedom,
prosperity, and Union. Now Northern firmness was equally essential, but
only prosperity and freedom could be reclaimed. 12
II
Though Adams and Clarke were influential figures, neither was representa-
tive of his denomination. For Unitarians tended to be social conservatives,
while Orthodox Congregationalists— along with other evangelical Trini tarians--
were generally receptive to social reform. The various New England denomi-
nations did not separate merely along theological lines; they also drew
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upon different social classes. One could often tell a man's religion
by the toughness of his palms. And when he occupied his pew on Sunday
morning he did not leave his politics behind. But the structure of ante-
bellum Massachusetts Protestantism is complex and requires further de-
scription in order to explain the Commonwealth's response to the events
13
of 1861.
Rationalism and conservatism dominated Massachusetts Unitarianism and
made it the religion of the acquisitive commercial class. There were, of
course, dissenters from this path. Emerson and Parker found the Unitarian
creed lifeless and ventured into Transcendentalism. Others like Clarke,
Higginson, and Samuel May, though theologically less heterodox, champi-
oned radical social reform. But for the most part Massachusetts Unitarians
were social and political conservatives who expected ministers to conform
to their narrow views. May, for example, found himself without a parish
for disobeying this unwritten rule. Ante-bellum New England Unitarianism
was often called "Liberal Religion;" but it was liberal only measured against
the hoary doctrines of Calvin rather than against the world in which its
members lived.
The Unitarian parishes of Boston were easily the wealthiest congrega-
tions in New England. It was the Unitarian churches that leading Whigs such
as Webster and Everett, and industrialists like the Lowells and the
Appletons attended. When Harriet Beecher Stowe arrived in Cambridge she
discovered that the Harvard trustees and professors were all Unitarians
and "the elite of wealth arid fashion crowded Unitarian churches." The
ministers were themselves gentlemen, their salaries several times those of
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their peers in other denominations. They enjoyed the prestige of belong-
ing to the inner circle of power. Octavius Frothingham, whose father
Nathaniel was among the most noted of this ministerial group, wrote that
it required the strength of a saint to turn one's back on such privileges
and champion reform. In the towns and smaller cities, the Unitarian con-
gregations followed a similar, if more modest, pattern. Their members
consisted of the mobile upper-middle class-bankers, merchants, and manu-
facturers-men who had the least to fear from the new industrial system.
Few laborers, mechanics, or farmers belonged to their churches. 14
For Massachusetts Unitarians, the Harvard tracts on moral philosophy
took the place of papal bulls. Invariably their academics identified God
with the causes of Whiggery and Union. Although the theology of Unitari-
anism emphasized the primacy of human reason, the Harvard pnilosophers op-
posed the freedom of individual conscience on matters of society. "In the
ordinary course of things," wrote Harvard President James Walker, "I cannot
help thinking public opinion to be a safer ruler than the conceit of pri-
vate judgment." The "public opinion" that Walker and his associates heeded
15
was limited to a very narrow base.
Massachusetts Trinitarians were often social and political antagonists
of the Unitarians. Their churches attracted the great majority of the
native-born middle class. As a result, their politics were Republican and
their sentiments antislavery. During the ante-bellum period, the theology
of the major Trinitarian denominations— the Methodists, Baptists, and Con-
gregationalists—grew closer until it merged into what was virtually a
united evangelical faith. By mid-century, most Congregationalists and
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Baptists had abandoned Calvinsim and now resembled closely the Arminianism
of the highly successful Methodists. During the great revival of 1858
the three sects cooperated in the harvest of souls for Christ. The spirit
of Christian perfectionism and millennialism accompanying this great up-
surge in religious activity fostered great interest in social reform.
Churchmen looked more to ethics and less to doctrine as they espoused the
cause of the poor, the ignorant, and the enslaved. As Timothy Smith has
noted 1n Rev'valism an d Social Reform , these evangelical ministers were
well aware that personal sin often had communal roots. Their restless en-
thusiasm and their habit of "reducing complex matters to simple terms"
enabled them to "cut through the dilemmas that held other Christians back
from the campaign to free Negroes." In the 1850's New England clergymen
asserted themselves on public issues in a way they had not done since the
Revolution.
16
Of course, there was no unanimity on these issues. The Congregational -
ists—heirs of the original Puritans—were arrayed into Old School and
New School factions. The Old School retained much of its Calvinism and
the New School enthusiastically embraced the new evangelicalism. The denom-
ination avoided formal rupture only because its diffusa organization allowed
men of varying opinions to stay within the fold. Attitudes toward reform
tended to follow theological principles. Parsons Cooke, a Lynn minister
and editor of the Old School Boston Recorder
,
believed this w?s because
the New School relied on "independent reasoning and philosophical specula-
tion" rather than scrupulously following the Bible. Cooke argued that, un-
like New School advocates who ignored the Bible when it differed from their
theories cf society, Calvinists followed the Scriptures wherever they led.
1 ''
183
The Old School argued that Christian ministers should draw a wide
line between politics and religion. As Cooke declared, the pulpit ought
not be turned into "a grand electionary theater." But Cooke and his
allies were inconsistent on this point. Once they had been active sup-
porters of colonization, and they continued to promote temperance cam-
paigns. The reform movements which they opposed were those they could not
control and which threatened their notions of social stability. Thus they
despised the Garrisonians who, with their anti-clericalism and anti-Sab-
batarianism, divided churches, diverted money from "Christian programs,"
and espoused such heresies as women's rights. It was not "promiscuous
combinations" like antislavery societies, Old School clergymen argued, but
the Gospels as expounded by the ministry that was "God's chosen instrument
for removing men from all sin."
18
The Old School justified its varying attitudes toward temperance and
antislavery. It maintained that drunkenness was a malum in se (a sin which
in itself denied entrance into heaven), but that slaveholding was not.
Though Nehemiah Adams' support of slavery was rare even among the Old School,
some Congregational ists argued that because neither Christ nor his Apostles
preached against slavery that they likewise should remain silent. The
Christian's duty, they insisted, was to bring both master and slave into
19
the Church. God would resolve slavery in His own way.
If the Old School was the Congregationalism of Boston and Andover, the
New School flourished in the Massachusetts countryside. Abolitionist lec-
turers who found the churches of the commercial cities closed to them were
welcomed by rural congregations, many of whom had passed resolutions af-
firming "no fellowship w.th slaveholders." Still, Garrisoni anism was
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suspect among many antislavery clergymen, because of the Liberator' s
stand against participation in the political process. The evangelical
clergy, anxious to reassert the church's temporal influence, strongly
believed in joining politics and prayer. The Congregationalism a peri-
odical reflecting the views of the reform-minded New School, accused
conservative ministers and Garrisonians of falling into parallel errors.
Conservatives, who urged silence on slavery, would strip the church of
its moral authority and deprive it of a great influence over the minds of
men. Garrisonians, by having Christians reject political action, would
leave the nation in the hands of infidels. Let atheism prevail in the
government, warned Lynn minister John Moore, and our doom is sealed.
20
New School Congregational ists did not necessarily accept the doctrine
that slaveholding was an absolute malum in se . They argued that there
could be instances where an individual involuntarily became a master or
remained so through ignorance. But slavery itself was a "great dark,
damning sin" which blackened the entire South, and slaveholding was primae
facie evidence that an individual had set himsel f outsi de Christian chari-
ty- Tn e Congregationalist denounced all those who would graft onto the
Bible "wild and wicked theories" whether they be infant damnation, pre-
destination, or the justification of slavery. Antislavery Congregational
-
ists admitted that the Apostles had not preached against bondage, but as-
serted that human progress allowed for a new approach. The Apostles lived
in a heathen society and were aliens with no hand in public affairs; nine-
teenth-century Americans lived in a Christian society, were citizens and
21
voters, and thus "part and parcel of . . . the power that oppresses."
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Similar to the New School Congregational ists in their attitudes toward
slavery and reform were Massachusetts 1 Methodists and Baptists. Method-
ism was popular among the skilled worklngmen of the towns and cities and
particularly strong among the Commonwealth's shoemakers. With its in-
sistence of the availability of salvation for all men, Methodism had long
been in the forefront of the reformist tradition of American Protestantism.
But the antislavery of the Methodist General Conference waxed and waned
during the early nineteenth century, and the antipathy between those of
differing views increased until 1844 when it divided into Northern and
Southern churches. Still, New England Methodists
-who were strongly anti-
slavery- found that even the new Northern church contained a conservative
element that urged compromise as a way to maintain fellowship with co-
religionists in the Border States. The New England Conference, speaking
through its organ Zion's Herald
, condemned "church saving" much in the
way that radical Republicans condemned "Union-saving." "Church saving is
unchristian business," the paper asserted. "If firm adherence to right
severs it, God will bless the division. The pure uncompromising character
22
of primitive Methodism must be preserved."
Edited by Daniel Wise, Zion's Herald became a strong advocate of church
leadership in secular affairs. "Political action is moral action," the
Herald declared. The church must take the lead in reforming society lest
"adversaries of Christ" seem more interested in the welfare of mankind.
Gilbert Haven, a Boston evangelist who later became a bishop, threw down
the gauntlet to his fellow ministers: "The temple of our national life
has become defiled. Woe to that priest who is dumb before the defilers."
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Under such leadership New England Methodism decreed that slaveholding
Placed the master outside Christian fellowship and denied him the benefit
of Christ's atonement.
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Massachusetts 1 Baptists adopted similar positions. Once the region's
quintessential dissenters, they joined the mainstream of New England
Protestantism after the disestablishment of the Congregational Church.
Except for the doctrine of infant baptism, they became virtually indistin-
guishable from New School Congregationalists. Like the New School they
had abandoned the husk of Calvinsim and joined in the evangelical ferver
of the great revivals. The organ of Massachusetts Baptists, The Christian
Watchman and Reflector, though more cautious than Zion's Herald
, also
advocated reform and antislavery. The work of the church, it argued, was
more than merely assisting individuals to salvation; it included tne cre-
ation of a world which lived by God's laws. The Watchman questioned the
efficacy of ending intercourse with slaveholders, but it recognized that
slavery impeded the creation of "God's Kingdom in America." By denying
2 4the divinity of all men, slavery was an outrage to the sufferings of Christ.
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The social attitudes of Massachusetts clergymen conditioned their re-
sponses to secession. Conservative ministers watched the dissolution of
the Union with a sense of despair. They believed that secession, an affront
to law and order, threatened the basic stability of their society. They
argued that government was an institution with divine sanction and that
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Christians were obligated to submit to the Constitution as they were to
follow the precepts of the Bible. William Stearns, president of Amherst
College, outlined this view in a sermon delivered on January 4, the
National Fast Day. God was the supreme magistrate of every social organi-
zation, Stearns declared: having created mankind, He then created govern-
ment. Rebellion against a legally constituted government, was nothing
less than rebellion against God. Conservatives like Stearns had obviously
traveled far from the theories of social compact that had justified the
25
American Revolution.
Other conservatives argued that secession was a threat to the survival
of Protestantism. According to the Recorder
, only Britain and the United
States stood in the way of papal domination of the world. If the United
States disintegrated, a coalition between the Pope and other European
Catholic despots would attack Britain. The consequences of such an event
would be far graver than the continuation of Southern slavery. The Record-
er asked if freedom for a few million Africans was worth the spiritual
slavery of all mankind. James WaTker also viewed disunion as a threat to
America's spiritual health; But ne believed its source to be internal.
The country, he warned, was "fast becoming a conglomeration of all nations
with no common ties to bind us." Becoming dangerously heterogeneous and
without a unity of purpose, .Americans directed their energies toward
material ends and turned their backs upon God's commands. Disunion, which
would destroy the only national institutions which our people possessed,
26
would only hasten this tendency.
The conservative clergy believed that "church-hating, Bible-hating,
minister-hating abolitionists" lay behind the nation's agony. According
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to Frederick Dan Huntington, a former Unitarian lately ordained in the
Episcopal Church, unchristian attitudes toward the South had angered God.
The conservatives argued that if agitators were silent and provocative
statutes like the Personal Liberty Law repealed, the crisis would pass.
But although conservative ministers enthusiastically endorsed compromise,
many would use force to keep the South within the Union should concilia-
tion fail. Indeed, talk of coercion was more common among conservative
clergymen than among their more radical counterparts. Parsons Cooke
'
warned that disunion would destroy the nation's credit and reminded his
readers of the money that the national government had paid for Florida and
Louisiana. It was impossible for the South to leave in peace: "You not
only carry with you your own property, you go in such a way to set fire to
the house when you vacate." Cooke acknowledged that no state could be
made to send representatives to Congress, but he insisted that the reve-
nues be collected and that federal laws be enforced. President Stearns
argued in a similar vein. He compared the Union to a partnership in which
one man contributed a ship, another a warehouse, a third a shop, and a
fourth capital. Certainly, he argued, none of them had the right to sud-
denly withdraw his property and bankrupt the firm. Stearns prepared his
audience for the prospect of war. God works in mysterious ways, he asserted;
He has used the murderous passions of man to advance His own benevolent
ends. Every man must prepare to play his role in the unfolding drama.
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While conservatives mourned, reformist ministers rejoiced over the elec-
tion of Lincoln. For those who thought in millennial terms, this victory
was clearly a step toward the regeneration of America. In a Thanksgiving
aion
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Day sermon in Cambridge, Gilbert Haven assured his congregation that
they would see the beginning of a new Union. "For years we have been
by-word and a hissing among nations," he declared; our name has been
associated around the world with chattel slavery. But the transformati
of our government will inspire the world. Mexico and South America, which
once feared we meant to reduce them to slaves, will now rush to become our
disciples. Europe will imitate us in government and religion. And the
prosperous North shall soon bestow its gifts of energy, culture and piety
to the benighted South. "No distant prophecy of millennial glory is this,"
Haven assured. "The day is right at hand. It has already dawned." 28
Despite this prediction, Haven and other reformers soon recognized that
the nation must ready itself for a severe test. Haven, for one, was wil-
ling to go to war rather than allow the Union to dissolve and lose an
opportunity for spiritual advancement. He asserted that even Jesus advo-
cated the use of force in exceptional circumstances. Many evangelical
ministers extolled the importance of "Christian manliness" and lectured
on the possibilities of "Progress by Convulsion." Luther shook Europe like
an earthquake, one Congregationalist noted, and only after bloody civil
wars did the English Puritans and the American colonists forge their own
freedom. Some antislavery churchmen echoed the conservative sentiment
that government was ordained by God, and that Christians were required to
uphold it. The Watchman and Reflector wrote that secession could lead to
anarchy with counties seceding from states, towns from counties, and wards
from towns. Better the despotism of Napoleon, the editor asserted, than
29
the lawlessness of a Mexican state.
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Yet many antislavery ministers questioned the wisdom of fighting to
preserve the Union. Zachary Eddy told his Northampton congregation
that, while the laws of nations would justify a war against the seces-
sionists, the law of God forbade it. He graphically portrayed the evils
which a civil war would bring: the closing of schools and libraries,
the decay of religion, "vice in its coarsest forms," flowering regions
turned to deserts. The crisis came from the Lord, Eddy insisted, and men
should accept it with pious acquiescence. It was God's design that there
should be more than one republic in the territory where the United States
now stood; "else why should two dissimilar and incompatable social systems
—two distinct nationalities indeed—have been suffered to grow up?"
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The Massachusetts clergy frequently expressed the view that North and
South were irreconcilably different. They asserted that the North repre-
sented piety and virtue, and South sin and degradation. Some like Gilbert
Haven argued that this disparity gave the North an obligation to uplift its
Southern brethren. But others believed that the slave states only contami-
nated the remainder of the Union. Thus one Plymouth clergyman described
the Southern states as "members already monstrosi ties
, and never firmly
bound to the real body" which "waste its strength, cripple its energies,
and make it a loathsome deformity in the sight of heaven and earth." Another
minister, speaking in Dorchester, echoed the Garrisonian argument that the
Union was disfigured by its compromises with slavery. "All compromise with
wrong, " he preached, "to secure whatever ends, to avert whatever peril, is
inexpedient as it is unjustifiable." Separation, though economically diffi-
cult, would be a small price to pay for freedom from complicity in slavery.
31
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Many antislavery clergymen saw the secession crisis as retribution
for national sin. An Orthodox minister in Watertown warned his parish-
loners that God would turn the nation upside down to wipe out its corrup-
tions and worldliness. He noted a connection between complicity in
slavery and "our atheistic, code of trade and traffic." Godless ambition,
lust for place, abuses of trust, were all becoming characteristic of
important segments of the population. From the perspective of their small,
rural parishes, evangelical ministers could clearly see the bond between
the "Lords of the Lash" and the "Lords of the Loom."
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Many of these earnest Protestants believed that excessive fidelity to
the Union impeded loyalty to God. Nationalism, like materialism, could
become a substitute for religion, a rival to Christianity. Most New England
ministers felt more comfortable with parochial institutions rather than
national ones. Inter-sectional commerce and distant politicians dominated
the Union; but on the local level the greatest influences were men of known
piety, family ties, and the parish church. "We have glorified the Union
more than God," wrote Gail Hamilton, a regular contributor to the Congrega-
tiona1l
'
st
-
Charles Beecher denounced those who made God into the image of
their choosing and would worship any fetish from a Union to an onion. Such
men, he declared, could justify anything. They would cast infants into the
fire to please Moloch or sell men to please South Carolina.
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During the secession crisis, Henry Ward Beecher-Charles ' fcmous brother
—spoke frequently in Boston. Though minister to a Brooklyn parish, he re-
mained New England's most popular preacher and received an enthusiastic
response when he denied that there was virtue in "Union for the sake of
Union." "Even squirrels know enough not to hoard nuts after the meat was
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out," he exclaimed at a well-attended Boston lecture. He compared the
original Union to an alabaster box which contained the precious ointments
of Justice, Humanity, Liberty, and Rectitude.
fh./"? 1° l0n 2 aS ?hese Precious qualities are in it, I love it fortheir sakes. But when the alabaster box has emptied out the o ntment
I do not care what hand breaks the box-it is good for nothing after1° flff ] s gdne. The idea of maintaining the Union for beggarlysake of Union! Union for honor, Union for truth, Union for vigor inliberty, Union for power in free institutions, Union for humanity
and greater growth--for that I would sacrifice almost anything inlife. But Union without liberty, Union without humanity, is but the
corpse of my friend, and not his living and soul-inspired body. Bury
the corpse when the soul has gone out of it. Don't keep it to stink
above ground.
Others contended that, while Union meant strength, strength could be used
for evil as well as for benign ends; strength could kill as well as give
life. The Italians were uniting in the cause of liberty; but Americans had
used the power of their Union to extend slavery and hunt down helpless
fugiti ves.
The views expressed by these Massachusetts clergymen had a significant
impact on the Commonwealth's Republicans. Indeed, it may be fair to say
that evangelical, reformist Protestantism—with its dislike of commercialism,
Catholicism, and slavery—was inseparable from Massachusetts Republicanism.
These Protestant divines could find no virtue in substantive compromise with
the South because they saw nothing of value for which to compromise. They
believed that, should the Union disintegrate, New England would fall back
on its greatest resource— the character of its p2ople. Henry Ward Beecher
argued that those who believed New England depended on its factories, banks,
and commerce were mistaken. Burn down New England's buildings and her
people would rebuild better ones. New England had no need to save the Union
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with cotton bandages.
193
III
In its teachings on slavery and the Union, Massachusetts Catholicism
maintained a staunchly conservative position. Though not the monolith of
Protestant fears, the ante-bellum Catholic Church clearly lacked the di-
versity of New England Protestantism. If many of its priests and intel-
lectuals were Yankee Catholics, most of its comnuni cants were Irish. If
diocesan censorship was milder than it would be in a later age, the ec-
clesiastical organization of the Catholic Church allowed its leaders to
speak with an authority missing among Protestant denominations. And the
Church's rank-and-file-mainly peasants and their children-displayed an
obedience toward authority quite unlike the independence of the Protestant
Yankee.
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It was among middle- and lower-class Protestants that antagonism toward
Catholics was greatest. Upper-class Protestants— those who controlled in-
dustry and held to conservative opinions—often found Catholicism an insti-
tution they could tolerate. They did not compete with the Irish newcomers
for either employment or homes; in many cases they made their fortunes off
the immigrants' inexpensive labor. There were also social affinities be-
tween the commercial elite and the Catholic Church. Upper-class Bostonians
frequently sent their daughters to Catholic -seminaries for their education.
John Fitzpatrick, Boston's bishop from 1846 to 1866, was a frequent com-
panion of Lodges, Cabots, and Lymans. Upper-class Protestants did not fail
to notice the Church's own social conservatism, for unlike many Protestant
denominations it eschewed agitation for social reform. Mill owners saw
Catholicism as an important instrument of social control in the developing
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industrial cities. Corporations often assisted in the construction of
Catholic churches because they attracted labor and channeled their workers
into acceptable directions. With its hierarchial organization, its clear
lines of authority, the Catholic Church was organized much like the fac-
tory itself. The Catholic emphasis on obedience to authority was good
socialization for the mills of Lawrence and Lowell.
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But it was the very qualities that made Catholicism acceptable to the
upper class that made lower-status Protestants see the Church as a threat
to their way of life. An ti
-democratic and anti -reformist, Catholicism
seemed intricately linked to corporate capitalism and slavery. There would
be no convent-burnings after the infamous Charles town riot of 1834, and the
dramatic success of the Know-Nothings would quickly subside after 1855.
But there remained on the eve of the Civil War deep antagonisms between
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Massachusetts' Protestants and Catholics.
The Irish Catholics were Massachusetts' most tightly knit ethnic group.
Indeed they intermarried with native Protestants less than did the Common-
wealth's Negroes. The Irish Catholic birthrate was the highest of any group
in the state; by the 1850's some observers were predicting that Massachusetts
would soon have a Catholic majority. Yankees increasingly noticed the phys-
ical presence of the Roman Church. During Bishop Fitzpatrick's reign the
diocese acquired four Boston churches formerly belonging to Protestant sects,
a development repeated elsewhere in the state. "Upon the graves of the Puri-
tans have they layed their corner stones and founded their altars," the New-
buryport Hera!
d
complained, as it observed that the grandest church in town
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was now Catholic.
195
Catholics continued to see themselves as an embattled minority. They
resented the use of the Protestant Bible in the Commonwealth's schools
and the exclusion of priests from such public institutions as poor houses
and hospitals. They protested the absence of their peers on the Boston
police force and the refusal of the legislature to grant a charter-much
less funds-to Holy Cross College. And they accused Protestant charitable
organizations of snatching Catholic children and placing them in homes
where they would be lost forever to their original faith.
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But if New England Protestants harassed their Catholic neighbors, Catho-
lics were themselves insensitive to the anxieties which their presence a-
roused. Protestant anti-Catholicism produced a scurrilous literature of
seduction in the confessional and infanticide in the convent which Richard
Hofstadter has aptly called "the pornography of the Puritans." But Massa-
chusetts Catholics showed that they could hate no less passionately. The
Pilot— the newspaper of the Boston Irish community—published anti -Protestant
41harangues that equalled the nativists for irrationality and invective.
The publisher of the Pilot
, Patrick Donahue, was born in County Caven,
Ireland, in 1811 and emigrated to Boston with his laborer father at the age
of ten. Starting as a printer's devil for the Columbian Sentinel
, Donahue
worked his way through the printing business with the tenacity of such
Protestant successes as Henry Wilson and Nathaniel Banks. He purchased
Boston's tottering Catholic journal and transformed it into the most popu-
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lar Catholic publication in the country.
Both Protestants and Catholics recognized that Donahue's Pi lot- - though
not formally controlled by the see of Boston—spoke for the Commonwealth's
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Catholic cotnnunity. In his role as spokesman, Donahue adopted a policy
of contention toward the Protestant majority rather than conciliation.
He vigorously opposed Catholic assimilation into Massachusetts' Protestant
culture. With whom would the Catholics assimilate? Donahue sarcastically
asked; with the Methodists, one of the three kinds of Baptists, or perhaps,
"the anti-Bible, anti
-marriage, promiscuous intercourse folks?"
Donahue taunted Protestants where they were most sensitive. For over
two decades Irish immigrants had been replacing the native-born in many
areas of low income employment, especially domestic service. Rural Protes-
tants were displaced by Irish girls who worked for lower wages. But the
Pilot had its own interpretation for the shift in the work force. Middle-
class women feared that Protestant girls with their inferior moral training,
would seduce their sons and husbands. Thus they preferred to employ virtu-
ous Catholic girls who would not offer such temptation. Donahue also
played upon Protestant fear of Catholic domination. He exulted in the birth
rate among the Irish and reported that, although the foreign-born were only
twenty percent of the population, they accounted for forty percent of the
marriages. These statistics, Donahue proclaimed, pointed to the end of
the Anglo-Saxon era in Massachusetts and the beginning of a Catholic majori-
ty. "The reason why Americans of Anglo-Saxon blood do not marry," he con-
tinued, "is an unwillingness to labor for the support of a family, as the
happiness to be derived from a family will not compensate them for the self-
denial required." Protestant women did not appreciate the nobility of giv-
ing birth to an immortal soul; their husbands generally were impaired by
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pre-marital debauchery.
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For Catholics, American Protestantism was a kind of theological anar-
chism. They argued that denominational chaos was merely the inevitable
result of the rejection of the True Church. Protestants, the PTIot as-
serted, believed in "the right of every human being to make a religion
for himself." Catholics saw an intimate connection between religious
heresy and social reform. "Whenever you find a free soiler," wrote the
Pilot, "you find an anti-hanging man, a woman's rights man, an infidel
frequently, a bigoted Protestant always, a red Republican, a fanatical
teetotaler, a believer in mesmerism, Rochester rapping, and in every devil
but the one who will catch him." Catholics were well aware that Massa-
chusetts antislavery was heavily laced with nativism. Knowing that they
shared common antagonists with the South, their politics gravitated towards
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men sympathetic to the Southern cause.
The American Catholic hierarchy took a conservative stand on slavery.
Archbishop Hughes of New York, whose archdiocese included Massachusetts,
clearly stated that slavery, in itself, was not a sin. He taught that, wnile
it was sinful to reduce men to slavery, the Church did not require an owner
to return an enslaved people to its primitive condition. All the Church
required was that the master treat his property with Christian kindness.
The Pilot argued that the only solution to the dilemma of slavery was for
all Americans to accept the authority of the Catholic Church. Through its
influence the slave would eventually be elevated to freedom. Donahue gave
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no indication of how long this process might take.
The hierarchy believed that its teachings on slavery could prevent the
divisions that had plaguad the Protestant denominations. As a persecuted
minority, Catholics could not affort to fragment their strength. They
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also hoped that their hostility to abolitionism would be taken as a
patriotic gesture. Like immigrants in other periods of stress, ante-
bellum Catholics sought to demonstrate through fierce loyalty to national
institutions that they were as "American" as the native-born. After the
Harpers Ferry raid, the Pilot proudly noted that none of the conspirators
were of Irish ancestry. Indeed, Brown and his cohorts were all of Puritan
ancestry; they were enemies of the Catholic Church and men who had helped
to turn New England into a "moral and political bedlam." Brown represented
the ultimate Protestant, the reincarnation of a Puritan Roundhead who de-
fended his fanaticism through the heretical principal of private interpre-
tation of the Scriptures. The Pilot argued that Brown was but a tool in a
British plot to impair the strength of its greatest conmercial rival.
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But Massachusetts Catholics found themselves in a paradoxical situation:
for their unswerving loyalty to national institutions made them even more
unpopular within the state. Most Massachusetts Protestants had little use
for those who placed devotion to the Union above all else. A good example
of the Catholics' dilemma occurred during the Anthony Burns affair in 1854.
A company of Catholic militia, thinking they were acting patriotically by
enforcing a federal statute, aided in the return of the fugitive slave.
But in the eyes of the Protestant majority, they were acting in behalf of
an authority that was as obnoxious and nearly as alien as themselves. Anti-
slavery men grew anti-Catholic as they saw Catholics oppose reform and
Catholics grew anti-abolitionist as they saw antislavery men become anti-
Catholic. Both sides were caught in a cycle of distrust that seemed end-
less.
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Antagonism between Protestants and Catholics continued unabated during
the secession crisis. At a Saint Patrick's Day dinner Hugh O'Brien, the
president of Boston's Charitable Irish Society, criticized the extremism
of Massachusetts' Protestantism. Anti-Catholicism and anti-Southernism,
he said, were the Commonwealth's parallel evils. Puritan fanatics could
launch a vulgar inquisition into an inoffensive convent or a violent raid
against a peaceful Southern town. The Two-Year Amendment and the Personal
Liberty Law were twin blights on Massachusetts' reputation. Other Catholics
argued that Massachusetts Protestants had never been friends of the Union.
The Commonwealth had refused to send troops outside her boundaries in the
War of 1812 and had flirted with disunion at the Hartford Convention. She
had threatened to secede over the annexation of Texas and had given only
grudging support in the Mexican War. Irish-Americans agreed that their
own record had been far more loyal.
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Catholics hoped that their actions during the secession crisis would
demonstrate their loyalty to the Union. Donahue believed that the Church,
as one of the few remaining national institutions, might play an important
role in bringing about a re-united nation. The Union, he declared, was
one of God's noblest handiworks and true Christians were obligated to work
for its preservation. In January, President Buchanan proclaimed a National
Fast Day and asked all citizens to pray for reconciliation. Many Protestant
churches scorned the request. (Charles Beecher's congregation called it a
"Bull of Excommunication for political adversaries.") But Bishop Fitzpatrick
ordered every parish to celebrate the Mass and pray for the preservation of
the Union. The Pilot would offer this as proof of the greater patriotism
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of the Catholics.
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The Pnot expressed its sympathy for the Southern position. The slave
states, it maintained, had been driven to their desperate act by the con-
tinuing aggression of Northern fanatics. Donahue continued to argue that
Southern slaves received adequate care and that they were better kept in
bondage than released to compete with white working men. Catholics gave
enthusiastic support to the Crittenden proposals as an equitable solution
to the sectional dispute. But the Pilot had only hostility for secession
and compared it to Satan's rebellion against God. Donahue foresaw that
peaceful disunion was impossible. He predicted that clashes over trade
and fugitive slaves would be inevitable. Thus he became an advocate of
both compromise and coercion— compromise if it were possible, but coercion
in preference to the disintegration of the government. With the seizure
of Fort Moultrie, he believed the South had crossed the Rubicon, and he
bitterly denounced Buchanan for failing to defend the national flag.
Catholics could have but one course, Donahue maintained; they must "stand
50by the Union, fight for the Union, and die for the Union."
CHAPTER X
THE CONSERVATIVE OFFENSIVE
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Massachusetts looked to Manrnon as well as to God during the
secession winter. But as the division between North and South
widened, the economic panic-so ominous in November-appeared to
diminish. According to the Springfield Republican , the news of
South Carolina's secession was received with "an advance in stocks,
'
a reduction in the rates of interest, and an improved state of busi-
ness generally." Though the Republican 's enthusiasm was somewhat over-
stated, it was true that by mid-January many stocks were close to their
pre-election values and that banks had returned to comfortable specie
levels. Interest rates, though still high, were no longer exorbitant.
1
A few Massachusetts mills slowed production— not because they lacked
either orders or raw materials, but to avoid being caught with large
stockpiles should a serious depression ensue. In Lowell and the other
industrial cities a few workers were discharged and some were placed on
an eight-hour day, but the majority of the factory operatives continued
their long hours of drudgery as if there were no sectional crisis. At
the same time the mills continued to pay their semi-annual dividends.
By February, the deteriorating political situation actually stimulated
some areas of the Massachusetts economy, as Southern merchants made large
orders of Northern goods to beat an impending Southern tariff. And those
involved in the manufacture of arms and the outfitting of ships had more
2business than they could handle.
Some Massachusetts businessmen continued to believe that their finan-
cial destruction was imminent. One such individual was I. E. Carver, a
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Bridgewater manufacturer of cotton gins. Carver reported that his
long-time Southern customers would no longer deal with a man from
Massachusetts and that he would have to leave the state to avoid
bankruptcy. He told Governor Andrew that merchants like himself
"will leave the homes and the graves of their fathers with as much
regret as was ever experienced by a returned Negro."
3
But by the first of the year such dire predictions were rare
even among conservatives. Many businessmen recognized that talk of
a depression could easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Amos
Lawrence was among those who believed that the worst of the panic was
over. "There can be no general suffering here at present," he reported
to Crittenden. There was a hint of disappointment in Lawrence's note,
for he warned the Kentucky Senator that the improving economy would
lessen the pressure for political compromise.
4
The improving economy was indeed a godsend for the Republicans.
Had Northern cities degenerated into chaos— as Southerners hoped they
would—the Republican position would have been untenable. But most
Massachusetts Republicans had believed from the first that the panic
was artificially contrived by speculators anxious to buy up undervalued
stocks and by conservatives seeking to create political mischief. Re-
publicans condemned papers like the Courier and the Mew York Herald for
publishing stories that were unreasonably alarmist. Some radical Re-
publicans engaged in economic saber rattling of their own. They warned
the Boston commercial community that their policy of appeasement would
be considered as giving comfort to the nation's enemies; Westerners
might launch their own boycott of disloyal Bostonians. When the state
legislature defeated a bill that would allow an increase in the capital
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stock of the Granite Bank, Senator Whitney implied that the action was
punishment for State Street's worship of King Cotton. 5
Republicans argued that even if the North and South divided perman-
ently that the two sections would continue to carry on normal commerce.
Trade would transcend both national boundaries and political antagonism.
Lacking industry, finance, and even the capacity to feed itself, the
South would have no alternative but to continue her traditional patterns
of exchange. She could neither eat nor wear the cotton she produced.
Republicans, who believe that Southerners were ignorant of the value of
labor, had little fear that they could effectively compete in those areas
hitherto monopolized by the North. In reply to a suggestion that the
South might establish its own cotton mills, the Atlas and Bee brusquely
replied that "they would no more know what to do with them then the
Hottentots would know how to navigate one of the Cunard steamers."
6
But Massachusetts Republicans prepared a variety of arguments in
the event that the Southern trade was suspended. Some asserted that
austerity would be healthy for New Englanders who had become fat in
prosperity and who had lost contact with their roots. Venison, salmon,
and cod-fish were excellent foods, and even the old-fashioned Massachusetts
meal of brown bread and beans was highly nutritious. According to this
sentiment, New England would lose little if the artificial aristocracy
of money was deflated. Others argued that Massachusetts had little need
for the Southern trade. Most of the state's trade was with the West, and
if the port of New Orleans were closed additional commerce would come by
rail to eastern cities.
7
But the cotton supply did concern Massachusetts. Southern politi-
cians had long boasted that King Cotton could halt the economy, not only
I urn
)ver
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of the North, but of the entire world. Much as twentieth-century
Americans are enraged by the power of Arab oil sheiks, ante-bell,
New Englanders resented the influence which Southerners had o<
their lives. But Massachusetts Republicans had an answer to the
problem: cotton may be king, they claimed, but its kingdom was
longer confined to the South. During the secession winter, Republi
journals were filled with articles on the development of cotton culture
around the world. They warned the South that, by raising doubts as to
its reliability as a supplier, it was inviting the development of rival
producers. Republicans pointed to India, Egypt, and Latin America as
potential sources. But two areas struck their imagination as both
economically viable and politically attractive. Charles Francis Adams,
Jr., wrote in the Atlantic that Africa would make "cotton, and not her
children, her staple export in the future." Others looked to the develop-
ment of Haiti. Not only could the Negro republic provide a bountiful
supply of cotton, it could also absorb the runaways who would cross the
Ohio River once secession nullified the Fugitive Slave Act. Republicans
relished the prospect that a black republic could become the downfall of
p
the slave-cotton economy of the South.
A number of Republicans hoped to eliminate the need for cotton al-
together. Their plan for Northern economic independence was based on
fibrilia—a cotton-like substance made of flax. The principle promoter
of this scheme was Stephen Merril Allen, a former Massachusetts legislator
who had patented a machine that he claimed could cottonize two tons of
flax a day. He asserted that New England farmers could grow flax for
four cents per pound, and that his machine could make it into a cotton-like
fiber for an additional four cents. The delivered substance, ready for
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spinning, would be less expensive than cotton. By January 1, Allen
had a small factory in operation demonstrating the feasibility of
his plan.
Some considered the new process the most powerful antislavery
weapon short of war. Charles Winslow wrote his friend Andrew that
"Southern planters are wholly unaware of the cloud that is gathering and
soon to break upon their system of agriculture and slave labor." Allen
himself saw fibrilia as a national panacea. He reasoned that the fund-
amental cause of the current crisis was the economic imbalance of the
sections. The South had become totally dependent on cotton; the North
had ignored agriculture and turned to manufacturing. As a result each
sought to control the national government and maintain its superiority
at the expense of the other. Fibrilia would stimulate agriculture in
the North, forcing the South to diversify its economy and abandon
slavery.
Allen hoped that fibrilia could restore Massachusetts to a simpler
and purer age. Speaking to a group of Massachusetts legislators, he
reminded them of their youth when every home contained a spinning wheel.
But now the cottage industries had died and middlemen stood between pro-
ducer and consumer, consuming the profits and creating an unwholesome
class system. Allen argued that flax raised on the New England farm and
fibrilia produced in home manufactories could re-establish the dignity
of the individual producer. Fibrilia could strike a blow against the
two great enemies of free labor—the slaveholder and the mill owner.
Many Republicans—Governor Andrew among them—supported Allen's fibrilia
project. Congressman Alexander Rice displayed a piece of flax cotton in
the House of Representatives and warned his Southern colleagues that
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secession would only hasten its development. Even Amos Lawrence,
though he obviously had little desire to turn cloth-making back
'
into a cottage industry, was interested in the fibrilia process.
Allen's scheme proved to be infeasible, but for a time it served
as a Massachusetts' answer to the dictates of King Cotton.
11
II
The most perceptive and self-interested among the Massachusetts
industrialists believed that, despite a probable increase in cost and
temporary disruption in shipments, cotton would continue to find its
way into the New England mills. Nathan Appleton, who described him-
self as the largest holder of textile manufacturing stock in the
country, wrote that if there was cotton in the world New England money
would get it. The major concern of Massachusetts capitalists was not
that they would be ruined but that their expansionist plans would be
unfulfilled. For these men the Union represented an economic empire
with extensive markets, cheap and plentiful raw materials, and the
promise of greater things to come. Unlike most small town Republicans
whose limited horizons and provincial concerns rarely went beyond the
borders of the Commonwealth, commercial men were keenly aware of the
economic benefits of the Union. "It is sad to see this powerful glorious
nation," wrote Appleton, "in the midst of unparalled prosperity, shatter-
ing itself into fragments and all out of an impractical idea, a nonentity
concerned with slavery." As the political crisis grew deeper, Mass-
achusetts businessmen drew together in an effort to preserve the compact
12
that offered them so much.
On February 5, Massachusetts conservatives filled Faneuil Hall to
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testify to their love for the Union. They were relieved that on the
previous day Virginia had rejected secession; but they were well aware
that while they were applauding patriotic addresses in Boston, repre-
sentatives of the six seceded states had met in Montgomery, Alabama, to
form a Southern confederacy. The Faneuil Hall gathering proclaimed
that it loved the Union second only to God. J. Thomas Stevenson, a
merchant-politician, called upon antislavery men to sacrifice their
reputations for consistency to serve the common good. Leverett
Saltonstall described the Union in terms that his audience was certain
to understand. United, the nation could support fifty times its present
population. It could clothe and feed the world; it had stores of iron,
lead, silver, gold, and coal that would last "for untold ages." Soon
American ships could carry the commerce of the entire globe. But
Saltonstall warned that disunion would ruin America's greatness, for
England would seize upon her rival's troubles to retain her hegemony.
The centrifugal effects of secession would quickly hit the North.
Pennsylvania would demand a tariff and New York free trade; it would
become impossible to maintain a union between the Atlantic and Pacific
states. Soon the nation would fragment into a score of impotent republics,
"worse than the petty municipalities of Germany." And with the Union
13
would go "our wealtn, our power, our means of doing good."
Edward Everett was not present at the Faneuil Hall meeting, but his
absence reflected no indifference to the perils of the moment. As one
of the foremost exponents of American nationality, Everett was crushed
as he watched the country disintegrate. He found the contrast with events
in Italy particularly humiliating. The United States was once an exemplar
of orderly self-government, while Italy had suffered alternately from
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anarchy and tyranny. But under Garibaldi and Cavour, Italy was chang-
ing. "It is humiliating to reflect," Everett wrote, "that while the
Italians are healing the wounds of ages and coming together, we are so
soon flying asunder." For one who had long insisted that the American
Constitution was the glory of the world, Everett showed little faith
that it would weather the secession crisis. He regretted that the
United States did not have a parliamentary system which could resolve
the issue by a change in ministers. The British, he thought would never
tolerate a minority administration like Lincoln's for four years.
Privately he suggested that Congress clothe General Winfield Scott with
dictatorial powers. In peaceful times, Everett wrote, there was safety
in a multitude of counsellors, but in times of danger the country needed
"the patriotic energy of one."
14
Everett felt abandoned by his former Southern allies who now rushed
headlong into secession. "Cannot our Southern friends be persuaded to
proceed more deliberately?" he wrote plaintively to Crittenden; "they
give us no time for healing counsels to take effect—nor do they con-
sider in what a position they place their friends here." Everett's
feelings were shared by many men with long political and commercial
dealings with the South. Men who had risked unpopularity by defending
Southern institutions, who had offered their Southern friends credit,
hospitality, and even their daughter's dowry, could not understand why
their efforts at conciliation were met with indifference and hostility.
15
Some ant i
-Republicans became bellicose toward the South. This was
particularly true of Douglas Democrats who still carried the political
scars of the Charleston convention. Wrapping themselves in the mantle
of Jackson, these Democrats often outdid Republicans in their demands
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for enforcement of federal laws. Benjamin Butler also adopted this
position. Though he had supported Jefferson Davis for the presidential
nomination, he now urged Buchanan to treat as traitors the commissioners
sent by South Carolina to Washington. Butler later met these men, who
told him that if Massachusetts sent troops to quell secession he would
need twice as many to put down rebellion at home. Butler bluntly re-
plied that if Massachusetts troops marched south they would not leave a
single traitor behind-"unless he is hanging on a tree." 16
However, many Massachusetts conservatives feared coercion as much as
they feared disunion. Their vision of the Union was incompatible with
any compulsion to remain within the fraternity of states. How could a
nation based on the will of the governed rule a people subdued by
military force? "If the Union cannot be preserved but by a war of ex-
termination, "wrote Harvard professor Joel Parker, "it is far better
that it should be dissolved." Victory in a brothers' war would be as
titter as defeat. But whether conservatives loved the Union so much
that they would fight or loved it too much to soil it with blood, they
were united in their determination to force the Republicans to compro-
mise with the South.
17
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The conservatives hoped to open the breach that increasingly sepa-
rated moderate and radical Republicans. Robert Winthrop even speculated
that this policy might suceed in defeating Lincoln in the electoral
college. Everett assured a Southern friend that if the South were only
patient the Republican party would disintegrate. The growing dispute
over Massachusetts' Personal Liberty Law provided an opportunity for
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the conservatives; for Banks and Andrew had disagreed sharply on the
issue and their respective speeches had left bitter feelings in both
wings of the Republican party. It was inevitable that the debate
should be heated, as the statute's history was closely intertwined
with the Commonwealth's antislavery struggle.
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By 1861 there was no single personal liberty law but rather a
series of statutes and amendments that curbed the ability of a master
to recover his fugitives in Massachusetts. The earliest among them
dated back to 1843 and merely forbade state officials from assisting
in the capture of slaves or using Massachusetts jails for their de-
tention. Conservative Republicans would later emphasize the fact that
Democrat Marcus Morton had signed this bill into law. Not until after
the turmoil of the Burns affair did sentiment against slave-hunting
force stronger legislation. The return of Burns to slavery was a
watershed in Massachusetts' attitude toward slavery and the federal
government. As a result, the Know-Nothing legislature passed a law,
over Governor Gardner's veto, that virtually nullified the severe 1850
Fugitive Slave Act. This personal liberty law imposed heavy penalties
on any Massachusetts official who aided in the return of a fugitive
slave and forbade any Massachusetts judge from holding a federal office
that would require him to execute the Fugitive Slave Act. In addition,
it granted to alleged fugitives the right of habeas corpus and trial
by jury.
The report of the legislative committee that drafted the law re-
veals the sentiments behind this new defense of personal liberty. It
asserted that, when Massachusetts was asked to violate the fundamental
principles of the feclera" Constitution as well as her own, she would
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re-assert her rights as an independent state. "She cannot forget that
she had an independent existence and a Constitution before the Union
was formed," the committee maintained. The Massachusetts Constitution
secured to all its citizens the rights of trial by jury and habeus
corpus. These essential elements of her liberty she had never bartered
away; "she will not suffer them to be wrested from her by any power
20
upon earth."
In 1856, conservatives led by Charles Hale worked to repeal the 1
laws; they were on the verge of success when Brooks' brutal assault
on Sumner intervened. Radicals argued convincingly that repeal
at such a time would be a rebuff to the injured Senator. In 1858 the
law's penalties were slightly reduced; but the following year an amend-
ment required county sheriffs to remove fugitives from federal custody
and forbade federal officers from reclaiming a suspect whom a jury had
declared a free man. Early in 1860 radicals in the legislature made a
strong, though losing, effort to pass a law freeing any slave setting
foot on Massachusetts soil.
Anti -Republicans argued -that the Personal Liberty Laws demonstrated
Republican willingness to override the Constitution and threaten social
order. Caleb Cushing drew an analogy to demonstrate the subversive
nature of the law. Suppose, he said, your wife attended some abolition
meetings and "got some pretty large notions in her head." She leaves
you, takes your child and apprentice, and goes to Maryland. "What if
Maryland had a personal liberty law that frustrated your attempts to
force her to return?" Cushing asked. Harvard Professor Joel Parker
argued that the Massachusetts law proved antislavery men no longer gave
their allegiance to the government of the United States but considered
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it "a kind of foreign jurisdiction." Other conservatives maintained
that Massachusetts Republicans had repudiated one of the basic compro-
mises that had made the Constitution possible. The South would not
have entered the Union without the fugitive slave clause. Massachusetts,
by ratifying the Constitution, had given its sacred oath to enforce it.
By its attempts at nullification, Massachusetts gave the Southern states
a legitimate reason to declare the partnership dissolved. The Post de-
clared that, by enacting the Personal Liberty Laws, Massachusetts was
more in rebellion against the Constitution than South Carolina.
21
Conservatives mounted a movement for repeal when Lemuel Shaw, the
venerable Chief Justice of Massachusetts' highest court, agreed to head
a petition challenging the laws' constitutionality. The December petition,
sponsored by many of the state's most distinguished lawyers, urged the
legislature to revoke the laws "for the sake of the sacredness of the
Constitution" and for "social order and domestic peace." Repeal, its
supporters argued, could give great strength to the cause of the Southern
22
Unionists.
Conservative Republicans, led by Charles Hale, supported repeal.
Hale and his allies, emphasized the laws" Know-Nothing origins, and
denied that they formed part of responsible Republican Party doc-
trine. Lincoln and the entire party, they declared, were pledged to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Law regardless of how obnoxious it might be.
Benjamin F. Thomas, a former justice of the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts and a supporter of Lincoln, published a well -circulated pamphlet
on the Personal Liberty Laws. "Incapable of substantial legal good,"
he wrote, "they do much political and moral evil." For whether the laws
were constitutional or net, secessionists used them as a pretext for
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treason. Charles Rogers' Boston Journal bitterly criticized Andrew's
intransigence on the issue. It accused him of lavishing his solicitude
upon the hypothetical chance that a black might be returned to the
South. The governor's real responsibility, this Republican paper
argued, was to avoid a civil war; his first concern should be with "the
helpless women and children of his own race."
23
Some Republicans hoped to find a compromise position that would
avoid the appearance of capitulation to Southern demands. They wanted
the laws submitted to the courts for a ruling on their constitutionality.
But the proposal languished in the absence of a case; for the very
presence of the laws discouraged attempts to recover fugitives in Mass-
achusetts. Moderates suggested that the legislature pass a "Declaratory
Act" affirming that the Personal Liberty Laws were not intended to impede
the deliverence of bona fide slaves. Others urged compensating slave
owners as an alternative to the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act in
24
Massachusetts.
Still, the Personal Liberty Laws were not without their unconditional
supporters who accused compromisers of a shallow allegiance to freedom.
The Atlas and See vigorously attacked the Springfield Republican for its
suggestion that the laws be repealed. Would Samuel Bowles like it if he
were seized and dragged before an officer who made twice as much for
deciding against him than for setting him free? Under those circumstances
would he consider the law "useless?" John Andrew defended the laws in
ringing terms, reminding his audience of the state's obligation to protect
even its most "obscure and friendless inhabitants." And Sumner argued
that saving the Union by repealing the Personal Liberty Laws was like
rescuing a floundering sl.ip by throwing overboard a jewel of little .-/eight
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but great value.
As the forces for repeal gathered strength, the radicals began
to mobilize. When the Rhode Island legislature revoked its Personal
Liberty Law on January 25, their anxieties heightened. Robinson and
Bird, along with a number of other Sumnerites, established a tabloid
called the Tocsin to firm up the radical position. Paraphrasing
Garrison, they placed on the masthead the defiant announcement that
they were Republicans "Who are in Earnest and Who will be Heard."
Sumner wrote a long letter to Henry Pierce that was passed around the .
legislature. After warning that repeal would only encourage the seces-
sionists to bolder acts, he referred to his assault by Brooks. "It was
once said that the assault on me saved the law. If this were so it
consoles me for much that I have suffered." He told Pierce that he
would gladly suffer for it again.
The radicals noted that since the enactment of the laws the Common-
wealth had enjoyed peace; the Vigilance Committee had dissipated through
inactivity. Recalling that it had cost Boston $10,000 to return Sims to
slavery, supporters of the Personal Liberty Lav: argued that repeal would
only invite a new round of costly riots and arrests. Furthermore, it
was important that state officials be enjoined from enforcing the Fugitive
Slave Act lest they lose the respect and confidence of the community.
Radicals also maintained that under the Constitution it was a state
responsibility to regulate the return of fugitives and to ensure that
no free man be sacrificed to slavery. Inherent in this responsibility
was the mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
27
property without due process of law."
Frank Sanborn claimed that the Personal Liberty Laws had helped
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free him from the federal marshal at Concord. Without the law, Sanborn
maintained, "white citizens of the Commonwealth have little security
for their persons." And Andrew planned a dramatic presentation before
the legislative committee that would look into the question of repeal.
Writing to Sumner, he revealed his strategy:
"I have arranged to have
our 'Ida May' and a large number (say ten to twelve) of other handsome
and bright freed slaves, exhibited before the Committee, as persons
touching whom kidnappers might get up full 'records' and ex-parte af-
fidavits
.... A live man: woman! childl-these are great arguments
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to human hearts."
By mid-February both sides were anxious to strike a bargain. Con-
servatives were disappointed by Adams' refusal to support the movement
for repeal and recognized that the anti-abolition riots had played into
the hands of the law's supporters. They were now willing to settle for
any change that could be heralded as a gesture to the South. Radicals
feared that Lincoln might express opposition to the Personal Liberty Laws,
and were anxious to dispose of the issue before his inauguration. The
compromise forged by the legislative committee provided for only modest
alterations in the statute. It restricted to the Massachusetts Supreme
Court the power to issue writs of habeas corpu s in fugitive slave cases,
permitted claimants of alleged fugitives to testify, and allowed the
militia to quell any riot associated with the attempted return of a slave.
Put the core of the Personal Liberty Laws remained, and radicals applauded
the committee's assertion that every man on Massachusetts soil was prima
facie free and that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state from
protecting its citizens from unjust seizure. Though they preferred to
leave the laws untouched, the radicals had won a victory over those who
wanted to appease the South.
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IV
The attack upon the Personal Liberty Laws was only part of the
conservatives' offensive. Virtually all the Massachusetts anti-
Republicans agreed that the Crittenden Compromise was the key to
sectional peace. In December, the Senate's Committee of Thirteen
had refused to endorse the proposals, but during January Crittenden
campaigned for a national referendum on compromise. The Massachusetts
conservatives sought to assist the Kentuckian by pressuring their
Congressional delegation into conciliation. A committee headed by
Lawrence, Everett, Benjamin Curtis, and William Appleton, launched
a massive drive to secure signatures to a pro-Crittenden petition;
and in Boston, Mayor Nightman ordered the city's police to canvas
every residence for supporters. Collecting over 22,000 signatures
from around the state, the Union Committee delivered its flag-draped
roll of petitions to Washington in February. Crittenden presented
them to the Senate, arguing that they represented a great revolution
in popular sentiment. He noted that in the town of Scituate which had
cast 350 votes in the presidential election, the petition had gathered
328 names. In Ballardsvil le, a manufacturing hamlet with but forty-four
votes, forty-one persons had signaled their support for compromise. And
of Boston's 19,000 voters, the Senator claimed that 14,000 had supported
. . ,30his proposals.
If Crittenden's assertions were accurate, the petition indeed would
have represented a substantial force. But its validity can be questioned
on at least two grounds. First, many of those who signed the docume.it
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later claimed that they believed they had endorsed only a general plea
for compromise; others had assumed that the Crittenden proposals merely
provided for the restoration of the Missouri Compromise. Secondly,
antislavery men asserted that the petitions were filled with fraudulent
signatures, and that the sponsors had paid two dollars for every name
acquired. John Murray Forbes reported that he had overheard a boy
complain that he only had the chance to sign the petition fourteen
times. And Garrison complained that his name appeared on the list
along with those of Wendell Phillips and the deceased Theodore Parker. 31
"Warrington" condemned the petition as a farce; its sponsors he
likened to men administering a bread pill to the invalid Union. Sumner,
replying to Crittenden on the Senate floor, suggested that the signers
were ignorant of the proposals they had approved. Crittenden was very
popular in Massachusetts, Sumner maintained, and many people were will-
ing to endorse anything that had the sanction of his respectable name.
A few days later Sumner introduced his own anti-compromise petition.
Though much smaller than Crittenden's, the Massachusetts Senator in-
sisted that it represented the true spirit of the Commonwealth, which
could only be found "away from the paving stones."
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But pro-Sumner Republicans had more to worry about than merely
the relative size of petitions. Crittenden supporters hoped to attract
the support of conservative Republicans by identifying themselves with
Charles Francis Adams. Everett, Winthrop, and Saltonstall made every
effort to cultivate the Massachusetts Representative to their cause and
to blur the public distinction between Adams' Mew Mexico proposal and
the more sweeping Crittenden plan.
Adams, however, was aware of the conservatives' strategy and he
was determined to frustrate it. "The Bell-Everett people mean nothing
but mischief," he told Richard Henry Dana. "They laud me in the same
breath that they recommend the Crittenden compromise which I denounce."
In mid-January Adams had abandoned the New Mexico proposal, believing
that ft could no longer be used to divide the South. But by the end
of the month he was once again willing to promote immediate statehood
for New Mexico; now it would serve to divide Northern conservatives..
The New Mexico scheme would give Republicans of the Advertiser school
an alternative to the Crittenden compromise and keep them from be-
coming the cart behind the Bell-Everett horse. By supporting Adams,
conservative Republicans could express their desire for peace without
repudiating the Chicago platform.
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One of Crittenden's amendments created special problems for Mass-
achusetts conservatives: slavery would be protected not only in exist-
ing territories, but also in those "hereafter acquired." Such open-
ended wording troubled even the Bell-Everetts
,
though they tried to dis-
miss it as a merely abstract question. But Republicans pushed hard on
this phrase which they denounced as a "bounty on filibustering."
fcnry Pierce argued that, as it was the propensity of the Anglo-Saxon
to acquire additional land, future territorial conflicts would be in-
evitable. And Richard Henry Dana predicted that the provision would
result in "a whole string of Floridas," with white populations equal to
South Boston but with power in the Senate equal to New York.
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Despite these obstacles, conservatives were encouraged when Virginia
invited all the states to send representatives to Washington in early
February to discuss ways of promoting sectional peace. They hoped that
the "Washington Peace Convention" could become a 'vehicle for the adoption
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of the Crittenden compromise. But the first task for the Massachusetts
conservatives was to prod their state into sending a delegation. For
when the conference opened on February 4, Massachusetts was unrepresented. 35
Massachusetts Republicans were divided over the Virginia invitation.
Most radicals opposed participation in any meeting called for the purpose
of compromise. Frank Bird warned that attendance would be the first step
toward total abandonment of principle. William S. Robinson denounced the
convention as "irregular if not revolutionary," and argued that, as Vir-
ginia had invited states that were willing to offer "adequate guarantees"
for the security of slavery, Massachusetts was not included. Even some
Republicans of a moderate stripe had little use for the convention.
"There is nothing to settle, but whether there is a government or not,"
wrote Richard Henry Dana.
Initially, Andrew shared these sentiments. He advised Ohio governor
William Dennison to refrain from sending any delegates, at least until
after Lincoln's inauguaration. But Andrew retained his ability to be
strategically flexible while remaining ideologically rigid. He recog-
nized that rejecting Virginia's offer to talk was hardly the way to keep
the Border States in the Union. However futile the convention might be,
a month of speeches might fill the time remaining until inauguration
and help the Republicans take office with the capital intact. Another
consideration forcing Andrew's hand was the concern that the Common-
wealth's conservatives might send their own delegation to represent
Massachusetts. One group, meeting at the Merchants' Exchange, had al-
ready resolved that "the people" should appoint their own delegates if
37
the governor and the legislature refused.
With the exception of Sumner, the entire Massachusetts Congressional
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delegation believed that the state should attend the conference. "If
the meeting be a treasonable one," Adams wrote the governor", "the
Massachusetts delegates would, of course, be able to expose it to the
country. If not, they would appear to take some interest in any prop-
osition to reconcile differences. I am much afraid that absence would
confirm the charge of indifference." Even Sumner was not irreconcilably
opposed to sending representatives, though he remained adamant that
Massachusetts remain an example. of steadfast principle. If Massachusetts
yielded "one hair's breadth," he feared, other states would yield a
mile. He wrote that while he would not advise that the state attend,
38he would not stand in the way.
Andrew angered some radicals when he recommended to the legislature
that it authorize him to select a delegation, and furthermore, that it
refrain from issuing instructions to oppose the Crittenden proposals.
But the governor precluded any possibility that Massachusetts might
endorse compromise at the Washington Convention by appointing a commission
with unbending antislavery views. Conservatives were enraged at the
selection, but Sumner was delighted when he saw the list and discovered
that there was "not a single weak joint" on it. To lead the delegation
Andrew chose George Boutwell
, John Murray Forbes, and Lieutenant-Governor
John Z. Goodrich. The other members v/ere Andrew's own law partner,
Theophilis P. Chandler, who recently had urged a preventative war to
"drive the ruffians into the Gulf of Mexico;" Charles Allen, an old
Free-Soil warrior of the 1840's; Francis Crowinshield , former Speaker
of the Massachusetts House; and Richard P. Waters, a "stiff-backed"
39
Republican from Beverly.
The delegation met Sumner's expectations. They offered no substantive
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suggestions at Washington, drew out the proceedings as much as possible,
and voted against virtually every proposal before the assembly. George
Boutwell, who became the principle Massachusetts spokesman, declared
belligerently that if the Union could not be saved without providing
new guarantees for slavery, it was not worth saving. If secession con-
tinued, he warned, "we shall march our armies to the Gulf of Mexico,
or you will march yours to the Great Lakes." The convention's final
resolutions, prepared in the last days of February, closely resembled •
Crittenden's. The Massachusetts delegation duly opposed them, but was
unconcerned that they had passed. As Goodrich cheerfully assured
Andrew: "The recommendations of the Convention have no moral weight
whatever they might be." Congress rejected the proposals soon after
the convention disbanded, and with their failure died the hope for
political compromise. Massachusetts Republicans rejoiced at the occasion,
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CHAPTER XI
THE MINUTEMEN OF 1861
Conservatives were not surprised by the obstructions which Mass-
achusetts Republicans placed in the path of compromise. In a bitter
editorial, the Courier lamented that no other free state nurtured such
disloyalty-especially among its clergy, its intellectuals, and its
women-as Massachusetts. The paper regretted that, while Massachusetts
felt "fervid and vehement" passion toward personal liberty, it cared
little for the Union. Massachusetts' bond to the Union was self-interest
rather than sentiment-a careful calculation of the advantages which the
national attachment might bring to the state. The Post expressed a
similar opinion. It argued that Massachusetts and South Carolina were
fundamentally alike and that they had done more than any other states to
disrupt the Union. One was the birthplace of abolitionism, the other of
nullification; but both had eaten fruit from the tree of disunion.
1
Massachusetts Republicans hotly disputed any question of their national
loyalty. But there was more truth to the conservative argument than
Republicans would admit. Behind their refusal to offer substantive con-
cessions to the South was the conviction that some things were more import-
ant than the preservation of the Union. Most Republicans would save the
Union if it was within their power--but only if the cost was minimal.
They believed that the sacrifice of anti si a very principle, party integrity,
and personal pride was too great a price for the continuation of a united
nation. "Save the Union if it can be done with honor," William Claflin
2
advised Henry Dawes, "but save your honor anyhow."
There were, of course, differences among Massachusetts Republicans.
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Some conservatives, especially those in the eastern section of the state,
displayed a reverence for the Union that was barely distinguishable from
the Webster Whigs. The Newburyport Herald voiced this sentiment when it
declared that "not since the days of primeval chaos" had a people been so
free and happy as Americans under the protection of the Federal Union.
The Constitution worked so well, the Herald declared, that it was almost
as if "heaven had made us a self-regulating community." In order to pre-
serve the Union, the Herald was willing to accept the Crittenden compro-
mise.
But the unwavering Unionism of Webster and Choate, though it lived
on in the oratory of Everett, was no longer the dominant emotion of
Massachusetts. The Webster Whigs had clothed the Union with powers great-
er than that of a mere political organization. Recognizing that the
United States lacked the institutions which gave stability to other
societies— a royal family, ancient traditions, a national church—con-
servatives had given the Union the mystical attributes of divinity.
Paul Nagel discussed this phenomenon in his study of American national-
ism, One Nation Indivisible
. He saw the sanctification of the American
Union as the response of an apprehensive people "to the questions of
order and security, purpose and achievement, glory and honor." The Union
was a Gestalt, far greater than the several states that comprised it.
But when Massachusetts Republicans discussed the value of the Union, they
rarely did so in transcendental terms. They believed that the Union held
value, but that its merits were specific and tangible. Republicans ap-
preciated the freedom which it gave to trade and travel within the United
States without the constant barriers that one found in Europe. They
recognized that the Unioi promoted peace among the sections and provided
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a common shield against foreign aggression, and that it embraced a
common legal and political tradition. Republicans respected the Con-
stitution as the heritage of an honored generation of heroes and as
one of the world's foremost political documents.
4
But unlike those who defined their identity in national terms,
Bay State Republicans thought of themselves as citizens of Massachusetts
or as New Englanders. Like Southerners, their primary allegiance was to
their state and region rather than to the United States. In this they
differed from the nationalistic Republicans of the West. For New England
had a long history and a tradition that on the eve of the Civil War-was
more than three times the age of the Union under the Constitution. By
contrast, the West had no such heritage, and was in fact the offspring
of the federal government. It was natural that a Westerner would think
of himself first as an American rather than asanOhioan or Illinoisan.
Western Republicans like Lincoln held a different perspective of the
Union than men like Charles Sumner and Henry Wilson.
Hans Kohn has written that the North pursued the Civil War "for the
maintenance of imperial Union against the principle of self-determination."
Such a characterization is hardly applicable to Massachusetts Republicans;
they had formed their party in protest against large institutions— the
Catholic Church, huge factories, and the growing cities—which threatened
local control and personal responsibility. They had fought the extension
of federal authority in the 1850' s when those in power had sought to ex-
pand slavery; and this experience had left them with a fear of the corrupt-
ion of power. One of their arguments against the Crittenden proposals
was that it would give the federal government authority over the states
5
which it formerly did not have.
225
During the secession winter, Massachusetts Republicans carefully
weighed the value of the Union against the cost of Southern demands.
Generally the Union came out wanting, with some Republicans asking if
it had substance enough to save. One country paper noted that there
was "a want of nationality among our people" and suggested that no
political connection could unite people as disparate as New Engenders
and cotton planters. Perhaps, it suggested, the Union was an artificial
device that had served a purpose during the early days of continental
independence, but whose usefulness had passed. It had lasted seventy-two
years-far longer than many other governments in the world; like all the
works of man, it was mutable. Other Republicans noted that the United
States lacked many of the traditional trappings of a nation; there were
few institutions that welded North and South into a common bond. The
country had no national capital in the manner of London or Paris.
Washington served as a seat of government, but not as a national focus
for commerce or culture. Indeed, Massachusetts Congressmen had always
dreaded their return to Washington, a raw and unfinished city, permeated
with the odor of Southern slavery. More than one Republican had sug-
gested that Washington was a place the North could cheerfully abandon.
6
Some Massachusetts Republicans asserted that the Union was based
on dishonorable compromise and that it forced the North to fulfill un-
conscionable obligations. The Hampshire Gazette deplored the Constitu-
tional provisions which made the North enforce laws "purposefully designed
to be irritating and humilitating to all our ideas of self-respect and
manhood." Even Charles Francis Adams, though imbued with the nationalism
of his father, admitted that the Constitution forced the North to shelter
en institution which it vould otherwise repudiate. Massachusetts Republicans
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generally believed that slavery survived only because the Union had
preserved it. Outside the Constitution, Southern slavery would be
doomed.
Some Massachusetts Republicans ridiculed William Seward for
"making a fetish out of the Union" when the New York Senator gave an
emotional, patriotic address on January 12. Others, like the editor
of the Traveler, sympathized with Seward's sentiments but suggested
that he "threw pearls before swine" when appealing to the South.
Massachusetts' deeply-rooted anti-Southernism crucially affected the
state's response to the secession crisis. Many believed that the South
was a benighted region which regularly indulged in unspeakable atrocities
in order to uphold slavery. Even moderate newspapers like the Springfield
Republican and the Boston Evening Transcript often read like Theodore
Weld ' s Slavery As It Is, leading subscribers to presume that Southerners
o
were beyond redemption.
Massachusetts newspapers reported the continual harassment of North-
ern whites who traveled beyond Mason and Dixon's line and suggested that
impeccable proslavery credentials were needed to venture into the South.
In the months before the Civil War, Massachusetts read that travelers'
luggage was opened and searched, that teachers were expelled for Republican
sympathies, and that visitors to Mount Vernon encountered insults and
hostility. One account told of a Massachusetts citizen expelled from
Alabama when a letter from Sumner was discovered in his trunk; another
reported that a man in Virginia was made literally into a "Black Repub-
lican" when a mob seized him and covered him with printer's ink. As
the secession crisis grew darker so did the nature of the atrocities
which Massachusetts journals published. In February, the Travele r
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reported that Southerners had seized two Northern artisans, denounced
them as abolitionists, and hanged them. The case of Joseph Ribero
attracted particular attention. A carpenter working in Savannah,
Ribero allegedly said that Lincoln's election would mean the end of
slavery. For this crime, outraged Georgians shaved his head, ordered
slaves to lash him, and threw him on a Boston-bound ship. The press,
noting that the assailants had taken away Ribero's tools, urged "friends
of freedom" to help him secure employment. Republicans argued that such
incidents proved that Southerners had violated one of the basic principles
of the Union-that an American citizen should receive the protection of
any state he visited. One rural legislator asserted that a Massachusetts
man would be more secure in the Barbary States than in Virginia. Others
believed that Northerners would be safer traveling in a separate Southern
confederacy under a United States passport.
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During the secession winter, Massachusetts Republicans repeated their
now-familiar arguments about the squalor of Southern civilization. At a
time when healing words were needed to avert dissolution, Republican con-
tempt took on an added dimension. Many New Englanders believed that the
South languished in ignorance and illiteracy, that they needed "an army
of primers and elementary text books," and that their society was "an
inversion of the ordinary rules of morality." Owning slaves had made
Southerners incapable of living under republican government. In the
eyes of many Yankees the South was both odious and alien, comparable to
Turkey with its polygamy or India with its suttee. Some in Massachusetts
looked for additions from the North to replace the departed states.
"Canada will rush to our embrace," exclaimed John Alley before the House
of Representatives. Sumner and Andrew both v/elcomed such an exchange.^
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II
Historians have tended to discount the sincerity of Republicans
who, during the secession crisis, called for peaceable disunion.
David Potter, for example, has argued that all public men were well
aware that the only real options during the winter of 1860-61 were
compromise or war. Those who urged that the South be allowed to
leave the Union in peace did so only when the immediate alternative
'
was compromise. Faced with a choice of disunion and war, they chose
war. Potter is correct in noting that Republicans who urged peaceful
separation at the outset of the crisis grew more bellicose as the
winter proceeded. But he is engaging in a hindsight not available to
the men of 1851 when he suggests that compromise and war were the only
possible results. Acquiescence to peaceable secession in 1861 only
appears fanciful when viewed through the patriotic dust swept up by the
war-time North, anxious to clothe the cause of the North with divinity.
One fact seems clear: if the Massachusetts population truly loved the
Union, they would not have tolerated the disparaging comments by their
politicians, journalists, and preachers. Most Massachusetts men would
not shed their blood for the abstract virtues of the American Union.
Many clearly entertained the idea of peaceful separation.
11
The pages of the Springfield Republican trace the evolution of the
idea of peaceable secession. During November this influential mouthpiece
of moderate Republicanism argued that the principles of representative
government forbade coercing any state to remain within the Union. It
noted that, while some politicians still glorified the Union "with a
drapery of eloquent and patriotic phrases," the masses no longer believed
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its preservation to be of "infinite consequences." The citizens of
the free states, it argued, were not about to fight to keep the slave
1
2
states from departing.
By December, the Republican focused upon the process of secession.
It still maintained that the slave states were free to leave; South
Carolina could "re-annex herself to the kingdom of Dahomey" if she
wished. But the paper insisted that the Southern states leave the
Union in a constitutionally acceptable way. They should petition
Congress if they wanted to break the national tie. But until they re-
ceived the assent of a majority of the states, their actions constituted
rebellion. Under such conditions, presidential action could not be con-
sidered coercion but merely enforcement of the law. The Republican re-
minded its readers of the expense which the entire nation had borne in
the acquisition of Louisiana, Texas, and Florida; before they could
leave the Union, compensation was due. But the Republican still hoped
that separation could be accomplished orderly. When South Carolina
announced that it would send commissioners to Washington to discuss the
federal property within her borders, the paper interpreted it as a
.
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positive sign.
But as it became clear that the commissioners were issuing demands
rather than negotiating, Bowies' Republican became incensed. It was in-
tolerable, it declared, that the squalid republic of South Carolina
should try to dictate to the rest of the nation. The Republica n's rage
increased when Southerners occupied Fort Moultrie. It considered the
firing on the Star of the West to be a declaration of war: "The rebellion
at Charleston must be crushed out; Major Anderson must be reinforced; the
other forts in the harbot must be taken and held." The Republ ican
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insisted that the nation would face "anarchy and social confusion,"
if Southern lawlessness was not suppressed. But it still argued that
it was this lawlessness and not disunion per se that was the peril.
14
Nineteenth-century New Engenders strongly believed that a society
could remain healthy only so long as its citizens took responsibility
for their actions and honored their obligations to others. It was
natural that they should think of the relationship among the states in
much the same terms. The Union was not so much an indivisible or im-
mutable institution as it was a community of members, bound by common
laws. The community could survive the departure of individual members,
but it could not survive the destruction of its laws. Massachusetts
Republicans, who most strongly embodied this attitude, feared that il-
legitimate secession could become a threat to law and order throughout
the nation. This fear, combined with their belief that the South was '
growing increasingly belligerent, lead them to prepare for war.
15
As the secession winter progressed Republican journals as far apart
as the T raveler and the Tocsin came to believe that Civil War was in-
evitable. "If you cannot have peace with it in the Union," the Tocsin
remarked about the South, "by the same token and more so, you cannot out."
Republicans catalogued the conflicts that would inevitably arise between
the rival confederacies. In the area of trade alone, the potential for
confrontation was ominous. What would happen when the South attempted
to restrict the traffic on the Mississippi? Or when smugglers used the
slave states as a haven to pass untaxed goods into the North? To protect
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their economy, the free states would raise a substantial force sealing
off the long border that once had been as open as a county line. The
two confederacies, believing it their destiny, would attempt to expand
into Latin America; inevitably they would clash in Mexico and Cuba.
The North could not allow the South to re-open the barbaric trans-
Atlantic slave trade. But what would happen when the United States
hanged a Southern citizen for slaving? And what would the North do
when Southerners executed a citizen of the United States as an abolition-
ist? Peoples so inimical could not live peaceably as neighboring
republics. Let us meet the issue now, at the point of a bayonet,
James Stone wrote his friend Sumner, "rather than leave it an unhappy
legacy for my children."
As the prospect of war came closer, many appeared willing to face it.
Pel eg Chandler warned an audience at the Music Hall against the "tempta-
tions of peace." He asserted that one must inquire into "the quality
of what is called peace" before assuming it is preferable to war. He
told the story of a pacifist who denounced all recourse to arms and who
used the Mexican War as a particularly odious example. "What would you
do if you were a Mexican?" he was asked. "I'd fight to the last gasp,"
came the reply. The Adams sons were caught up in the same martial spirit.
Henry, who wrote of his desire to join "some Cromwell type of Massachusetts
regiment," believed that it would benefit the Northern cause if Anderson
and his command were murdered in cold blood. His brother Charles talked
of making Southern whites "eat the pie of humility" and handing them over
to their slaves. In the Senate, Henry Wilson spoke of those who were
preparing for the coming struggle: "farmers who till their own fee-simple
acres . . . mechanics whose hands are skilled by art . . . laborers who
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recognize no master but Almighty God." And Emerson predicted that
2,000 Concord men of Wilson's description could march at an instant's
notice.^
Massachusetts Republicans agreed that the South would be no match
for aroused Yankees. With a wary eye on both its slaves and its white
mudsill, the planter class would be unable to resist the massed forces
of the North. The Advertiser noted that Tennessee's Andrew Johnson had
suggested that "it is better to keep the North to quarrel with, than to
quarrel among ourselves." Republican newspapers offered historical evi-
dence that New England had won the War for Independence while the South
had played the role of slacker. A report that South Carolina had order-
ed her Palmetto flags from a Boston manufacturer was the occasion for
considerable mirth. Republicans argued that Southerners would have to
fight with Northern arms and wear Northern clothes with Northern buttons;
they would use lead dug in Illinois, cast into bullets in New York, and
1
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propelled by Connecticut powder.
But despite the bluster of the Republican newspapers, Massachusetts'
political leaders were worried lest the state be caught unprepared.
Andrew, working through January to ready the Commonwealth for war, relied
heavily upon his correspondents in Washington and particularly upon Sumner.
Moderates believed that Sumner was a dangerous influence. Charles Francis
Adams wrote that the Senator was "full of stories of conspiracies" and
suspected that he looked forward to bloodshed," and Henry Adams believed
the Massachusetts Senator to be "the most frightened man in Washington."
But at times Sumner could be a moderating force. Urged by Bird in early
January to issue a call for Northern mobilization, Sumner replied that
,
19
the government could defend the capital with the forces at its disposal.
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Sumner became a confidant of Edwin Stanton, Buchanan's new
Attorney-General. The two met furtively at night; and Stanton, whose
imagination was among the most active in the capital, would relay tales
of treason in high places. Believing that he had a window on the acti-
vities of the administration, Sumner hastened to convey the information
to Andrew. On January 26, he warned that Washington would be attacked
before Lincoln's inauguration. Alarmed by Sumner's reports, Andrew
asked the Senator to call on Buchanan and discover why he had failed
to answer Massachusetts' offer of military aid. The harried President
insisted that the movement of Northern troops would only foster hostili-
ties. But Sumner pressed him. "What else can Massachusetts do for the
good of the country?" the Senator asked. "Adopt the Crittenden propo-
sition," Buchanan replied. Ending the conversation, Sumner asserted that
Massachusetts would rather sink below the ocean and become a sandbank than
20
accept such dishonorable demands.
Sumner was not the only Massachusetts Congressman working to ferret
out conspiracy. Henry Dawes was one of five members of a House committee
charged with investigating reports that armed rebels were gathering near
the capital. He too was in contact with Stanton and received notes which
the Attorney-General clandestinely left at prearranged locations. And
Henry Wilson belonged to an informal vigilance committee which sought to
prevent interference with the counting of the electoral votes in February.
Like Sumner, he believed that war was imminent, though he thought that
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Massachusetts' major contribution would be money rather than men.
Andrew brought these reports to the Massachusetts legislature and
urged its members to take action. He was particularly insistent that the
state's militia law, which limited the number of men actively enrolled to
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5,000, be amended so that he could enlist all the troops he believed
necessary. On February 4, the legislature went into an unusual secret
session from which reporters and the public were barred. The members
heard little that had not been rumored in the press; but dark hints by
the Republican leadership that fighting could erupt at any time con-
vinced them to assent to the Governor's requests. Andrew received
authority to raise the troops he wanted and an emergency fund of
$100,000 to cover the expense. However, the Republican legislators •
were reluctant to bail out the bankrupt Democratic administration, and
deferred a request to guarantee $2,000,000 in federal bonds. On the
same day Virginia voters rejected immediate secession. Shortly after-
wards, the Dawes committee reported that it could discover no evidence
of an organized conspiracy within the District of Columbia; and in mid-
February the counting of the electoral votes took place without incident.
Each of these events brought some respite from the anxiety. But Mass-
achusetts' Congressmen agreed that they only had postponed the inevitable
clash. There would be no need for troops before March 4; but after the
22inauguration, conflict was certain.
Many Massachusetts Republicans had acquired a low opinion of Abraham
Lincoln in the months after the presidential election. Samuel Bowles, for
one, thought he was a "simple Susan." New Englanders sometimes tried to
cover their embarrassment with the president-elect by patronizing the
simplicity and openness of Westerners; but clearly they were displeased
with the rustic manners of their new leader. Adams feared that Lincoln
lacked the "heroic qualities" that were necessary at such a time and
interpreted his actions curing the crisis as a sign of vacillation.
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"I am much afraid," Adams wrote as he followed Lincoln's progress
from Springfield to Washington, "that in this lottery we have drawn
a blank."
23
But Lincoln's inaugural address raised his stature among Mass-
achusetts Republicans. Virtually every faction of the party, from the
Advertiser to the Bird Club, applauded it. Adams was grateful that the
President had endorsed the Constitutional amendment that would forbid
interference with slavery in the states. Though opposed by a majority
of his Massachusetts colleagues, Adams had supported the measure; and
he hoped that Lincoln's statement would silence those who had criticized
him. But even Sumner was happy with the address for its unwillingness
to compromise basic Republican doctrine. Using Napoleon's famous simile,
he called it "a hand of iron and a velvet glove." Republicans were
greatly relieved that inauguration day had passed. Many believed that,
with the party in control of the government, serious danger was ended.
"Again we have a government," John Goodrich exclaimed to Andrew; "the
inaugural is delivered and already the beat of the public pulse begins
24
to indicate returning national health."
The inaugural also unleashed a great scramble for office. Mass-
achusetts' leading Republicans were deluged with requests for patronage.
Many of the appeals were desperate, coming from men who claimed that
the economic difficulties brought on by the secession crisis made them
unable to feed their families. Others were from former officeholders
who had lost their posts for refusing to uphold the proslavery policies
of the Democratic administrations. All proclaimed their loyalty to the
Republican party, recorded their past services, and asserted that they
should share in the frui ;s of the victory. In these appeals the larger
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issues of war and peace, of union and discord, of slavery and freedom,
are lost in the pursuit for places in the Boston Customs House.
25
Massachusetts had hoped for a place in the new cabinet. The most
likely candidate was Charles Francis Adams for the Treasury post; but
the controversy over his recent political course made his appointment
impossible. The matter was sealed when Lincoln gave New England's
cabinet seat to Gideon Welles of Connecticut. Adams and Sumner were
both candidates for the Court of St. James, a rivalry that could have
further divided Massachusetts Republicans. Adams went to London, but
Sumner was assuaged when he became the chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, a post that he would make exceedingly important
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in the coming years.
It was the competition for more prosaic offices that created the
greatest friction. Old-line antislavery men were jealous at those who
lately had climbed onto the Republican bandwagon; and the editors and
publishers of Republican newspapers demanded a reward for their past
services. "I am tired, sick, and unhappy," Sumner wrote Longfellow
in mid-March. "My rooms are 'full from early morning till midnight
with office seekers." There is reason to believe, however, that Sumner
enjoyed his role as Massachusetts' chief spokesman on federal patronage.
It was only human that he, who for so long had been excluded from the
inner circles of Boston and Wasnington, should appreciate his new in-
fluence. The appointment of a Boston Postmaster and a Port Collector
was particularly important; for together they controlled hundreds of
positions. Republicans relished their dominion over these offices
which were so important to the commercial life of Massachusetts' capital
city. Pressing the claims of one candidate, Theophilis Chandler, Andrew
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crowed that State Street would have to "take off its hat to him."
"We must, be bold.. We must use power where we have it," the Governor
maintained. Chandler, he argued, would not be afraid "to use his
proper influence" to promote the Republican cause. Andrew was deter-
mined to punish his antagonists within the Republican party. Thus he
urged that Charles Hale, who wanted to be postmaster of Boston, be cut
off from all preferments. And he wrote directly to Lincoln to warn that
Nathaniel Banks was unworthy of consideration for any post. As a rebuke
to Boston for its coolness to Republican principles, Andrew and Sumner
arranged for its leading posts to go to men from outside the city. 27
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The Charleston batteries that opened fire on Fort Sumter on April 12,
abruptly ended the argument over whether the seceded states should be
allowed to depart in peace. With unanimity, Massachusetts citizens
sprang to their muskets, their bank accounts, and their Bibles, to lend
assistance to the Northern cause. Men of all parties proclaimed their
determination to suppress the rebellion and punish those who had insti-
gated the conflict. There was no suggestion from any quarter that there
was an alternative to war. For the sake of honor and manhood the agress-
ive Southern act would be answered.
If all men recognized the inevitability of the events that were un-
folding, Massachusetts was not without those who received the news from
South Carolina with foreboding. "Mr. Lincoln has plunged us into war,"
Adams wrote. He doubted the President's ability to lead and worried about
the fate of his own sons. "Vie, the children of the third and fourth
generations," he reflected, "are doomed to pay the penalties of the
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compromises made by the first." Sumner was no less appalled by the
opening of hostilities. "Alas!" he wrote Longfellow, "that I, loving
peace, should be called to take such great responsibility in a dread-
ful ghastly civil war." He lamented that the nation had not chosen
the road of amicable separation.
28
But other Republicans did not share these regrets. They eagerly
prepared to punish the South, not merely for firing on one fort, but
for a train of abuses that extended back for decades. The deep-seated
hostility against the alien slave society raised the emotions of the
post-Sumter days to a fever pitch. Some hotspur Yankees talked of
turning South Carolina into a desert and sowing its fields with salt.
Confident of their own superiority, they believed the task would be
completed before summer's end. Massachusetts Republicans also calculated
that the manner in which the war had begun was to their advantage. With
the onus on the South, their cause would be strengthened. Even the
Boston Recorder thanked God for allowing the North to begin the struggle
29
with a clear conscience.
The Garrisonians recognized that, despite its attendant horrors, the
war could bring about the abolition jubilee. Garrison himself urged sup-
porters to hold their criticism on the conduct of the administration.
"There must be no needless turning of popular violence upon ourselves,"
he warned. Abolitionists must practice circumspection to avoid divisions
in the North. He was confident that the war—which some fought only to
save the Union—would turn into a war that would free the slaves.
Phillips, who on April 9 had urged that Massachusetts not fight to keep
the slave states within the Union, recanted after the firing on Sumter.
For the first time in his life, he told a massive' crowd , he was proud to
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stand beneath the emblem of the national government. "Today the
slave asks but a sight of this banner, and calls it the twilight of
his redemption; today it represents sovereignty and justice." Blacks
were no less enthusiastic. They crowded into a Boston Baptist church
to pledge 50,000 troops if the color bar on enlistment were lifted.
30
Conservatives were likewise ready to prosecute the war. Everett
argued that defeating the rebels was the only way to save the country
from "general anarchy and confusion." The Courier 's motto was "Our
County, Right or Wrong." Though it blamed Lincoln for bringing on the
war and denounced those who talked of reducing Charleston to ashes, the
paper urged every citizen to support the federal government. At Boston's
Jackson Club the members proclaimed that, despite their sympathy for the
South, they would fight to sustain the Constitution. The commercial
community was also eager to prove its loyalty. Boston's banks loaned
$3,500,000 to the federal treasury and gave substantial aid to the Mass-
achusetts mobilization. The operators of railroads and steamship lines
offered to transport troops; and counting houses promised to continue
their clerks' salaries while they were off at war. Some merchants ap-
peared relieved that the period of ambiguity was over. "Anything like
certainty, even with an unfavorable result," the Commercial Bulletin
31
explained, "is better than a period of suspense."
Amos Lawrence was among those to offer his services to the govern-
ment. In the days after Sumter, he urged his friends in the Border
States to rally their people for the Union. He warned Crittenden that
the North "is becoming one great army" and that Kentucky would be "saved
or ruined in proportion -?s she supports or refuses to support the govern-
ment." If the Border States remained loyal, Lawrence wrote, a purely
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sectional war could be avoided. But if they went with the Confederacy,
the North would invade the South and destroy slavery. 32
Massachusetts citizens showed their enthusiasm for the war effort
in a variety of ways. Ladies wore the tricolor on their dresses and
ir.ade flannel shirts and bandages for the departing troops. "Here are
my two sons," one woman in Marblehead cried out; "I am sorry I have not
more to go." When a ship from Savannah arrived in Boston flying a
secessionist flag, a mob forced the crew to take it down and then ripped
it into pieces. Northampton's Zachary Eddy, who had earlier enumerated
the evils of war, now welcomed the conflict as a time for national re-
generation. "History has always recognized something Divine in national
enthusiasm," he told Hampshire County volunteers. "The conflagration
33
of patriotism ... is kindled by the breath of God."
On April 15, Henry Wilson notified Andrew that Massachusetts' initial
military quota was 1,200 men. The Governor chafed that the number was so
low, but he immediately set to work answering the call. His earlier prep-
arations payed handsome dividends as militiamen moved rapidly into Boston
from every corner of the state. The sense of urgency was due not only to
the prospect that rebel troops might be marching on Washington, but to a
determination that Massachusetts must place the first troops in the field.
Andrew did not overlook the politics of mobilization. He commissioned
young conservatives as a way to bind their merchant fathers to the success
of the war. And he placed Benjamin Butler in charge of the state's troops
to diffuse the charge that the conflict would be fought along partisan
34
lines.
Thousands streamed into Boston on April 17, to watch the Sixth Regi-
ment depart for Washington. Andrew reviewed the troops from the State
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House steps. Avoiding controversy, he spoke but briefly and exhorted
the soldiers to defend the flag and return it with honor. The Sixth
became the first armed regiment to arrive in Washington's defense.
But before they reached the capital, they also became the first to
shed blood. On April 19-the anniversary of the Battle of Lexington-
Massachusetts soldiers, passing through Baltimore, fought a mob of
secessionist sympathizers and suffered four casualties. Rage was
mingled with pride when the news reached Boston. Demands that Baltimore
be raised to the ground coincided with praise for the Massachusetts
troops. "Everybody in Massachusetts seems to be contratulating himself
that he is a citizen of such a state," wrote "Warrington."
And so the men of Massachusetts marched off to war. United by their
determination to defeat the Confederacy, they were divided in their motives.
Many, lured by the bright uniforms and the spirit of the bands, had little
notion of why they were fighting, but were glad to join this new adventure
and leave a dull life behind. Yet others had firm intentions. Some went'
because they wanted tc free the slaves, some to save the Union, and some
to serve the South its "pie of humility." Few suspected that long years *
would intervene before peace returned to the nation or the terrible cost
in lives and twisted bodies that the war would exact. Neither did they
realize that the war would hasten the demise of the Massachusetts they
were leaving. For the Massacnusetts of the farmer and artisan, of en-
thusiastic reform, of Anglo-Saxon Protestant dominance, would become a
distant memory in the post-war world. For the moment, however, Mass-
achusetts' men might think of themselves as "Minutemen of 1861" off to defend
their way of life from an alien threat.
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